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ABSTRACT  
   
Social-ecological systems (SES) are replete with hard and soft human-made 
components (or infrastructures) that are consciously-designed to perform specific 
functions valued by humans. How these infrastructures mediate human-environment 
interactions is thus a key determinant of many sustainability problems in present-day SES. 
This dissertation examines the question of how some of the designed aspects of physical 
and social infrastructures influence the robustness of SES under global change. Due to 
the fragility of rural livelihood systems, locally-managed common-pool resource systems 
that depend on infrastructure, such as irrigated agriculture and community forestry, are of 
particular importance to address this sustainability question. This dissertation presents 
three studies that explored the robustness of communal irrigation and forestry systems to 
economic or environmental shocks.  The first study examined how the design of 
irrigation infrastructure affects the robustness of system performance to an economic 
shock. Using a stylized dynamic model of an irrigation system as a testing ground, this 
study shows that changes in infrastructure design can induce fundamental changes in 
qualitative system behavior (i.e., regime shifts) as well as altered robustness 
characteristics. The second study  explored how connectedness among social units (a 
kind of social infrastructure) influenced the post-failure transformations of large-N forest 
commons under economic globalization. Using inferential statistics, the second study 
argues that some attributes of the social connectedness that helped system robustness in 
the past made the system more vulnerable to undesirable transformations in the current 
era. The third study explored the question of how to guide adaptive management of SES 
for more robustness under uncertainty. This study used an existing laboratory behavioral 
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experiment in which human-subjects tackle a decision problem on collective management 
of an irrigation system under environmental uncertainty. The contents of group 
communication and the decisions of individuals were analyzed to understand how 
configurations of learning-by-doing and other adaptability-related conditions may be 
causally linked to robustness under environmental uncertainty. The results show that 
robust systems are characterized by two conditions: active learning-by-doing through 
outer-loop processes, i.e., frequent updating of shared assumptions or goals that underlie 
specific group strategies, and frequent monitoring and reflection of past outcomes. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
  
 Resources held in common, or common-pool resources (CPR), play an important 
role in supporting the livelihoods of countless rural populations (Jodha 1990). The world 
is filled with cases of social-ecological systems (SES) in which CPR are actively used 
and managed to support the local livelihoods. Such systems include, for example, 
irrigated agriculture (Siy 1980, Wade 1988a), community forestry (McKean 1986), and 
coastal fisheries (Acheson 1988). It is important to note that, in these critical systems, 
humans do not interact with their resource base directly. Instead, these interactions are 
mediated by some kind of human-made components (or infrastructures) that are 
consciously designed to perform specific functions valued by humans (Anderies et al. 
2004).  
 For example, in many agricultural systems, humans build and maintain hard 
human-made infrastructure such as canals and dams to obtain a steady supply of water 
resources. This physical infrastructure enables humans to expand and stabilize 
agricultural production levels despite fluctuations in natural water availability. Further, 
humans often craft and deploy soft human-made infrastructure, such as institutional 
arrangements and organizational forms, to govern a SES. This type of social 
infrastructure brings order and regularity to human interactions with resource systems, as 
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well as to human behavior to each other, and thus facilitates collective action (North 
1990). In short, many SES (particularly those in which CPR are managed) are partially 
designed or engineered with some kind of physical and social infrastructures that 
intervene how humans interact with the environment.  
 Furthermore, the current era has witnessed the deepening of global change that 
generates high degrees of complexity and uncertainty in the dynamic elements of SES 
(Dietz et al. 2003, Polasky et al. 2011). Economic globalization and global environmental 
change have brought profound changes on the challenges faced by locally-managed SES 
(Young et al. 2006, Adger et al. 2009). How these novel conditions affect feedbacks 
among SES components, such as resource systems, human behavior and society, and 
physical and social infrastructures, are poorly understood (Brashares 2010). Given these 
trends, a sustainability question of great importance is: how infrastructure (and its 
design) shape the dynamics of SES in the face of global change-induced 
disturbances.  
 In this thesis, I explore this broad question using examples of communal irrigation 
and forestry systems as a testing ground. Note that the role of infrastructure is clearly 
present in these exemplary systems. Specifically, I study the dynamics of these systems 
in the context of the collective action problems associated with the maintenance of 
infrastructure and the appropriation of CPR (Ostrom et al. 1994, Dayton-Johnson 2003). 
Further, I focus on one particular aspect of system dynamics—robustness of system 
performance under collective action problems and global change. Robustness, which is 
conceptually similar to engineering resilience (Holling and Meffe 1996) and specified 
resilience (Carpenter et al. 2001, Folke et al. 2010), relates to the sensitivity or resistance 
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of some desired system outputs to disturbances (Carlson and Doyle 2002, Csete and 
Doyle 2002). Both concepts of robustness and resilience concern some aspects of ability 
to maintain desired system characteristics or function despite fluctuations in the behavior 
of its internal parts or external environment  (Folke 2006, Anderies et al. 2013b). I favor 
the use of robustness throughout this thesis because it is more in line with how designed 
systems withstand shocks and maintain functions, compared to resilience (Janssen and 
Anderies 2013).  
 This thesis progresses through the following chapters. In Chapter 2, I used a 
dynamic model of a farmer-managed irrigation system to explore how design variations 
in physical infrastructure may induce regime shifts and altered robustness characteristics 
in the model system. Specifically, I examined the effects of two designed features—
threshold of infrastructure maintenance and asymmetric access to irrigation water—on 
the long-term dynamics of the model irrigation system. 
  In Chapter 3, I explored the effect of organizational form or social 
connectedness (a kind of social infrastructure) on the robustness and transformability of 
self-governed forest commons. I conducted secondary analysis using an existing case 
study data of 89 self-governed forest commons (Kang 2001) to study the effect of the 
social infrastructure. These self-governed systems developed an intricate web of 
connectedness among social units to implement nested enterprises (Ostrom 1990). I 
investigated how some of the designed aspects of the nested enterprises influenced the 
trajectories of SES transformation under economic globalization.  
 In Chapter 4, I researched the question of how to guide adaptive management of 
an infrastructure-dependent SES under environmental uncertainty. To tackle this puzzle, I 
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used an existing laboratory behavioral experiment (Anderies et al. 2013a) in which 
human-subjects face a set of decision problems on collective management of an irrigation 
infrastructure under environmental uncertainty. By examining the iterated decision-
making and learning processes undergone by the human-subjects, I tried to uncover 
configurations of learning processes and supporting conditions that may be causally 
linked to system robustness.  
 Finally, in Chapter 5, I synthesize my research findings, and then reflect on what 
could be design criteria of physical and social infrastructure for more robust SES. In the 
remainder of this introductory chapter, I introduce some of the key concepts that are often 
referred to throughout the thesis: robustness of social-ecological system, notable 
frameworks and system-level properties related to SES dynamics (the Robustness 
framework, the SES framework, resilience, robustness, and resilience engineering), and 
collective action and self-governance of the commons. 
 
1.2. Robustness of social-ecological system 
 
 The social-ecological systems approach (Berkes et al. 2003) and the similar lines 
of thinking (Turner et al. 2003, Liu et al. 2007) have received much scholarly attention in 
the recent years. These approaches have helped us better understand complex patterns 
and feedbacks not evident when ecological systems or social systems are studied 
separately. In this thesis, I adopt a definition of social-ecological system developed by 
Anderies et al. (2004): "the subset of social systems in which some of the interdependent 
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relationships among humans are mediated through interactions with biophysical and non-
human biological units". Social-ecological system (SES) is a kind of complex adaptive 
system that can self-organize and adapt in a changing environment (Levin and Clark 
2010, Levin et al. 2012). It is composed of multiple components (e.g., natural system, 
individuals and their behavior, and physical and social infrastructures) that locally 
interact to generate system-level dynamics that are often emergent and unpredictable. 
Throughout the thesis, I focus on a particular kind of SES—highly-engineered or 
infrastructure-dependent SES in which the role of physical infrastructure, social 
infrastructure, or both is clearly present. 
 Managing an infrastructure-dependent SES through global change is a task 
riddled with an irreducible amount of uncertainty in coupled social and ecological 
processes. Change and surprise are inevitable because components of SES often interact 
across scales and levels of organization (Holling and Meffe 1996, Gallopin et al. 2001, 
Berkes 2007). It is thus impossible to know in advance all disturbances that threaten a 
SES and their probabilities, and to be prepared for them through preemptive measures 
(Polasky et al. 2011). Hence, a critical challenge for sustainability is how we can 
facilitate the capacity of an infrastructure-dependent SES to maintain their 
functions in the face of unexpected and emergent threats. 
 Due to the fragility of rural livelihood SES, communal systems of natural 
resources that depend on infrastructure, such as irrigated agriculture and community 
forestry, are of particular importance to address this sustainability challenge. A major 
kind of threat faced by these systems is collective action problems—a conflict between 
individual and group-level interests (Olson 1965, Sandler 1992, Kollock 1998). For 
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example, farmers in irrigation communities of the developing world often face collective 
action problems associated with infrastructure maintenance and resource appropriation 
(Ostrom 1990). Because it is often difficult to exclude non-contributors of infrastructure 
maintenance from deriving benefits from the infrastructure, the problem of free-riding 
can spread and hinder adequate maintenance of infrastructure. Moreover, one person's 
consumption of resources often leads to a reduced amount of the resources available to 
others. Benefits of excessive resource consumption by one individual solely accrue to 
that individual, while associated negative effects (e.g., resource depletion) are shared by 
all others (negative externality). In this type of circumstances, self-interested rational 
actors would make behavioral choices that constrain positive externality (under-provision 
of infrastructure from free-riding) and foster negative externality (resource degradation or 
depletion from over-use of resources). 
 On top of the collective action problems, global change driven by climate change 
and economic globalization has had significant effects on the sustainability of communal 
systems of natural resources and people's livelihoods (e.g., O’Brien and Leichenko 2000, 
Adger et al. 2009). For example, as economic globalization deepens, users will likely 
gain more exit options to their traditional livelihood dependence on CPR: an increased 
availability of substitute goods (e.g., imported oil and coal replacing firewood) or new 
livelihood opportunities (e.g., Baker 1997, Adams et al. 1997).  Economic value of CPR 
will likely be less salient in such situations, and this will, in turn, weaken the incentives 
for collective action (Basurto and Ostrom 2009). Further, impacts of climate change are 
becoming more apparent around the world on ecosystem structure and function (Walther 
et al. 2002, Grimm et al. 2013), global food production (Parry et al. 2004), and human 
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health (Patz et al. 2005). Under these novel conditions, communal SES with existing 
physical and social infrastructures may be stretched beyond their capacity to perform and 
maintain their intended functions on their own. To sum it up, in the current era of global 
change, infrastructure-dependent SES have to deal with multiple stressors that originate 
from collective action problems, economic globalization, and climate change.  
 Building on the above discussion, I tackle the following specific questions related 
to the robustness of  infrastructure-dependent SES. First, how designed aspects of 
physical infrastructure or organizational form affect the incentives that users face in 
collective action problems associated with infrastructure maintenance and resource 
appropriation and how such effects, in turn, influence the robustness of SES to 
globalization and climate change-related disturbances? This question is important 
because, although much understanding has been gained on the design of institutional 
arrangements linked to collective action, we still do not know enough about the effect of 
physical infrastructure design and organizational form on the robustness of SES. Second, 
in the face of uncertainty, how can we guide adaptive management of 
infrastructure-dependent SES for more robustness? This question attempts to address 
a long-standing research problem in the field of adaptive management of natural 
resources. Adaptive management is a learning-focused approach in which resource 
managers engage in iterated decision-making and learning to manage their resource 
system through uncertainty (Walters and Holling 1990). Although the concept of adaptive 
management of natural resources has been around for more than three decades, the 
evidence in support of  the approach does not show what type of learning process is most 
effective and under what conditions for success (Biggs et al. 2012, Fabricius and Cundill 
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2014). More nuanced understanding is needed on what characterizes configurations of 
learning process and underlying conditions that may be causally linked to robustness 
under uncertainty. 
 
1.3. Frameworks, resilience, and robustness. 
 
 To study the dynamics of SES over time, it is useful to have a conceptual 
framework that organizes key components and interactions within SES, as well as a 
system-level property that represents how well a SES can maintain its function in the face 
of change. Some of the notable frameworks for this purpose include the SES Framework 
(Ostrom 2007, 2009) and the Robustness Framework (Anderies et al. 2004), among 
others. Two system-level properties are widely cited in the SES-related literature: 
resilience as developed in ecology and the SES research (Holling 1973, Walker et al. 
2004) and in safety management of built systems (Hollnagel 2014) and robustness as 
developed in robust control of feedback systems (Csete and Doyle 2002, Anderies et al. 
2004). There is also the concept of vulnerability, which can be thought of as the opposite 
of resilience or robustness (Folke et al. 2002) or "a function of the exposure of a system 
and its sensitivity to stress, shocks, and adverse change, and its capacity to cope with and 
adapt to such disturbances" (Adger et al. 2009). In the SES literature, vulnerability is 
typically used in the context of household-level capacity to maintain livelihoods in the 
face of disturbances (Adger 2006). Since I am more interested in the system-level 
dynamics of SES, vulnerability will only be sparsely discussed throughout the thesis. 
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1.3.1. The Robustness framework 
 
 The Robustness Framework emphasizes infrastructure-related aspects of SES. As 
shown in Figure 1.1, it conceptualizes a SES as an aggregate of four main components: 
resource, resource users, public infrastructure, and public infrastructure providers. The 
key interactions among the four components can be summarized as follows. Resource is 
appropriated by resource users (link 1). Resource users build and maintain some kind of 
public infrastructure (link 6). This infrastructure can be either hard human-made 
infrastructure such as dams and canals that makes resources available for appropriation 
by resource users (link 4) or soft human-made infrastructure such as social institutions 
that intervenes how resource users appropriate resources (link 5). Moreover, not all of the 
resource users may be involved in maintaining the public infrastructure. There may exist 
a separate entity (public infrastructure provider) such as a government agency that 
interacts with resource users (link 2) and produces public infrastructure (link 3). The four 
components are also exposed to disturbances from outside. Social, economic, or political 
disturbances (link 8) such as economic development and political regime changes can 
affect resource users and public infrastructure providers. Biophysical disturbances (link 7) 
such as climate variability and natural disasters affect resource and public infrastructure. 
Taken together, these components and interactions provide a useful common vocabulary 
or meta-theoretical common language that we can use to study the dynamics of SES 
under collective action problems and biophysical and socioeconomic disturbances.  
Figur
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contains detailed attributes in the lower tier, which may then be expanded recursively into 
another lower tier with more detailed attributes. Thus, the SES Framework is both 
ontological and diagnostic (Poteete et al. 2010). It is ontological in the sense that it views 
a SES as a system within another system in hierarchy (thus, elegantly capturing the 
complexity of SES). It is also diagnostic because it allows institutional analysts to 
pinpoint an appropriate level of system and attributes for diagnosing problems. 
 
1.3.3. Resilience of SES 
 
 Two system-level properties are often used to study the persistence of SES in the 
face of change: resilience and robustness. Resilience, rooted in ecology (Holling 1973), is 
a cluster of concepts that has recently expanded to study how SES persist and transform 
among multiple regimes of self-organizing processes: resilience as persistence, 
adaptability, and transformability (Walker et al. 2004, Carpenter and Brock 2008, Folke 
et al. 2010). It is formally defined as "the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and 
reorganize while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same function, 
structure and feedbacks, and therefore identity " (Folke et al. 2010). Resilience can be 
further classified into general resilience and specified resilience (Carpenter et al. 2001, 
Folke et al. 2010). General resilience refers to the general capacity of a system to deal 
with all kinds of disturbances, both expected and unexpected ones. Hence, adaptability 
and transformability are important elements for general resilience. Specified resilience, in 
contrast, is about "resilience of what to what" (Carpenter et al. 2001). It focuses on the 
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capacity of a system to maintain a specific function in relation to a particular disturbance. 
At its core, resilience thinking is about the aspects of self-organizing processes that 
generate multiple regimes (also referred to as stable attractors or basins of attraction), 
thresholds that divide those regimes, and how critical transitions may occur among them 
from a seeming small change in a variable (regime shift). Finally, resilience by itself does 
not address normative considerations. That is, a regime, whether good or bad to human 
well-being, can be still resilient. In short, resilience thinking highlights endogenous 
processes that generate multiple regimes and does not address normative considerations 
that may be central to SES managed by humans for a purpose. 
 Consider the cases of intentionally-designed SES that are with little endogenous 
processes and are invariable in short to medium run. How can we identify thresholds and 
multiple stable attractors for them? How can we conceptualize adaptability and 
transformability in such invariable, designed systems? Because of ambiguities of 
resilience ideas in relation to these questions, some scholars have argued that resilience is 
conceptually difficult to apply to SES that are designed with human intent to perform 
specific functions (Anderies et al. 2004, Janssen and Anderies 2013, Krupa et al. 2014). 
This argument motivates us to consider another system-level property that we can use to 
study the persistence of SES in the face of change, i.e., robustness.  
 
1.3.4. Robustness of SES 
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 Robustness, rooted in engineering, relates to the sensitivity of some desired 
system outputs to internal or external perturbations (Carlson and Doyle 2002, Csete and 
Doyle 2002). Application of robustness ideas to a system requires a precise definition of 
system boundary and at least one output or performance measure (Anderies et al. 2013b). 
Robustness is a disturbance-specific concept; it represents a degree of resistance relative 
to a particular disturbance. Hence, application of robustness ideas leads us to consider 
potential tradeoffs in robustness of a system output to different disturbances that may 
occur as a result a design change.  
 Inspired by the work of theoretical engineers on robustness and robust control of 
feedback systems, a group of SES scholars have extended the concept of robustness to 
the study of SES (Anderies et al. 2004, Lam 2006, Shivakoti and Bastakoti 2006, Krupa 
et al. 2014). Their rationale for the adoption of robustness is that many SES contain 
human-made components that are designed to help maintain system performance in the 
face of some variability, a prime example of which is irrigation infrastructure (Anderies 
et al. 2013b, Janssen and Anderies 2013). In a typical farmer-managed irrigation system, 
farmers sense outcomes and conditions (e.g., water availability) and then dynamically 
adjust their infrastructure maintenance and water appropriation levels according to 
institutions that act as a feedback control mechanism (e.g., Cifdaloz et al. 2010). Such 
feedback controls help farmers to achieve stable crop production levels despite 
fluctuations in conditions.  
 Further, a fundamental property of all feedback systems is that designed features 
that confer robustness to certain kinds of disturbances cause the systems to harbor hidden 
fragilities to unexposed disturbances (Csete and Doyle 2002). This robust yet fragile 
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nature of feedback systems provides an important insight to SES management because 
patterns of shifting fragilities have been indeed observed in some SES despite human 
efforts to build robustness (e.g., Anderies 2006, Janssen et al. 2007). The notions of 
feedback control for robustness and tradeoffs in robustness are not explicitly considered 
in resilience thinking. Given these differences between robustness and resilience, 
robustness, though less well known than resilience, is the more fitting conceptual tool 
with which we can study the dynamics of SES that depend on physical or social 
infrastructure. Throughout this thesis, I use the concept of robustness more often because 
the irrigation and forestry systems that I study are partially designed with some physical 
or social infrastructure to achieve a certain performance objective. 
 
1.3.5. Resilience engineering of built systems 
 
 There is also the concept of resilience engineering, which views resilience as "the 
intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its functioning prior to, during, or following changes 
and disturbances, so that it can sustain required operations under both expected and 
unexpected conditions" (Hollnagel et al. 2011). Inspired by the concept of resilience as 
developed in ecology and the SES research, safety management engineers and policy 
makers have recently begun to embrace resilience engineering as a viable approach to 
complement their existing safety management approach of complex infrastructure 
systems (Fiksel 2003, Hollnagel et al. 2006). Engineers working with infrastructure 
systems have traditionally focused on robustness, i.e., how to reduce the sensitivity of a 
15 
desired system output to a known set of disturbances. To attain robustness, engineers 
typically use the risk-based engineering approach, which entails identification of all 
possible threats and their probabilities through risk analysis and implementation 
appropriate designed fixes to deal with those threats in advance. However, in the face of 
global change, this kind of approach is insufficient for sustaining infrastructure systems 
because it is impossible to predict all possible threats (especially the once in one-
hundred-year type disturbances) and their probabilities. 
 This realization has motivated some safety management professionals to consider 
resilience engineering as a complementary approach to the conventional risk-based 
engineering. The basic idea is to complement the conventional approach by investing in 
and improving the general capacity of a system to adapt to changing conditions and to 
effectively deal with and recover from all kinds of disturbances. Hollnagel (2014) 
outlines four main abilities that constitute resilience engineering: the ability to respond to 
various kinds of disturbances (both familiar and unfamiliar ones), the ability to monitor 
what is going on (e.g., the status of system performance, ecological conditions, and 
human behavior), the ability to learn from the consequences of past decision-making, and 
the ability to anticipate and proactively adapt to changing conditions. Although these 
insights provide only conceptual guidelines, they are useful heuristics with which we can 
work to enhance SES adaptability. In a nutshell, resilience engineering can be thought of 
as a form of general resilience heuristics applied to built systems. It is crucial to note that 
resilience engineering is intended to complement the conventional risk-based approach, 
not to replace it.  
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1.3.6. Coalescing robustness and resilience engineering 
 
 The two fields of robustness of SES and resilience engineering may be on a path 
to convergence unknowingly because both concepts in fact argue about similar issues and 
solutions to deal with the challenge of maintaining SES in the face of change. Safety 
management professionals, who have traditionally focused on robustness through risk 
analysis, are now beginning to embrace resilience engineering to improve adaptability to 
deal with all kinds of disturbances. That is, they are expanding their focus from 
considering tradeoffs in robustness of infrastructure systems to different disturbances to 
more a general form of resilience of coupled infrastructure and social systems to deal 
with irreducible uncertainty. In comparison, the research on robustness of SES has its 
roots on the opposite side—a group of scholars who have worked with resilience thinking 
felt that it is conceptually difficult to apply resilience ideas to SES with strong presence 
of designed components. Further, they felt that resilience thinking does not explicitly 
address the patterns of tradeoffs in robustness in SES that result from efforts to build 
robustness to a particular disturbance. As such, they embraced the concept of robustness 
to better reflect the persistence of and robustness-fragility tradeoffs associated with 
infrastructure-dependent SES.  
 However, one must realize that adoption of robustness ideas does not mean 
rejection of resilience and vice versa. Robustness scholars argue that when the time scale 
of analysis is in the units of decades or longer, resilience may be a more fitting 
conceptual tool because it incorporates aspects such as adaptability and transformability 
that begin to matter in such longer time scales (Anderies et al. 2013b). When the time 
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scale is shorter (i.e., in the units of few years or months) and system boundaries are 
narrowly-defined (i.e., a small-scale irrigation system), robustness may be more fitting 
because it explicitly deals with the sensitivity of a well-defined system output to a 
particular shock and the shifting fragilities that may result from design choices. Hence, 
resilience and robustness are complementary concepts—the choice between the two 
concepts ultimately depends on the nature of system boundary, time-scale, and the 
specificity of output measure that one is considering (ibid).  
 Robustness scholars also show how robustness and resilience relate to each other 
through the intermediary role of adaptability (ibid). In a short term, social actors 
managing a SES can achieve robustness by deciding which disturbances they want to be 
robust against and which fragilities they can live with at a particular point in time. 
Robustness better facilitates this process because it forces analysts to consider a precise 
system boundary and output measure and potential robustness-fragility tradeoffs 
associated with design choices. In a longer term, adaptability can be used to navigate 
through robustness-fragility tradeoffs. In response to a changing environment, actors can 
sense changing conditions and learn to dynamically adapt their system robustness 
characteristics.  That is, by constantly adjusting decisions to achieve short-term 
robustness at a particular point in time through the exploration of robustness-fragility 
tradeoffs, social actors may be able to achieve long-term resilience to deal with all kinds 
of change and uncertainty. Hence, robustness and resilience are closely related concepts 
and complement each other. 
 Similarly, resilience engineering does not claim that resilience is a panacea and 
should replace the conventional risk-based approach. It simply argues that risk analysis 
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alone is insufficient for dealing with uncertainty associated with global change and thus 
should be complemented by improved adaptability to deal with all kinds of shocks (Park 
et al. 2013). Hence, one could interpret the four main abilities of resilience engineering 
(the ability to respond to various kinds of disturbances, the ability to monitor what is 
going on, the ability to learn from the consequences of past decision-making, and the 
ability to anticipate and proactively adapt to changing conditions) as system adaptability 
characteristics that are needed to achieve long-term resilience via short-term robustness 
built through maneuvering robustness-fragility tradeoffs. In short, both concepts 
acknowledge robust-yet-fragile nature of SES with designed components. Scholars in 
both fields also suggest that general resilience-related aspects such as adaptability are 
needed to cope with hidden fragilities associated with unexposed shocks. Hence, a 
possible area of future research may be to explore ways in which the concepts of 
resilience engineering and robustness of SES can be coalesced to create a unified 
conceptual tool with which engineers, ecologists, and social scientists can work to 
understand the sustainability of infrastructure-dependent SES. 
 
1.4. Collective action and the self-governance of the commons 
 
 Common-pool resources (CPR) are defined by two characteristics: high cost of 
exclusion and subtractability in use (NRC 1986, Berkes et al. 1989, Feeny et al. 1990). 
High cost of exclusion means that it is costly or difficult to exclude outsiders or those 
who do not hold rights from accessing and using the resource. For example, a large forest 
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commons cannot be easily enclosed and monitored 24 hours per day to prevent outsiders 
from accessing the resource. Likewise, it is difficult to enclose and monitor mobile 
resources such as migrating stocks of fish. Subtractability in use means that one person's 
resource consumption leads to less of the resource available to others. An amount of fish, 
forest resources, and irrigation water appropriated by one user subtracts from what is 
available to other users.  
 These two characteristics of CPR open the door to two types of collective action 
problems: provision and appropriation problems (Ostrom et al. 1994). Provision problem 
concerns how to motivate users to contribute to a shared infrastructure (e.g., irrigation 
infrastructure) that makes resources available for appropriation. Overcoming the problem 
of provision, however, is difficult because of the high cost of exclusion. Users face 
temptation to free-ride by taking benefits from the shared infrastructure without making 
contributions to it. Appropriation problem concerns how to curb an individual's excessive 
resource consumption. Because benefits of one individual's resource consumption accrue 
solely to that individual while resulting negative effects (e.g., resource degradation) are 
shared by all others, individuals face temptation to take as much resources as possible 
while they last.  
 In the absence of proper incentive mechanisms, self-interested, rational actors will 
likely act to pursue individual gain and harm group interest when facing the collective 
action problems (Sally 1995, Kollock 1998). Under-provision of infrastructure (less of 
positive externality) and excessive consumption of resources (more of negative 
externality) are probable in such situations. Thus, SES in which CPR are managed will 
likely be on the path to the tragedy of commons unless institutions are devised to restrain 
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excessive resource appropriation and promote contributions to shared infrastructure 
(Ostrom 1990).  
 Creation and enforcement of institutions, however, are difficult in their own right 
because they entail a second-order provision problem (Kollock 1998, Boyd and Mathew 
2007, Ostrom 2008). Creation and enforcement of institutions incur costs on those who 
supply them as shared social infrastructure, but the resulting benefits are shared by many. 
If it is difficult for humans to overcome the first-order problems of provision and 
appropriation of commons, why would they solve the even more difficult problems of 
creating and enforcing institutions at a cost to themselves? Because of the inherent 
collective action problems and the prevailing view that humans are self-interested 
rational actors, the conventional wisdom of natural resource management until the 1980s 
has been that either state control or privatization of commons is needed to prevent the 
destruction of natural resources (Poteete et al. 2010). This conventional thinking, 
however, has been debunked by numerous comparative studies of field cases (NRC 1986, 
2002, Wade 1988a, Ostrom 1990, Baland and Plateau 1996), behavioral experiments of 
commons dilemma (Ostrom et al. 1992, Janssen et al. 2010, 2011a), and mathematical 
models (Sethi and Somanathan 1996) that demonstrated the capacity of humans to self-
organize and overcome the provision and appropriation problems. 
 Douglas North defines institutions as "humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction", and asserts that the main role of institutions is to "reduce uncertainty 
by providing a structure to everyday life" (North 1990). Elinor Ostrom refers to 
institutions as "rules that humans use when interacting within a wide variety of repetitive 
and structured situations at multiple levels of analysis" (Ostrom 2005a). These 
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characterizations of institutions explain why institutions help humans to overcome 
collective action problems. Because humans tend to be rational (or boundedly-rational) 
actors with imperfect information, we often feel uncertain about the future actions of 
others in collective action situations and expect others to feel the same way (North 1990). 
Hence, trust is difficult to emerge, and it is costly for humans to transact with others to 
achieve productive outcomes in collective action situations. The beneficial role of 
institutions is that they alleviate such a state of uncertainty and lower the cost of 
transaction by brining structure and order to our everyday interactions with others (ibid). 
Such a state of structure and order creates an environment conducive for trusting 
relationships to develop and collective action to follow (Ostrom and Ahn 2003).  
 However, institutions incur transaction costs on those who supply and enforce 
them as shared social infrastructure. Transaction costs are defined as costs of exchange or 
costs of measuring and enforcing contractual agreements (Coase 1937, North 1990, 
Ménard and Shirley 2008). For example, enforcing a rule on restraining the amount of 
catch in a fishery may incur substantial monitoring and sanctioning cost to those involved. 
If the benefits of deploying institutions do not outweigh the transaction costs of doing so, 
people will not follow and maintain the institutions. Then, from an institutional design 
perspective, a key challenge to overcoming collective action problems surrounding the 
commons is how to devise institutions that can promote and sustain collective action 
without excessive transaction costs. 
 Through comparative analyses of case studies of commons, a number of scholars 
identified commonly-occurring features of long-lasted CPR management regimes (Wade 
1988a, Ostrom 1990, Baland and Plateau 1996, see Agrawal 2002 for a comparative 
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analysis). Among these, the design principles (DP) of long-lasted institutions developed 
by Elinor Ostrom (1990) have gained prominence among scholars. These principles 
include (DP 1) clearly defined user and resource system boundaries, (DP 2) congruence 
between costs and benefits of using the commons, (DP 3) collective-choice arrangement 
that allows users to participate in decision-making processes,  (DP 4) monitoring by those 
who are accountable or appropriators themselves, (DP 5) graduated sanction against rule 
violations, (DP 6) cheap and effective conflict resolution mechanism, (DP 7) recognition 
of users' legal rights to self-govern their resource system, and (DP 8) nested enterprise in 
the case of large-scale commons.  
 DP 1 and 2 address the core challenges of collective action and the commons: 
free-riding and excessive resource consumption. DP 3 and 7 facilitate users to self-govern 
the commons and continuously adapt and refine their institutional arrangements in 
response to changing conditions. These four principles, however, are insufficient on their 
own to maintain collective action. Additional features such as monitoring and graduated 
sanction (DP 4 and 5) and conflict-resolution mechanisms (DP 6) are needed to 
continuously enforce and bolster the governance regime. Taken together, these principles 
facilitate a set of reinforcing processes that sustain a successful governance regime of 
SES. 
 
1.5. Robustness of communal irrigation and forestry systems 
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 In this thesis, I use communal irrigation and forestry systems as a testing ground 
to examine how infrastructure design affects SES robustness. Communal irrigation 
systems managed by farmers (Yoder 1994) are commonly found in the developing world 
(e.g., Wade 1988a, Tang 1991, Lam 1998, Dayton-Johnson 1999, Bardhan 2000, Baker 
2007). These systems still serve a large portion of total irrigated area in many developing 
countries, especially those in Asia (Barker, Randolph; Molle 2004). In fact, 90% farms 
worldwide cultivate less than 2 hectares of land, and most of such small-holder farmers 
practice irrigated agriculture to produce nearly 40% of global agricultural products 
(Wallingford 1997, McIntyre et al. 2009). Hence, irrigated agriculture operated by small-
holders is paramount to global food security and rural livelihood sustainability.  
 More importantly for our purposes, farmers in these systems depend heavily on 
physical infrastructure to produce a crop (Ostrom and Gardner 1993). They bring water to 
their fields through production infrastructure (e.g., water diversion structure such as dams 
and weir) and distribution infrastructure (e.g., water conveyance structure such as canals). 
The presence of this physical infrastructure, however, challenges the robustness of 
irrigation systems by introducing two types of collective action problems (Ostrom et al. 
1994). First, farmers need to mobilize collective labor to repair water diversion structure 
and clean canals each year. If too many farmers free-ride by skipping collective 
maintenance activities, the irrigation system will eventually cease to function (threshold 
public goods dilemma). Second, farmers located along the canals need to coordinate 
among themselves to achieve fair distribution of water. But achieving fair water 
distribution is difficult because the physical layout of canals often leads to upstream-
downstream asymmetry among farmers. That is, farmers located in upstream locations 
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access water before those in downstream locations, and consequently face temptation to 
take more water than others (asymmetric commons dilemma). This heterogeneity makes 
the system fragile to economic inequality—unless the opportunistic behavior of upstream 
farmers is checked, downstream farmers are most likely left with little or no water during 
water-stressed cropping seasons. In such situations, collective action will likely fail 
because downstream farmers who do not get enough water often retaliate by reducing 
contributions to infrastructure maintenance (Janssen et al. 2011b).  
 The robustness of communal irrigation systems is also affected by new livelihood 
opportunities, as rural communities become increasingly integrated into wider 
socioeconomic fabric (e.g., Baker 1997, Araral 2013). New livelihood opportunities may 
affect at least two situational variables that influence whether groups self-organize to 
overcome collective action problems: user dependence on resource and the option to 
enter or exit from a group (exit option) depending on whether users are dissatisfied with 
outcomes (Basurto and Ostrom 2009, Poteete et al. 2010). With growing economic 
globalization, social norm for collective action will likely be eroded as younger 
generations leave for better-paying wage labor opportunities in urban areas.  
 Further, there is growing evidence that communal irrigation systems will likely 
face water-related stresses from changing climatic patterns (Arnell 1999, Tubiello et al. 
2007, Immerzeel et al. 2010). For example, in some arid regions, farmers may face 
reduced precipitation in early stages of cropping season because of climate change, but 
the predicted rainfall during the summer monsoon season is expected to increase (IPCC 
2007). Such changing patterns in water availability may pose significant challenges to the 
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capacity of existing physical and social infrastructures of an irrigation system that have 
been optimized to past conditions. 
 Community forestry has supported the livelihoods of countless rural populations 
worldwide (WRI 2003). Many rural households depend on forests for securing resources 
such as firewood,  fodder, and timber (Dorji et al. 2003, Andersson and Agrawal 2011). 
In these resource systems, a social unit (a village) sometimes forms a federation or links 
with other social units (neighboring villages) to co-manage a shared forest commons. The 
resulting organizational form or structure—a prime example of which is nested 
enterprise—is a kind of social infrastructure that humans develop to efficiently manage 
large-scale commons (Ostrom 1990).  
 Nested enterprises, defined as having multiple centers and layers of management, 
are built on the structure of horizontal and vertical social links (Andersson and Ostrom 
2008, Mwangi and Wardell 2012). Horizontal links can be thought of as inter-community 
connections (e.g., shared property rights or joint collective action) through which 
management tasks and appropriation activities are coordinated. Vertical links, on the 
other hand, are connections between different levels of social organization. Together, 
these social links are known to contribute to adaptive capacity of SES in several ways. 
Nested enterprises allow oversight and tasks to be assigned at levels of organization that 
better reflect local conditions. The division and layering of duties also help to economize 
the transaction costs of managing a SES (especially in cases of large-scale commons).  
 But the cost of maintaining such a social infrastructure is not zero—it takes time 
and the efforts of participating social units to regularly interact to coordinate their 
activities, resolve conflicts, and to assess trustworthiness of each other. In order for this 
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type of social infrastructure to persist over time, the benefit of maintaining social links 
for nested enterprise must outweigh the costs of doing so. An interesting question is: how 
will the design of this type of social infrastructure affect the robustness of self-governed 
forest commons under economic globalization? For example, what happens if there is 
influx of substitute goods for forest resources (e.g., coal and oil) that can significantly 
lower the economic salience of maintaining forest commons? The design of existing 
horizontal and vertical social links may influence how the systems adapt or reorganize 
under such novel conditions. 
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2. THE EFFECT OF PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ON THE DYNAMICS OF 
SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL SYSTEM 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
 Human societies now find themselves embedded in a myriad of social-ecological 
systems (SES) that depend heavily on the physical infrastructure. How physical 
infrastructure mediates human-environment interactions is thus the linchpin of many 
pressing sustainability challenges in contemporary SES (Anderies et al. 2004). For 
example, the resilience of urban systems to natural hazards often depends on engineered 
structures such as levees, roads, or buildings. Similarly, global food security depends on 
irrigation infrastructure through which farmers obtain water. In mediated SES, the 
presence and particularly the design of physical infrastructure fundamentally shape the 
dynamics of coupled social and natural processes (Park et al. 2013, Anderies 2014a, 
Linkov et al. 2014).  
 A major puzzle for sustainability in this era of global change rests on a deep 
understanding of interactions among social, natural, and physical components and the 
effects of such interactions on the robustness of SES to unexpected disturbances. How 
can the design of physical infrastructure affect the capacity of SES to maintain vital 
functions in the face of disturbances? What are design criteria for physical 
infrastructure for more robust SES? This chapter examines these questions using a 
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simple formal model of a community irrigation system—a classic case of a SES in which 
physical infrastructure is the key interface between social and ecological processes.  
 Communal (or farmer-managed) irrigation systems (Yoder 1994) are widespread 
in rural areas of the developing world (Wade 1988a, Tang 1991, Lam 1998, Bardhan 
2000, Trawick 2001, Baker 2007), and even today serve a significant portion of the total 
irrigated area, especially in Asia (Barker, Randolph; Molle 2004). These systems provide 
an excellent testing ground for exploring how infrastructure affects SES. Farmers need a 
reliable supply of water to produce food and often move water from its source through 
production infrastructure (weir) and distribution infrastructure (canals). Two strong 
empirical regularities emerge from a long-term comparative case analysis of robustness 
of such systems. The first regularity is regarding the critical importance of infrastructure 
maintenance and the collective action or cost-sharing problems associated with it 
(Ostrom and Gardner 1993, Dayton-Johnson 2003). For instance, a study of 50 irrigation 
systems in Nepal found that farmer-managed systems have cruder infrastructure than 
agency-managed systems in the form of temporary headworks and unlined canals 
(Bastakoti and Shivakoti 2011). This kind of infrastructure demands greater mobilization 
of collective labor or investment each year to maintain functionality (a threshold public 
good dilemma). The second empirical regularity is regarding the challenge of achieving 
fair water distribution, which can be undermined by upstream-downstream asymmetry 
stemming from the canal layout (an asymmetric commons dilemma) (Ostrom and 
Gardner 1993, Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson 2002). Because of the tight links between 
livelihoods, social dilemmas, resource flow, and infrastructure, it has been suggested that 
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community irrigation systems are to the study of SES sustainability what fruit-flies are to 
the study of evolutionary biology (NRC 2002, Janssen and Anderies 2013).  
 Irrigation infrastructure, which is key to meeting food security—especially in 
South Asia where most of the poor people reside—is in dire need for maintenance. Much 
of this infrastructure, built in the 1960s and 1970s, has deteriorated rapidly and poses a 
major threat to food security in the region (Huppert et al. 2003). Lack of funding is 
generally given as the reason behind the deterioration. While this is certainly important, 
this chapter focus on the collective action problem that maintenance poses in farmer-
managed systems by characterizing the structure of incentives that users face under 
different design conditions and tracing the dynamics that follow. Our focus on the 
interactions between the infrastructure design and the incentives facing user groups is 
novel and opens doors to alternative ways of thinking about solutions to the maintenance 
problem, beyond the budgetary considerations. This problem is highly relevant to current 
discussions on global food security. Nearly 90% of farms worldwide are operated by 
small-holder farmers who cultivate less than 2 hectares of land (McIntyre et al. 2009). 
Most of these small-holders practice irrigated agriculture, which consumes roughly 70% 
of global developed water supplies and produces nearly 40% of global agricultural output 
(Wallingford 1997). It is imperative to understand how these small-holders can continue 
to maintain cooperation and, with it, critical infrastructure in the face of a globalized and 
rapidly changing world.  
 I address the question of how infrastructure design affects SES sustainability in 
two stages. First, I explore the effects of different design conditions on long-term system 
behavior in our model system. I examine two types of distribution infrastructure, one 
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with and one without upstream-downstream asymmetry, and different thresholds of 
infrastructure maintenance. Second, I evaluate how these design conditions influence the 
robustness of system function to an economic shock. Our model results suggest that how 
infrastructure is constructed can cause regime shifts, i.e., fundamental changes in 
qualitative system behavior. Regimes of sustainability, persistence with economic 
inequality, and system collapse emerged, expanded, or shrunk as I varied the designed 
features in the model system. I also observed that infrastructure design can influence the 
robustness (or sensitivity) of system performance to socio-economic shocks such as an 
increase in the attractiveness of alternative livelihood opportunities. It is important to 
note, however, that our goal is not to accurately model the dynamics of a particular 
irrigation system. Rather, the goal of studying the stylized model is to better understand 
the mechanisms that may underlie empirical regularities observed in field and behavioral 
studies, and to explore long-term system dynamics under different design conditions.  
 What emerges from our analysis is the need to re-conceptualize SES as coupled 
infrastructure systems (CIS) in which the role of shared infrastructure is clearly present. 
As suggested by Anderies (2014a), this can be achieved by conceptualizing ecologies of 
SES more broadly to include both built and natural elements, as in industrial ecology 
(Graedel and Allenby 2010). This broader view, which will likely be built on earlier 
conceptualizations of the role of hard infrastructure (Clark et al. 1979) and soft 
infrastructure in SES governance (Dietz et al. 2003), would help us consider the links 
among social, natural, and built elements more explicitly. Given the prominence of hard 
infrastructure in contemporary SES, this broader view better facilitates addressing global 
challenges to SES sustainability.  
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2.2. The nature of irrigation system 
 
 In general, irrigation systems both increase crop production (by enabling an 
increase in cropping intensity) and stabilize yields despite variability in annual water 
supply. To obtain these benefits, farmers must maintain shared infrastructure, and create 
and enforce governing rules to coordinate the infrastructure-maintenance and water-
distribution processes (Dayton-Johnson 2003). These conditions typically occur in 
farmer-managed irrigation systems in several developing country contexts. Without 
effective rules for allocation, monitoring, and enforcement, farmers can free-ride by 
taking irrigated water without contributing labor or fee to the maintenance work. 
Likewise, upstream farmers can use their location advantage to over-appropriate water, 
leaving an unfair share of water for downstream users during the distribution process 
(Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson 2002). Interestingly, these two processes often become 
interdependent because maintenance of infrastructure often requires a critical mass of 
labor, i.e., upstream farmers usually cannot carry out the task without help from 
downstream farmers (Ostrom and Gardner 1993, Lam 1996). This interdependency likely 
affects the likelihood that upstream farmers will over-appropriate water because 
downstream farmers who do not get enough water can retaliate by reducing their inputs to 
maintaining infrastructure (ibid).  
 Despite the many challenges facing farmers, field studies have identified several 
irrigation communities that have successfully maintained their infrastructure and 
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achieved fair water distribution for hundreds of years (Bacdayan 1974, Siy 1980, Wade 
1988a, Gupta and Tiwari 2002, Baker 2007). These long-lived systems typically have 
well-tuned rules to govern user behavior (Ostrom 1990). Behavioral experiments have 
followed up on field-study findings by demonstrating that individuals in small groups 
(say, 5 players) can endogenously solve relatively complex commons dilemmas 
associated with irrigation if allowed to communicate (Janssen et al. 2011b). These studies 
suggest that players were willing to tolerate some inequality in the amount of 
appropriated water, as long as there was some proportional equivalence between 
investments in and benefits from shared infrastructure (ibid). However, this tolerance 
declined with external shocks, i.e., inequality may make systems more sensitive to 
variability (Anderies et al. 2013a).  
 Recent studies stress that contextual variables, such as attributes of physical 
infrastructure, the availability of exit options, or power asymmetries, influence human 
decisions in SES collective-action situations (Agrawal 2002, Bardhan and Dayton-
Johnson 2002, Poteete et al. 2010). A related question that this chapter addresses is how 
these factors combine to affect SES robustness. Here, I use modeling to help answer these 
questions. Specifically, how do maintenance thresholds and asymmetric access interact to 
influence collective action outcomes and robustness in the long run?  
 
2.3. The basic model structure 
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 Suppose that N farming households are spread across two villages (Village 1 and 
Village 2) that manage a shared irrigation infrastructure. The number of households in 
each village is 1N  and 2N , respectively, which satisfy 1 2N N N  . Each farmer is 
endowed with the same amount of available labor ( l ) each year and the same acreage ( a ). 
A farmer may appropriate a volume of water ( q ) from the system, and allocate labor 
among three kinds of work: farming ( fl ), maintaining infrastructure ( ml ), and outside 
employment ( el ) with wage rate w , i.e., f m el l l l   . Then, a farmer's income is 
( , , )f epf l q a wl   , where ( , , )ff l q a  is the production function for agricultural yield, 
p  is the price per unit of agricultural yield, and ewl  is the employment income. 
Similarly, the aggregate income of the two villages is given by ( , , )f epF L Q A wL    
(upper case symbols represent aggregate-level quantities).  
 To receive irrigation water, farmers have to maintain the physical infrastructure 
each year (canals must be cleaned of silt and debris, and water diversion structures such 
as weirs must be repaired). If farmers' aggregate maintenance labor ( mL ) exceeds the 
threshold of maintenance, the infrastructure can continue to deliver water. If too few 
farmers contribute labor, the infrastructure delivers no water. This threshold of 
maintenance is a design parameter that varies across different irrigation systems 
depending on physical characteristics of the irrigation infrastructure. For example, if a 
weir is located in the shallow reaches of a river where the cross-section is wide, there is 
greater accumulation of silt and thus greater need for maintenance (Baban 1995). I use a 
piece-wise linear function ( )mI L (Figure 2.1 A) to represent this threshold. The parameter 
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  is the half-saturation point of mL , yielding half of the maximum infrastructure 
efficiency ( maxI ). The parameter   controls the slope of the threshold. It follows that the 
threshold of maintenance is   . Total irrigation water is given by 
( ) ( )mQ I L S t , where ( )S t  is the state of a renewable water resources system such as 
river. In this study, ( )S t  is assumed to be constant ( ( )S t S ).  
 
 
Figure 2.1. Designed aspects of the irrigation infrastructure. Panel A shows the efficiency 
of irrigation infrastructure ( )mI L  as a function of maintenance labor mL . The half-
saturation point of labor ( ) and half-width of the threshold slope ( ) determine the 
threshold of maintenance (  ). When 0 , slope is infinite and no water is generated 
until mL  . When  , the amount of water increases linearly with mL  until 
mL    . Panels B and C show two types of distribution infrastructure. In B, two 
villages have equal access to water. In C, Village 1 has advantage over Village 2 in water 
access. 
 
 Our model system is governed by the following rules. Maintenance labor to be 
contributed by a farmer is proportional to his or her acreage (Dayton-Johnson 2003), 
which is assumed to be the same for all farmers in this study. Water allocated to a farmer 
is proportional to his or her acreage, but only among the water rights holders—only 
farmers who contributed labor to the infrastructure prior to the planting season obtain 
water rights. Reflecting on Ostrom's institutional design principles for long-lived 
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commons (Ostrom 1990), these rules ensure that the benefits and costs borne by a farmer 
are proportionate to each other.  
 Farmers choose between two strategies: group-conformist (G) and opportunist (O). 
The model tracks the fraction of Gs in Village i  denoted by /Gi i iX N N . I define the 
total number of Gs as 1 2
G G GN N N  . Accordingly, the fraction of Os in Village i  is 
1 /Oi i iX N N   (I use the notational convention that subscripts and superscripts refer to 
village and agent type, respectively, on all variables throughout the remainder of the 
paper). Gs follow and enforce the rules, and strive to maximize the total welfare of the 
two villages. Each G assumes everyone will contribute to the shared infrastructure and 
contributes their proportionate share (1/ N ) of the socially optimal maintenance labor 
( *mL ), attempts to take only the allocated share (1/
GN ) of the total irrigated water (Q ), 
and allocates labor between farming and employment to maximize the total income. *mL  
is the maintenance labor that would maximize the total welfare of the two villages via 
optimal production of Q , as would be prescribed by a village leader acting as a 
benevolent social planner. Further, Gs monitor for rule violations in their own Village i  
and the other Village j  ( i j ), and punish violators at a cost to themselves (see Ostrom 
1990, Ostrom et al. 1992, Fehr and Gächter 2000 for related examples). The cost of 
enforcement for a G increases with the frequencies of Os (Sethi and Somanathan 1996) , 
i.e.,    1 1s i o iX X       where s   and o   represent the maximum enforcement 
costs for the same village and the other village, respectively. Note 
that o s    because it is probably easier to enforce the rules within a same village. 
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 Os, in contrast to Gs, break the rules and attempt to maximize individual net 
income. They contribute zero maintenance labor, and thus do not hold water rights. 
Nevertheless, they take as much of other farmers' water as they can within the limits set 
by the penalties imposed, their capacity to compete for water relative to others, and the 
benefits to be gained from the outside employment. Os take an amount of water and 
allocate labor to employment to maximize individual net income. The probability of 
being caught and punished increases with GN , i.e., 1 2( ) / 2X X . The penalty varies by 
situation: it increases with the amount of water stolen ( Oq ; i.e., graduated sanction),  but 
decreases with water abundance in the system. When water is abundant, rule violations 
are tolerated because farmers have little incentives to concern themselves with equity 
issues (Adams et al. 1997). Empirical evidences show that resource users would be less 
likely to self-organize when resource is abundant (Agrawal 2002). This effect is 
represented by *[1 ( ) / ( )] Om mQ L Q L q   ; where    is the maximum penalty, 
*( ) / ( )m mQ L Q L  is the proxy for water abundance, and 1   is the tolerance factor. 
  In summary, the payoffs for G and O in Village i  are expressed as the following:  
 
   
*
( , , ) 1 1
( )( , , ) 1
( ) 2
G G G G
i f i e s i o j
i jO O O O Om
i f i e
m
pf l q a wl X X
X XQ Lpf l q a wl q
Q L
  
  
     
           
  
where j  denotes the other village ( i j ). See APPENDIX A for more details on the 
equations. Finally, replicator equations (Taylor and Jonker 1978) were used to model the 
dynamics of the two strategies within each village (Sethi and Somanathan 1996). The 
changes in the fraction of Gs ( )iX   in Village i  is given by:  
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 / [ ]Gi i i idX dt X      
where i  is the average payoff of a farmer in Village i , i.e., (1 )G Oi i i i iX X     . Our 
results were obtained from numerical simulation of the above system of equations.   
 
2.4. Infrastructure design 
 
 The parameters   and   (Figure 2.1 A) together represent the maintenance 
threshold of the irrigation infrastructure. The threshold could be high and sharp (small  , 
   ) or low and gentle in slope ( 0   ). The former case would fit a system 
characterized by a distant large-scale production structure coupled with long distribution 
networks. Examples of this can be found, for instance, in the major irrigation systems 
found in the plain regions of India (Wade 1988a). A scalable system with small-scale 
production units and shorter distribution networks would be approximated the latter case. 
Examples of this can be found in the hilly terrains of Nepal (Bastakoti and Shivakoti 
2011) and Taiwan and South Korea (Wade 1988b).  
 Another infrastructure feature is upstream-downstream asymmetry. When 
upstream-downstream asymmetry is absent (Figure 2.1 B), we essentially have a 
symmetric common-pool resource (CPR) situation in which two villages have an equal 
access to a shared commons (for simplicity, let us assume that within each village, 
farmers have equal access to water). This happens in what is referred to as 'bifurcated' 
layout of canals in irrigation engineering literature, and is observed in several traditional 
irrigation systems (Horst 1998). Several modeling studies have examined SES dynamics 
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in such a CPR situation (Ito 2012, Tavoni et al. 2012, Lade et al. 2013). In this setting, 
farmers are symmetric in their capacity for competing for water because they all have 
equal access to water and are endowed with the same levels of available labor, 
technology, and skills1. It follows that if all farmers are to rush and compete for water, Os 
will face, on average, the same constraint on the amount of water they obtain ( /Q N ).  
 When upstream-downstream asymmetry is present (Figure 2.1 C), which is the 
likely scenario in most irrigation systems, water is accessed sequentially—farmers in 
Village 1 access water before those in Village 2. This is referred to generally as 
'hierarchical' layout design in irrigation engineering literature. Because of their privileged 
access, users in Village 1 are less constrained on the amount of water they can 
appropriate than the symmetric case. In this setting, Os in upstream face a higher (i.e., 
less constrained) upper-bound on the amount of water they obtain ( 1/Q N ) (see 
APPENDIX A for more details). This chapter tested different scenarios of maintenance 
threshold and asymmetry in distribution to understand how infrastructure design affects 
qualitative system behavior and robustness characteristics in the long-run.  
 
2.5. Effects of asymmetry 
  
 Figure 2.2 A is a phase-space representations of the overall cooperation level of 
the system with asymmetry. Three regimes are possible: ALL-Os; a sustainable situation 
                                                 
1 Of course, this assumption is restrictive because farmers would likely be heterogeneous in their acreage in 
most irrigation systems. Nevertheless, this assumption enables us to focus on the effects of asymmetry in 
distribution infrastructure. 
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in which most are Gs in Village 1, but all are Gs in village 2 (MOSTLY-Gs); and a 
decoupled situation in which the two villages stop collaborating for a common goal, i.e., 
Gs dominate in Village 1 but Os prevail in Village 2 (DECOUPLED). In the absence of 
asymmetry, two regimes typically emerge for most parameters explored: all Os ( 1 0X   
and 2 0X  ) and all Gs ( 1 1X   and 2 1X  ). There is no inequality in total income 
between Villages 1 and 2 in these two regimes (see APPENDIX A for the details on the 
effects of symmetry).  
 Figure 2.2 B compares the performance of the three regimes of the asymmetric 
case: the levels of infrastructure efficiency and inequality in total income. At ALL-Os, no 
water is supplied and everyone is equally bad off. At MOSTLY-Gs, water is almost fully 
supplied and the two villages have a roughly equal total income (but the income of 
Village 1 is somewhat higher than that of Village 2). At DECOUPLED, some water is 
supplied but considerable income inequality exists at village-level because only farmers 
in Village 1 obtain irrigated water. Farmers in Village 2 leave agriculture and resort to 
outside employment.  
 Let us now take a closer look at the MOSTLY-Gs and DECOUPLED regimes in 
the asymmetric case. The total income of Village 1 is higher than that of Village 2 in both 
regimes (but the inequality is much more severe in DECOUPLED). This is consistent 
with existing knowledge of irrigation systems (Ostrom and Gardner 1993, Baker 2007, 
Janssen et al. 2011b). At MOSTLY-Gs, some Os exist in Village 1, but all are Gs in 
village 2. This slightly unfair regime occurs because Os in Village 1 are less constrained 
in the amount of water they appropriate than Os in Village 2. This advantage enables 
some Os to survive in Village 1 in the asymmetric case. The system converges to 
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DECOUPLED when enough Gs exist in Village 1 but few Gs exist in Village 2 at the 
outset. Because water rights holders (Gs) are few in Village 2, Gs in Village 1 pass down 
little water, which becomes subject to fierce competition between many Os and few Gs in 
Village 2. Because of this competition for scant water, the amount of water that 
downstream Os get is decided by the physical limit of available water rather than by the 
penalty they face. It follows, then, that Gs and Os in Village 2 end up obtaining an equal 
amount of water. Eventually, Os prevail in Village 2 because they are penalized little 
(because they obtain only a meager amount of water), appropriate the same amount of 
water as Gs', and free-ride on maintenance labor. In contrast to Village 2, Gs win over Os 
in Village 1—a substantial amount of water is available in upstream and Gs obtain more 
water than Os by means of enforcement. Hence, the system converges to MOSTLY-Gs in 
the long-run.  
 It is important to note that MOSTLY-Gs and DECOUPLED are resilient: the 
system is sustained even though income inequality lingers on. Our findings are 
concordant with empirical studies. Behavioral experiments have shown that players in 
irrigation dilemma games may be willing to tolerate some degree of inequality, as long as 
there is some proportional equivalence between investments in and benefits from 
infrastructure (i.e., MOSTLY-Gs) (Janssen et al. 2011b). Field studies also observed that 
downstream farmers may exit from co-managing a system if there is too much income 
inequality (i.e., DECOUPLED) (Baker 2007).  
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Figure 2.2. Effects of asymmetry and threshold. In Panel A, the x and y axes show the 
fractions of Gs in Village 1 ( 1X ) and Village 2 ( 2X ), respectively. Red dots represent 
stable equilibrium points of the dynamics. Arrows represent the flows of dynamics from 
particular initial states. Red and green lines represent 1X  and 2X  nullclines, respectively. 
Panel A shows possible regimes under asymmetry: ALL-Os (light pink area), MOSTLY-
Gs (light green area), and DECOUPLED (light blue area). At ALL-Os, the irrigation 
system collapses. At MOSTLY-Gs, most farmers follow the rules, water is almost fully 
supplied, and some income inequality exists between the villages. At DECOUPLED 
farmers in Village 2 leave farming, and considerable inequality in total income exists 
between Villages 1 and 2. Panel B shows a comparison of the three regimes shown in A 
(model with asymmetry) in terms of infrastructure efficiency and income inequality (gini-
coefficient) between Villages 1 and 2. Panels C and D show effects of infrastructure 
design on stability landscape. In Panel C, distribution infrastructure is symmetric and 
threshold of maintenance is varied from 0  to 0.2 . The small inset graphs in the 
far right show the shape of the infrastructure-labor relation for each value of  . In Panel 
D, distribution infrastructure is asymmetric and threshold of maintenance is varied across 
the same range. (see APPENDIX A for the parameters used).  
 
2.6. Effects of maintenance threshold 
 
 Some systems depend on a distant large-scale infrastructure that likely brings no 
water until some critical amount of maintenance work is done each year. In contrast, a 
scalable system in which a collection of small-scale infrastructure provides services may 
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start to bring water at much smaller maintenance inputs. Here, we explored how the 
degree of maintenance threshold affects system behavior in our model system. Figure 2.2 
D shows that the threshold can induce regime shifts in the asymmetric system. As the 
threshold gets lower and gentler in slope (  approaches  ), ALL-Os loses resilience, i.e., 
its basin of attraction shrinks. At the same time, MOSTLY-Gs emerges and expands. But 
this regime shift occurs at the cost of emergence of the DECOUPLED regime. The 
opposite is true when the threshold gets higher and sharper in slope (  approaches zero). 
These results suggest that low-threshold scalable systems (i.e.,  ) are less likely to 
collapse, but are more prone to economic inequality. Conversely, large-scale systems (i.e.,
0 ) are less likely to have inequality issues, but are more prone to collapse. In the 
symmetric system, only two regimes are possible: MOSTLY-Gs and DECOUPLED 
(Figure 2.2 C).  
 When the threshold is high and sharp (small  ), little or no water is generated 
until most of the population is comprised of Gs. In such a situation, DECOUPLED 
cannot be stable because upstream farmers alone cannot maintain the infrastructure, i.e., 
strong interdependency exists between Villages 1 and 2. When the threshold is extremely 
sharp, MOSTLY-Gs also becomes unstable because it is too vulnerable to opportunism. 
The path toward sustainability is much narrower in high-threshold systems because most 
farmers need to participate in collective action each year just to make the system work. In 
contrast, when the threshold is low and gentle in slope ( 0   ), water supply starts to 
increase almost linearly even at small labor inputs. Hence, ALL-Os has smaller 
resilience—as soon as some Gs are introduced, it is better for some farmers to cooperate 
and get some water than to quit farming (unless, of course, outside wage rates are 
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sufficiently high). However, this departure from ALL-Os is accompanied by a higher 
likelihood of inequality in the system because of the emergence of the DECOUPLED 
regime. At MOSTLY-Gs, downstream farmers continue to cooperate despite some 
inequality because the infrastructure generates substantial benefits that trickle down to 
them. At DECOUPLED, however, the system functions poorly with considerable income 
inequality. Because low thresholds weaken the upstream-downstream interdependency, 
upstream farmers cooperate only among themselves to obtain enough water (i.e., they do 
not need labor inputs from downstream farmers).  
 
2.7. Robustness of system performance to shocks 
 
 This chapter also explored how the combined factors of maintenance threshold 
and asymmetry affect the robustness of SES in this era of globalization. Field studies 
have found that, as globalization proceeds, rural communities tend to depend more on 
nonfarm work; suffer shortage of labor for maintaining shared infrastructure; and 
experience erosion of social norm for collective action, especially among younger 
generations (Adams et al. 1997, Baker 2007). Hence, I introduced into our model system 
a sudden rise in wage rates (Figure 2.3 A) to mimic the pressures of globalization 
processes. Four types of wage shocks were applied by varying their duration (short and 
long) and intensity (low and high).  
 I exposed the MOSTLY-Gs regime to the shocks under two different infrastructure 
designs: one with and one without maintenance threshold (both combined with 
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asymmetry). Figure 2.3 B and C show the sensitivity of infrastructure efficiency to the 
short and long wage shocks, respectively. It turns out that the low-threshold system 
( 0.2 ) is more sensitive (less robust) to the shocks than is the one with higher 
threshold ( 0.1 ). The reason is that upstream Os are more advantaged under low-
threshold infrastructure because of the weakened upstream-downstream interdependency. 
In such a situation, sharp increase in wage rates can cause Os to surge in upstream 
because they still access water while earning extra income from skipping maintenance 
work. As a result, downstream Gs progressively get less water despite their maintenance 
work and thus decline in number gradually. At some point, a limit is crossed—
downstream Gs give up and begin to decline rapidly (the trajectory starting from Point a 
in Figure 2.3 D). Hence, in the absence of threshold, the infrastructure efficiency of the 
MOSTLY-Gs regime is highly sensitive to the economic shocks. The system with higher 
threshold ( 0.1 ) is less sensitive to the economic shocks. This reduced sensitivity 
stems from the tight upstream-downstream interdependency associated with the 
maintenance work (i.e., upstream users need labor inputs from downstream users to 
obtain sufficient water). Upstream Os surge initially in response to the wage shocks, but 
the resulting decline of downstream Gs feeds back to balance the rise of Os in upstream 
(the trajectory starting from Point b in Figure 2.3 D). Hence, the MOSTLY-Gs regime can 
better withstand wage shocks when higher thresholds exist.  
 I also exposed the DECOUPLED regime (i.e., a sustained but highly unequal state) 
to the shocks under the same design variations. Figure 2.3 E and F show the sensitivity of 
infrastructure efficiency to the short and long wage shocks, respectively. A different 
pattern is observed in the DECOUPLED regime: the system with a higher threshold 
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( 0.1 ) is more sensitive to the shocks than is the one with a lower threshold ( 0.2 ). 
The reason is that high-threshold systems have lower infrastructure efficiency at the 
DECOUPLED equilibrium. That is, upstream users alone toil to maintain the 
infrastructure, but obtain only a meager amount of water because of the tight upstream-
downstream interdependency. Hence, upstream users react more sensitively to rises in 
wage rate. Low-threshold systems ( 0.2 ) at DECOUPLED are less sensitive to the 
wage shocks because infrastructure efficiency is higher at the DECOUPLED equilibrium. 
In sum, infrastructure design (different degrees of maintenance threshold) can 
significantly affect the robustness of infrastructure efficiency to wage shocks in our 
model system. We observed that the MOSTLY-Gs regime with maintenance threshold 
( 0.1 ) is less sensitive to the shocks because of the tight upstream-downstream 
interdependency. But, the same design was associated with more sensitivity in the 
DECOUPLED regime. These results suggest that design or technological fixes to SES 
must consider the potential for regime shifts and altered robustness characteristics. 
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Figure 2.3. Robustness of system performance to wage shocks. Panel A shows profiles of 
four wage shocks (w). Black solid line represents a high shock (HS) in which w jumps 
from 0.2 to 1.2. Black dashed line represents a low shock (LS) in which w jumps from 
0.2 to 0.8. These shocks apply between 150T   and 200T  . Grey lines represent the 
same shocks applied over a longer duration (between 150T   and 300T  ). Along with 
the shocks, we perturb the fractions of 1X  and 2X  a bit at 151T   to observe local 
stability properties. Panels B and C show the sensitivity of the infrastructure efficiency 
( ( )mI L ) at MOSTLY-Gs to the short and long wage shocks, respectively. Red and blue 
lines represent the system response when 0.2  and 0.1 , respectively. Panel D 
shows the trajectories of 1X  and 2X  at MOSTLY-Gs when the short-duration high shock 
is applied. Two design scenarios are compared: 0.2 (Point a) and 0.1  (Point b). 
Panels E and F show the sensitivity of ( )mI L  at DECOUPLED to the short and long 
wage shocks, respectively. Except for the focal parameters, the same default parameter 
values were used as in Figure 2.2.  
 
2.8. Conclusion 
 
 Farmer-managed irrigation systems contain all the basic features of complex SES: 
hard human-made infrastructure (water diversion and conveyance structures), soft 
human-made infrastructure (institutional arrangements and organizational forms), and 
natural infrastructure (watersheds and agricultural land). Understanding how these 
infrastructures interact and respond to change is critical for maintaining food security for 
billions of people in the coming decades. Using a model of an irrigation system as a 
testing ground, I have shown that infrastructure design can greatly influence SES 
sustainability. When distribution infrastructure exhibits asymmetric access, three regimes 
can emerge: sustainable, sustained but unequal, and collapsed. We also observed that 
regime shifts involving these three regimes occur as the maintenance threshold is varied. 
With a low-threshold scalable infrastructure, the likelihood of system collapse is low. The 
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tradeoff is a higher likelihood that economic inequality will increase. With a high-
threshold infrastructure, SES can attenuate the possibility of economic inequality, but the 
tradeoff is that they become more prone to system collapse. The maintenance threshold 
also influences the robustness of SES to wage shocks. Under low thresholds, the 
MOSTLY-Gs regime is more sensitive to wage shocks. However, the opposite pattern was 
observed with the DECOUPLED regime—high thresholds make the system more 
sensitive to wage shocks.  
 Although the purpose of this chapter has been to use this model to illustrate the 
dynamics of SES, rather than predict behavior, it is worth noting that our model results 
resonate with some notable cases of irrigation systems in the literature. For example, the 
community irrigation systems in hilly regions of Nepal, as described by (Bastakoti and 
Shivakoti 2011), come close to the characterization of a system with low threshold in a 
MOSTLY-Gs regime. These kinds of systems have been found to be highly sensitive to 
wage shocks in recent decades (Ostrom et al. 2011). In contrast, irrigation systems in 
plain regions of South India, for instance, the Kurnool Cuddapah canal system studied by 
Wade (1988a) is an example of a DECOUPLED system with high thresholds. This 
system has also been highly sensitive to wage shocks as described by Wade (1988a), and 
in accordance with our model results. Interestingly though, some specific villages under 
this system that Wade (1988a) observed to have been successful in developing local 
collective institutions, fall under a MOSTLY-Gs regime with high threshold levels. A 
recent study (Ratna and Reddy 2002) looking at the long term dynamics of the villages 
with collective institutions found them to be remarkably robust to wage shocks, again as 
found in our model.  
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 The findings also have some policy relevance. Policymakers must balance the 
increased robustness of maintaining cooperation and system function that scalable 
infrastructure (higher  ) confers with increased fragility to emerging inequality. Likewise, 
if biophysical conditions favor large-scale infrastructure (low  ), policymakers must be 
aware of the increased propensity for system collapse and reduced incentives for 
opportunism. The results also suggest the need for anticipatory approach—institutional 
considerations should not follow as derivatives from infrastructure after it has been built 
but as factors that should enter as part of project design itself to enhance robustness.  
 These outcomes highlight the need to re-conceptualize SES as coupled 
infrastructure systems (CIS) so that the role of public infrastructure is more central in 
SES research. This can be achieved by expanding ecologies of SES to include both built 
and natural components. We suggest that viewing SES as CIS provides a better reflection 
of the sustainability problem context in the modern era because of the prominence of 
infrastructure systems in contemporary SES. It would also help cross-fertilize knowledge 
between social and natural science-based sustainability scholars and those based in 
applied sciences of architecture and engineering. A better understanding of design criteria 
for robust CIS is crucial for sustainability research.  
 Of course, the findings of this chapter are preliminary and represent a first step 
toward better understanding the capacity of CIS to cope with global change. Our study 
restricted the number of strategies to two: group-conformist and opportunist. Additional 
strategies could be considered: for example, farmers could invest in the infrastructure but 
take more water than their allocated share. It is assumed that the depreciation rate of 
infrastructure is fast, i.e., no water is provided unless the infrastructure is repaired every 
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year. An alternative approach would be to assume a slower rate of depreciation, such that 
some water is still provided even if no repair is done in a given year. These variations 
will further our understanding of the influence of infrastructure in SES dynamics. Finally, 
further case-study analysis and empirical field work, like that which motivated this 
modeling effort (see csid.asu.edu), are essential to support theoretical and practical results.  
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3. THE EFFECT OF SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE ON THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS UNDER ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
 Studies of commons dilemmas have often focused on investigating factors that 
affect whether and how institutions succeed or fail in enabling collective action in social-
ecological systems (SES) (Ostrom 1990, 2005a, NRC 2002). This work has typically 
been static in nature - the biophysical, social, economic, and institutional factors that 
define the context in which the agents interact are assumed fixed. Recently, scholars have 
begun to view commons dilemmas through a dynamic lens and focus on what factors 
affect the capacity of SES to cope with change. One way SES cope with change is 
through transformation, a process that occurs when ecological, economic, or social 
structures make the existing system untenable and a fundamentally new system is created 
in response (Walker et al. 2004). 
 In this chapter, I build on this foundation to explore transformation patterns of 
SES. I examine the question of what factors help explain the persistence of effective 
collective action in the management of common-pool resources in SES under 
conditions that will likely be realized in the next few decades as a result of economic 
globalization. Specifically, I focus on the effect of organizational form (a kind of 
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social infrastructure) on how SES transform when they are forced to reorganize by 
changes brought by economic globalization.  
 Scholars suggest that economic globalization will connect SES across multiple 
temporal and spatial scales, dramatically changing the context in which many self-
governed common-pool resource (CPR) institutions operate (Young et al. 2006, Anderies 
and Janssen 2011). One of the ways that such global inter-connectedness can impact local 
self-governed CPR systems is by increasing the inflow of substitute goods for CPRs or 
the opportunity cost of labor that will reduce the salience of CPRs for local livelihoods 
(Poteete and Ostrom 2004, Araral 2009). Such changes in context will likely induce some 
self-governed systems to fail and subsequently transform rather than merely to adapt. In 
the process, social actors will likely be confronted with dilemmas linked to the release 
and reorganization of their natural capital. Some actors may prefer the immediate benefit 
of selling out natural capital and taking their share of the proceeds over the uncertain 
long-term benefit of maintaining cooperation in some alternative ways. How will the 
existing design or form of organizational structure affect actors' decisions on 
reorganizing their SES under the novel conditions?  Systematic research on post-
failure transformation process is rare in the commons literature (although see Abel, 
Cumming, and Anderies 2006), and the connection between different transformation 
paths and their determinants remains poorly understood (Rudel 2011).  
 In the literature, there are a number of studies that explore the reorganization of 
SES in a different light. For example, several case studies investigate the struggles of 
local SES subjected to novel disturbances such as increased market pressure (Wunder et 
al. 2008, Silva et al. 2010), flows of people or intruders (Pérez et al. 2011), or 
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development (Wollenberg et al. 2006, Levang et al. 2007). These studies focus on 
particular aspects of disturbances and ensuing responses themselves rather than the 
details of transformation. In another set of studies, scholars exclusively analyze 
transformations (Olsson et al. 2004, Biggs et al. 2010, Gelcich et al. 2010). These studies, 
however, either do not involve CPRs or rely heavily on small-N cases related to very 
specific contexts. A single case study or small-N set of case studies can reveal rich 
insights about a particular setting but their findings cannot easily translate into broader 
theoretical analysis (Basurto and Ostrom 2009). Lastly, some studies approach the 
subject from the perspective of long-term vulnerability and transformation (Anderies 
2006, Nelson et al. 2010). These studies rely on a small-N set of archeological cases 
populated with very coarse data and focus on aspects of hidden vulnerabilities that 
emerge when SES optimize for a particular set of disturbances. Further, none of the 
above studies cover how the design of social infrastructure affects the patterns of SES 
transformation. 
 This chapter complements the existing literature by examining 89 forest commons 
in the Geumsan region of South Korea (Kang 2001) and the designs of their social 
organizational structures linked to nested governance (Figure 3.1, Figure 3.3, and Figure 
3.4). After persisting for hundreds of years, these self-governed SES all collapsed and 
underwent major transformations, e.g., conservation of natural capital, conversion to new 
community infrastructure, selling-out, etc., in the second half of the 20th century as South 
Korea developed economically. The major drivers of this change include (Figure 3.2): (1) 
the transition in the nation’s primary energy consumption from high dependence on forest 
resources to near-zero dependence; (2) the massive rural-urban migration driven by the 
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search for better opportunities; and (3) the introduction of national-level forestation 
policies. Because this set of cases constitutes a relatively large-N dataset and provides 
accounts of a range of different transformations under globalization, a careful analysis 
may yield some general insights on the relationship between the transformation of SES 
and the design of organizational form. 
 This article tackles three research questions. First, what are the patterns of 
transformation undergone by the 89 self-governed systems? Unlike the dichotomous 
classification of either robust or collapsed SES (Anderies et al. 2004), transformations 
can involve multiple trajectories of change. Second, what are some of the key factors that 
influence the persistence of effective collective action in the management of shared 
resources as they undergo transformative change? We focus on the design of social 
organizational form linked to nested governance. Third, are there tradeoffs between 
optimizing to particular past conditions and transformative capacity (sensu Janssen et al. 
2007)?. Here, we investigate whether self-governed SES that may have become robust to 
particular past conditions undergo less cooperative transformations when they face new 
challenges in this era of globalization. 
 
3.2. Methods 
 
3.2.1. The study system 
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 The Geumsan region sits in the central inland of South Korea and encompasses 
576 km2. The landscape of the region is roughly characterized by a large central flat 
valley and surrounding mountain ranges with forests (Figure 3.1). Hundreds of villages 
are interspersed throughout the area. Songgye (pronounced like "song-geh") refers to 
traditional Korean forest organizations established for setting up community-owned 
mountainous forests to provide access to firewood and organic compost made from 
weedy plants growing inside forests (Kang 2001, Chun and Tak 2009). Many songgye 
operated in the Geumsan region for hundreds of years and played key roles for the 
sustainable management of forest commons until they became functionally obsolete in 
the mid-20th century (Kang 2001). Until the advent of fossil-fuels and commercial 
fertilizers, the lives of most commoners heavily depended on sourcing these forest 
resources (Kang 2001, Chun and Tak 2009). 
 The main role of a songgye (plural – songgye) as a resource management 
organization was to provide three important types of public infrastructure. First, songgye 
provided institutions in the form of appropriation rules. For example, cutting down trees 
for firewood was usually prohibited, and members could only collect brushwood or dead 
trees during specified time periods few times a year (Park 2000, Chun and Tak 2009). 
Second, songgye enabled communities to tackle challenges of infrastructure provision. 
Through  songgye, a village as a whole could pool money together to purchase a 
mountainous forest as common property (Kang 2001). Villagers also cooperated through 
songgye to repair mountain trails, essential infrastructure for enabling the mobility of 
resource appropriators (Kang 2001). Thirdly, songgye facilitated monitoring of rule 
compliance and sanctioning of unauthorized activities. Some songgye had dedicated 
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Figure 3.2 A) (KCC 2001) and rural populations made up approximately 58% (14.6 
million) of the 25 million people in 1960 (Bae and Lee 2006). However, in the 1960s and 
70s, the use of coal briquettes began to spread widely across the country for residential 
uses (even in rural areas) and substitute firewood from the increased supply of coal 
briquettes, and the use of foreign-imported oil skyrocketed from the 1970s (KESIS 2013). 
The use of firewood dropped dramatically (blue portion of bars in Figure 3.2 A and by 
the period of 1981 to 1990, only 3% of the annual primary energy consumption came 
from firewood. South Korea also underwent a massive rural-urban migration since the 
late 1960s driven by the search for better economic opportunities in urban areas (Figure 
3.2 B and C). By 1992, rural populations declined to approximately 13% (5.7 million) of 
the total population (BOK 2013). Driven in part by these trends, South Korea witnessed a 
striking turnaround in the nation’s overall forest cover from net deforestation to net 
reforestation (Figure 3.2 A  and B). The nation’s average use of commercial fertilizers 
also increased substantially during this period from 162 kg/ha in 1970 to 458 kg/ha in 
1990 (MAF 2005).  
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Figure 3.2. Changes in the broader context of songgye in South Korea. A. Trends in 
average primary energy consumption and volume of growing stock from 1955 to 2003 
(Source: KCC 2001, KESIS 2013). Other energy sources include coal, oil, gas, nuclear 
power, and hydro-power (TOE: tons of oil equivalent). B. Trends in rural population and 
volume of growing stock from 1934 to 2009 (Source: Bae and Lee 2006, BOK 2013, 
KFS 2010). The lines between the markers are linear interpolations. Note that the data 
before 1952 concerns the entire Korean Peninsula. C. Trends in earned income of urban 
household and farming income of rural household from 1970 to 2004 (Source: MAF 
2005). 
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 These trends also affected Geumsan: the use of coal briquettes and commercial 
fertilizers gained wide adoption in the1960s and 70s and some of the more remote 
villages were deserted by the 1990s (Kang 2001). The overall forest cover of the area has 
also increased tremendously, jumping by a factor of 13.4 between 1976 and 2010 (see 
Table B.1 in APPENDIX B). These drastic changes in context most likely rendered the 
songgye in Geumsan obsolete from the early 1960s because of the tempered economic 
salience of the key forest resources that songgye were designed to govern (Kang 2001). 
In fact, no sightings of active songgye operations have been reported in the region from 
that period (Kang 2001). After their collapse, the songgye in the region reorganized 
themselves in a number of different ways. The nature of their reorganization is the focus 
of this paper. 
 At the same time, a number of shifting sociopolitical trends also affected the 
decisions of local villagers as they weighed different options for reorganizing their 
songgye (Kang 2001). Beginning in the 1960s, the Korean government introduced a 
series of regional and national level forestation plans to revitalize forests that were 
denuded by the Korean War and past overharvesting (Chun and Tak 2009, Bae et al. 
2012). Rural villages were encouraged to organize tree-planting initiatives and to curb 
timber logging or other types of harvesting activities such as slash-and-burn farming. The 
government also rolled out concerted public campaigns to change the mental models of 
rural villagers. Slogans such as “planting is loving the nation” (Lee 2005) and “cutting 
trees is a menace and planting trees is an act of patriotism” (Bae et al. 2012) were 
directed at the general public. 
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 In some cases, legal disputes arose over unclear property rights regarding songgye 
forests. These disputes originated from a colonial-period forest policy introduced to 
restructure the traditional forest ownership and tenure system during the Japanese 
occupation period (1910-1945). Under this policy, songgye mountains were denied for 
registration as commons. As such, many songgye in Geumsan had to register their forests 
as private properties under the names of village leaders (Kang 2001). This made the 
forests privately owned de jure but de facto commons. Finally, a real-estate boom 
pervaded the region throughout the 1980s and 90s (Kang 2001). As a side effect of 
economic development, the value of songgye forests as a real-estate commodity increased 
significantly around this time while the benefits that could be extracted from forestry 
became further obscured (Kang 2001). This shifting valuation most likely influenced the 
decisions of local villagers during the transformations of their songgye.  
 
3.2.3. Data sources 
 
 We conducted secondary analysis of existing data collected for a previous 
research project on songgye (Kang 2001). Published and endorsed by the Geumsan 
Cultural Center, Kang (2001) is the only large-N qualitative study done to uncover 
historical evidence of songgye operation in the study site2,3. More important for our 
purposes, his study records how some of these songgye have reorganized themselves in 
                                                 
2 At present, Kang (2001) exists only in Korean Language. This book can be obtained at no charge from the 
Geumsan Cultural Center (http://geumsan.cult21.or.kr). The author of the book, Sungbok Kang, is currently 
full-time researcher at Chungnam National University in South Korea.  
3 FAO (2005) provides a similar historical case study about songgye in the Anmyoen-do region of South 
Korea. 
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the last 50 years. The 156 cases that are described by Kang (2001) offer a rare 
opportunity to explore general questions regarding the transformative capacity of SES 
subjected to relatively rapid change associated with globalization. 
 For the data collection, Kang (2001) primarily relied on oral histories, interviews 
with key informants, and archival research. The use of such qualitative methods of data 
collection are common in historical case studies of collective action related to natural 
resources (Poteete et al. 2010). Kang (2001)'s interview data came from 391 elderly local 
villagers who were identified to have some knowledge on the past practices of songgye as 
well as past village-level decisions related to the use of songgye forests. Of the 391 
informants, 388 are men, most of whom were likely heads of their households. The 
average age of the informants was 73.9. The documentary evidence came from the 
archival materials that included contracts of property rights and transactions involving 
songgye forests, legal documents settling disputes, and writings of constitutions of 
songgye. Kang conducted the research over 10 years from the early 1990s to 2001, during 
which he visited the site 80 times for the fieldwork. Most of the interviews (98%) were 
conducted between 1998 and 2001.  
 For the secondary analysis, we subsample 89 cases based on two conditions: 1) 
time coincidence of transformation events with the onset of economic development 
(1960~) and 2) presence of key variables, e.g., outcome of transformation, size of 
resource system, etc. The first condition ensures that we are investigating transformative 
capacity under the influence of globalization. We thus restrict our analysis to the events 
that occurred in the period between 1960 and 1999. In the sample, 85 out of the 89 
transformations occurred between the 1960s and 80s. Note that we are not further 
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grouping these 89 cases even though different drivers of change may have been more 
important in different times. Our aim is to understand transformative capacity toward the 
general resilience of SES under the broader influence of globalization, not their specified 
resilience or robustness to specific disturbances (Folke et al. 2010). A word of caution 
about sampling bias is in order here. Because of the sampling criteria above, we are 
actually sampling on the cases of more persistent songgye than all representative ones. 
Hence, any causal claims made here should be interpreted in relative terms in the sense of 
the bias created here.  
 
3.2.4. Methods and scope of analysis 
  
Growing theoretical literature on collective action posits that a large number of 
contextual factors potentially affect the likelihood of individuals solving collective action 
problems (Agrawal 2002, Poteete et al. 2010). Here, to identify relevant contextual 
factors and to compare user interactions and outcomes across the sample, we employ the 
ontological framework of SES (Ostrom 2009; Ostrom 2007). Using the framework, we 
identify relevant similarities and differences in contextual factors and type of 
transformation among the sampled cases. Then, we search for plausible models for the 
relationship between type of transformation and contextual factors. Our approach reflects 
the methodological challenge raised by Basurto and Ostrom (2009) who assert that 
scholars should look for similarities and differences from rich details across multiple 
cases and combine theories to generate new hypotheses.  
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 In our analysis, we focus on the roles of system-level factors, such as network 
diversity and biophysical context, rather than the details of community interactions that 
are often emphasized in small-N case studies. Our focus on system-level factors is 
motivated by recognizing that SES are complex adaptive systems (Levin and Clark 2010) 
in which emergent, system-level properties interact with individual-level processes to 
generate system dynamics. Of course, attributes of the community such as age and gender 
structure, existence of a local leader, and discussion during village meetings may affect 
the level of participation in community forest management (Lise 2000, Maskey et al. 
2006). Thus, attributes of individual agents interact with biophysical context and rules-in-
use in complex ways to produce governance outcomes (Ostrom 2005a). Our aim is to 
complement these earlier studies on attributes of the community and rules-in-use by 
exploring the effects of the system-level or structural factors on which these community 
details play out. Much work remains to be done to understand the effects of these system-
level factors in the context of social-ecological transformation (Folke et al. 2010). We 
also note that details on the influences of gender and age structure and community 
interactions during village meetings on the villagers’ decision-making were unavailable 
in Kang (2001)’s data. We suffer from a general limitation of all SES research: very few, 
if any, case studies exist that incorporate variables relating to all the components of SES 
articulated in the SES (Ostrom 2009) or Robustness (Anderies et al. 2004) Frameworks.  
As a result, we must use the data we have to study particular subsets of relationships 
within those frameworks. 
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3.3. Patterns of transformation 
 
 By the early 1960s, all songgye in Geumsan had become dysfunctional. In the 
ensuing post-failure reorganization phases, villagers interacted in the arena of village 
assembly meetings to decide the fate of their now-obsolete forests. The village assembly, 
an overarching village organization that oversaw all types of coordinated tasks in a single 
village, existed for every village in the region (Kang 2001). Depending on the number of 
participating villages in a songgye, either a single village or multiple villages interacted in 
the decision-making process. All member households of a village assembly could voice 
their opinions and, if voting was necessary for the decision-making, could cast a vote. In 
general, two broad types of actions were possible: 1) favoring short-term self-interest and 
2) maintaining cooperative management in alternative ways. A village consensus 
(unanimous or almost unanimous agreement) or voting (some sort of majority rule) was 
generally used for decision-making at the village level, and the decision reached was 
binding for all members. When multiple villages were involved, decisions were usually 
made through two stages – each village would first decide on its preference and then all 
involved villages would have to agree unanimously if their shared assets were to be 
liquidated for other purposes (Kang 2001).  
 Four patterns of transformations are observed in the data. In pattern A, villages 
chose to maintain cooperative governance regimes and conserved their forests intact. In 
such cases, resource systems that had provided direct use values were essentially 
transformed into public goods with existence values. In pattern B, villages sold some or 
all of their forest resource systems and used the revenue raised to establish alternative 
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community infrastructure. Examples include building village roads and bridges; 
purchasing lands for communal farming; constructing schools and community centers; 
and establishing communal funds (Kang 2001). In essence, these villages maintained 
their cooperative governance regimes in novel ways by converting their natural capital 
into new types of infrastructure that better met the modern-day needs of their 
communities. Pattern C is characterized by the release of some or all of the relevant 
natural capital with nothing contributing back to collective welfare. Motivated by short-
term self-interest, villages in these instances sold their natural capital and simply divided 
among households the proceeds from the sale. In pattern D, instances of property right 
disputes motivated by unclear land titles are observed. Despite the possibility of settling 
the conflict and preserving their communal forests, villagers in these instances failed to 
generate enough collective action (collecting fees for upfront legal charges) to initiate 
formal legal actions. In such cases, resource systems fell into the hands of few 
opportunistic stakeholders (Kang 2001). 
 For our purposes, we further compact the four observed patterns into two broader 
patterns based on the degree of persistence of cooperation: 1) cooperative transformation 
and 2) non-cooperative transformation. In the cooperative transformations, the common-
pool resources provided by the forest are transformed into public goods and cooperative 
governance is maintained in alternative forms (Pattern A and B). In the non-cooperative 
transformations, all of the forest resources are transformed into private gains, and 
cooperative governance is discontinued (Pattern C and D). This binary categorization 
constitutes our dependent variable in the statistical analysis. Our goal in the remainder of 
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the paper is to confront the data and test whether there is a significant relationship 
between these patterns of transformation and the structure of SES. 
 
3.4. Context of transformation 
 
 In this section, we discuss contextual factors that are judged to be important for 
affecting the patterns of transformation. These factors constitute the explanatory variables 
in our statistical analysis. 
 
3.4.1. The design of social connectedness 
 
 A web of village-level social connectedness emerged in Geumsan as many 
villages developed social links with other villages to govern their songgye governance 
prior to the 20th century. These horizontal and vertical social linkages are built to create 
multiple centers of management and arrangements where collective action is organized in 
multiple layers of nested enterprises (Ostrom 1990, Cox et al. 2010). 
 In Geumsan, three historical strategies played key roles for the development of  
social linkages: 1) multiple-village cooperation, 2) diversity and redundancy in 
cooperative networks, and 3) vertical nesting within village assemblies. Multiple-village 
cooperation occurred whenever two or more villages formed an allied or federated 
songgye by co-purchasing a resource system and performing joint appropriation and 
provision activities under the supervision of a loosely formed inter-village council (Kang 
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2001) (songgye A in Figure 3.3 B and D). This practice reflects the design principle of 
nested enterprises in governing the commons (Ostrom 1990). We speculate that the 
resulting economy of scale and modularity of social systems better facilitated the 
provision of threshold public goods such as purchasing a large-scale mountainous forest 
and repairing mountain trails. For example, for purchasing forests, multiple villages acted 
together to increase their total group size and delegated each village to pool financial 
contributions from its member households. In this way, these allied villages were able to 
increase the level of the public good provision while decreasing the size of individual 
contributions and coordination costs. For the same reason, member villages of an allied 
songgye usually divided and maintained different sections of a network of forest trails 
(Kang 2001). In the cases where multiple-village cooperation did not occur, a single 
village solely managed a mountainous forest (songgye A in Figure 3.3 A and C). 
 Diversity in cooperative networks arose whenever villages participated in 
multiple instances of songgye simultaneously, which resulted in the creation of cross-
institutional links across different songgye (songgye A in Figure 3.3 C and D). The 
resulting links of a village probably enabled that village to cope with varying biophysical 
conditions and uncertainties (due to redundant flows of forest resources) as well as 
gaining access to institutional diversity (for theoretical insights, see Elmqvist and Folke 
2003, Folke et al. 2005, Anderies and Janssen 2011). For example, some villages with 
existing songgye forests that were either unproductive or too distant from their village 
locations chose to join another songgye in order to access more productive or nearer 
forests (Kang 2001). 
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 Vertical nesting occurred whenever songgye-related affairs in a single village 
were nested under that village's assembly (Figure 3.4). Entire cases of songgye in 
Geumsan practiced vertical nesting (Kang 2001). We speculate that, through vertical 
nesting, a songgye could economize transaction costs by tapping into established 
leadership and legitimacy that already existed with village assembly. An additional layer 
of nesting occurred for allied songgye because they were coordinated by inter-village 
councils (Figure 3.4 B). 
 
3.4.2. Village location 
 
 Depending on where villages are located, we speculate that the villages faced two 
biosocial heterogeneities in the past: 1) variation in availability of forest resources in their 
immediate surroundings and 2) variation in degree of village-to-village social 
connectivity.  
 Most of the villages in the central districts (district E and H in Figure 3.1) are 
located on flat areas, and therefore, lacked access to forests in their immediate 
surroundings. In the perimeter districts of B, C, F, I, and J, multiple types of landscapes 
are observed. Here, clusters of flat areas and mountainous terrains coexist in closer 
proximity. Kang (2001) suggests that the flat areas in the central and perimeter districts 
were more populous areas where villages tended to link seamlessly to one another 
without major spatial barriers. Most of the villages here probably had more neighboring 
villages and better inter-village social connectivity but less ease in finding harvestable 
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forests nearby (Kang 2001). In contrast, most of the villages located in the mountainous 
areas (district A, D, and G and parts of district B, C, F, I, and J) tend to be isolated 
spatially by the natural barriers of mountain ranges. Inter-village social connectivity was 
probably lower there in the past, but these villages had better access to mountainous 
forests (Kang 2001). 
 
3.4.3. Resource system and units 
 
 Songgye forests varied in terms of size and/or terrain characteristics. Some forests 
were large in area, encompassing as much as few hundred hectares. Some forests also 
differed in resource potential by having mostly rocky or gentle sloping terrains. Mainly 
harvested resource units were firewood and organic materials for composts. Some cases 
of songgye, however, were different in that they historically exercised considerable dry-
field farming inside songgye forests as well as allowing outsiders to take over the farming 
in exchange for annual tenant fees  (Kang 2001). In such cases, the collected fees became 
an important source of income for covering miscellaneous operating expenses of songgye. 
 As for the forest conditions in terms of volume of growing stock and composition 
of tree species, there may have been some variation across songgye forests between 1960 
and 1999. However, such data is unavailable for our study, and the decisions of villagers 
were probably negligibly affected by these conditions. The dominant trend during this 
period is the declining user dependence on forest resources and the rise in forest cover 
regardless of the decisions selected by songgye users (see Figure 3.2 and Table B.1).  
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number of horizontally linked villages and ratio of member villages with cross-
institutional links. 
 Note that most of the similarities relate to the major drivers of change that were 
general and pervasive in nature. Because the songgye under study all derive from a single 
rural region that is mono-ethnic and -cultural in user characteristics, it is reasonable to 
assume that most of the songgye practically experienced the same level of shifting trends. 
Therefore, from a system-level perspective, notable differences across the cases mostly 
concerned the specifics of social connectedness and variations in villages' location, 
topographic position, and resource systems and units. Although the listed similarities and 
differences are not exhaustive, they largely cover the relevant information thought to be 
important for this research. Table 3.1 describes the variable definitions and measurements. 
 
Table 3.1. Definitions of the contextual variables related to songgye. 
Variables  Definitions 
Dependent variable:    
Outcome of 
transformation 
The outcome of transformation is categorized into two broad types: 
(1) cooperative transformation and (2) non‐cooperative 
transformation (=1 if cooperative; =0 if non‐cooperative). 
   
Independent variables:    
Number of horizontally‐
linked villages 
A number of villages in a songgye that are horizontally linked 
through shared property rights of a resource system and joint 
appropriation and provision activities.  For the songgye 'A' in Figure 
3.3 A and C, this measure is 1. In Figure 3.3 B and D, this measure is 
3. 
Ratio of member villages 
with cross‐institutional 
links 
The ratio of cross‐institutional links measures the percentage of 
participating villages in a songgye that participate in multiple 
instances of songgye simultaneously†. For the songgye 'A' in Figure 
3.3 A and B, this measure is 0. In Figure 3.3 C, this is 100%. In 
Figure 3.3 D, this is 2/3 or 67%.  
Spatial extent of villages  The spatial extent is measured by the scale of administrative districts 
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spanned by participating villages (=0 if one village is involved; =1 if 
multiple villages are involved but all are situated within one sub‐
district; and =2 if multiple villages are involved and are situated over 
multiple sub‐districts).  
Topographic location of 
villages 
The percentages of flat areas in the surrounding areas of 
participating villages are averaged to derive this measure‡. 
Size of resource system  The size of resource system measures the physical area covered by a 
songgye's mountainous forest(s) (=0 if 1‐10 hectares; =1 if 11‐100 
hectares; and =2 if greater than 100 hectares)§. 
Terrain of resource 
system 
The terrain type is estimated from the existence of considerable dry‐
field farming inside songgye mountains (=1 if considerable dry‐field 
farming exists, i.e., presence of large mildly‐sloping terrain; =0 
otherwise). 
Existence of tenant fees  The functional diversity carried by resource system is measured by 
the existence of annual tenant fees levied for the rights to exercise 
dry‐field farming inside songgye mountains. It gauges whether or 
not the villages were able to extract extra benefits from their 
mountains (=1 if annual tenant fees were collected; =0 otherwise). 
† Because these links in a given songgye can adjust over time as associated songgyeundergo 
transformations, we take a snapshot of these links (taken at 1960) as our basis of analysis. 
‡ Topographic position index (TPI) (Weiss 2001) is derived for each sub-district that contains member 
villages. For each sub-district, areas of flat and lower slopes are divided by the total sub-district area. This 
percentage is then averaged over all involved sub-districts. 
§ The physical size is ordinal because some of the empirical cases provided estimated ranges of area 
instead of exact figures. 
  
3.5. Data analysis 
 
 To relate the likelihood of cooperative transformation to the contextual factors, 
we used multivariate logistic-regression models. We used a model selection approach to 
hypothesis testing (Johnson and Omland 2004). We applied the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) method (see APPENDIX B for details) to compare the fits of all possible 
combinations of explanatory variables (Burnham and Anderson 2002). AIC is calculated 
for a suite of models. The absolute size of the AIC is unimportant; instead the difference 
in AIC values between models indicates the relative support for the models. In order to 
compare models, we calculate Akaike weights (Burnham and Anderson 2002). We 
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consider as plausible models those with Akaike weights that are within 10% of the 
highest weight. We also report the relative variable importance as the sum of Akaike 
weights over all models including the explanatory variable. The relative variable 
importance is the probability that, of the variables considered, a certain variable is in the 
best approximating model. 
 Lastly, we study correlations between topographic location of villages and their 
songgye-related social connectedness. If social connectedness is associated with 
topographic location and also with different trajectories of transformation, we could infer 
that optimizing for robustness (i.e., forming social connectedness) to past conditions (i.e., 
variations in resource flow stemming from topographic location) possibly affected the 
transformative capacity of songgye in the present day. 
 
3.6. Results 
 
3.6.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
 The majority (73%) of the transformations were cooperative: 36 cases of pattern 
A (40%) and 29 cases of pattern B (33%). The remaining transformations were non-
cooperative: 19 cases of pattern C (21%) and 5 cases of pattern D (6%). The notable 
trends in descriptive statistics are the contrasts in the averages of a number of villages 
involved and ratios of cross-institutional links (Table 3.2 and Table 3.3). The average of 
the former factor among the cooperative transformations is lower (2.2) than its 
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counterpart (6.3). The average of the latter factor among the cooperative cases is higher 
(0.6) than that of the non-cooperative cases (0.3). We now turn our attention to model 
selection techniques to explore the relationships between the explanatory variables listed 
in Table 3.1 and whether the transformation was cooperative or non-cooperative.  
 
Table 3.2. Categorical variable statistics by cooperative and non-cooperative 
transformations. For details, see Table 3.1. 
Variables  
Non-cooperative transformation 
(N=24) 
Cooperative transformation 
(N=65) 
Frequency (%) Frequency (%) 
(=0) (=1) (=2) (=0) (=1) (=2) 
Size of resource system 5 (21%) 13 (54%) 6 (25%) 19 (29%) 36 (55%) 10 (15%) 
Terrain of resource system 13 (54%) 11 (46%)  44 (68%) 21 (32%)  
Existence of tenant fees 6 (25%) 18 (75%)  25 (38%) 40 (62%)  
Spatial extent of villages 11 (46%) 5 (21%) 8 (33%) 42 (65%) 10 (15%) 13 (13%) 
 
 
Table 3.3.  Continuous variable statistics by cooperative and non-cooperative 
transformations. For details, see Table 3.2.  
Variables  
Non-cooperative transformation Cooperative transformation 
Mean Std. Dev. Min, Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min, Max 
Number of horizontally-linked 
member villages 6.330 9.020 0, 39 2.185 2.567 1, 16 
Ratio of member villages with 
cross-institutional links 0.344 0.423 0, 1 0.561 0.486 0, 1 
Topographic location of villages 0.244 0.127 0.051, 0.558 0.221 0.119 0.051, 0.610 
 
 
3.6.2. Model selection 
 
 The model selection results suggested that 20 models could be considered as 
plausible (Table 3.4). Given the data and set of candidate models, the best explanatory 
model is the one that included number of horizontally-linked villages and ratio of member 
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villages with cross-institutional links. The former variable was included in all of the 
plausible models with a negative response. The latter variable had a probability of 0.87 of 
being in the best approximating model with a positive response. Thus, cooperative 
outcomes were associated with lower number of horizontal villages and higher proportion 
of cross-linked villages. Existence of tenant fees had a probability close to 0.5 of being in 
the best model and with the previous two variables formed the second plausible model. 
The association of outcomes with existence of tenant fees was negative. The third model 
added terrain of resource system to the best model. This variable had a probability of 
0.31 with a negative coefficient. The fourth model added topographic location of villages 
to the best model. This variable had a probability of 0.32 of being in the best fitting 
model and its response was negative. Size of resource system was added in the fifth 
plausible model. This variable had a probability of 0.31 with a positive coefficient. 
Finally, spatial extent of villages first appears in the 17th plausible model. This variable 
had a low probability (0.14) of being in the best fitting model with a positive coefficient.  
See Table B.2 for the variable values used in the model selection. 
  
 Table 3.4. Plausible models identified by the AIC method. For each model, the table indicates the coefficient of the variables 
included, the number of parameters (df), log-likelihood (logLik), delta weight (∆AIC, difference between the AIC for a given 
model and the AIC of the best-fitting model), and Akaike weights (w, the model selection probability). Averaged coefficients 
and the relative variable importance are also presented. The Akaike weight is the probability that a model would be selected 
as the best-fitting model if the data were collected again under identical circumstances. Model averaged estimates are 
weighted by their Akaike weight. 
Model df (Intercept) 
Spatial 
extent 
of 
villages 
Existence of 
tenant fees 
Topographic 
location of 
villages 
Number of 
horizontal  
villages 
Ratio of 
cross- 
institutional 
links 
Terrain of 
resource 
systems 
Size of 
resource 
system logLik AIC w 
1 3 1.1059 - - - -1.0601 0.6322 - - -44.09 94.19 0.12 
2 4 1.1254 - - - -1.1117 0.6114 - - -43.24 94.47 0.10 
3 4 1.1091 - -0.3664 - -1.0242 0.6667 -0.2176 - -43.78 95.55 0.06 
4 4 1.1163 - - -0.2259 -0.9973 0.7214 - - -43.85 95.70 0.06 
5 6 0.9612 - -0.4227 - -1.5737 0.6889 - -0.0923 -41.88 95.75 0.05 
6 5 1.1409 - -0.3863 -0.2598 -1.0257 0.7069 - - -42.91 95.82 0.05 
7 5 0.8885 - - - -1.4457 0.7125 - 0.0064 -42.93 95.85 0.05 
8 5 1.1254 - -0.3348 - -1.0959 0.6264 -0.0710 - -43.21 96.42 0.04 
9 6 0.8829 - - - -1.4584 0.7606 -0.2790 -0.0081 -42.43 96.86 0.03 
10 5 1.1238 - - -0.2585 -0.9443 0.7760 -0.2464 - -43.46 96.91 0.03 
11 7 0.9199 - -0.4429 -0.2941 -1.5067 0.8027 - -0.0218 -41.48 96.96 0.03 
12 6 0.8402 - - -0.2638 -1.3957 0.8240 - 0.08224 -42.61 97.22 0.03 
13 3 1.0528 - -0.4015 - -0.9802 - - - -45.70 97.40 0.02 
14 2 1.0207 - - - -0.9109 - - - -46.78 97.56 0.02 
15 7 0.9530 - -0.3676 - -1.5649 0.7160 -0.1257 -0.0908 -41.79 97.59 0.02 
16 6 1.1420 - -0.3444 -0.2674 -1.0029 0.7315 -0.0942 - -42.87 97.73 0.02 
17 5 0.9564 1.0000 - - -1.2842 0.5691 - - -43.92 97.83 0.02 
18 7 0.8127 - - -0.3069 -1.4014 0.9021 -0.3128 0.1034 -42.00 98.00 0.02 
19 6 0.9913 1.0000 -0.3573 - -1.3017 0.5583 - - -43.11 98.22 0.02 
20 8 0.8989 - -0.3745 -0.3068 -1.4952 0.8450 -0.1518 -0.0017 -41.36 98.73 0.01 
Averaged coefficients 1.0230 0.0046 -0.1788 -0.0802 -1.2054 0.6007 -0.0536 -0.0110    
Relative variable importance 1.00 0.14 0.46 0.32 1.00 0.87 0.31 0.31    
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3.6.3. Linking social connectedness and biophysical context 
 
 We ran correlation analyses to test whether the biophysical context (topographic 
location) of a village is associated with its social connectedness. We first tested the 
association between the topographic location4 of a village and the group size of each 
songgye (number of villages) that the village belonged to5. The association is significant 
(p-value < 0.001) with a modest correlation (Pearson's r=0.365). This suggests that 
villages situated on a flat valley are more likely to be a member of an allied songgye (e.g., 
songgye A in Figure 3.3 B and D) than villages located in mountainous areas. This make 
intuitive sense: with more neighbors and less resource availability in its immediate 
surroundings, a village located in a valley probably had more incentives to cooperate with 
others to economize costs of operating a songgye. The association between the 
topographic location and whether a village carried at least one cross-institutional link is 
not significant (p-value > 0.05). 
 
3.7. Discussion and conclusion 
 
 This research began with the assertion that given the process of globalization now 
underway, the study of the commons needs to not only address whether cooperation 
                                                 
4 Topographic position index (TPI) (Weiss 2001) is derived for each sub-district that contains member 
villages. For each sub-district, areas of flat and lower slopes are divided by the total sub-district area to 
derive the percentage of flat terrains. 
5 Here, our unit of analysis is associations between a village and its participations in one or more songgye. 
Because we are dealing with past robustness, we apply all 156 cases of songgye as the sample. Since some 
villages joined more than one songgye, the total count of associations is 501 (although the total number of 
villages is 338). 
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arises or fails in a given set of biophysical, social, and economic circumstances, but also 
to begin to understand the dynamics of cooperation as those circumstances change. Here, 
I examined some dimensions of post-failure processes and the question of what factors 
help explain the nature of post-failure transformation of self-governed CPR systems. In 
particular, I focused on the effect of the design of organizational form linked to nested 
enterprise. In the current body of literature, we found no studies that directly attempted to 
answer this question in a structured way. Most of the studies either focused on 
relationships among aspects of specific disturbances, responses, and vulnerability 
tradeoffs or depended on either a single or a small-N set of cases that could not offer 
understanding of underlying structure for observed patterns of transformation in a 
statistically significant way.  
 From analyzing 89 songgye in Geumsan that underwent transformations under 
globalization, we observed two broad categories of transformation: cooperative and non-
cooperative transformations. The majority of the observed transformations are 
cooperative (65 out of 89). The presence of these two broader trajectories of 
transformation simply reflects the nature of a dilemma faced by the users: whether to 
continue to pursue some form of social welfare as they had previously or opt for private 
gains. The fact that the majority of the observed transformations are cooperative may be 
explained by the sampling bias we introduced by selecting only those songgye that 
remained intact until the early 1960s, which implies that our sample probably consisted 
of villages that were inherently high in social capital. Such higher levels of social capital 
probably enabled many villages to pursue some form of collective welfare in spite of the 
apparent temptation to pursue individual gains during transformations. 
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 Second, the best-fitting model shows that cooperative transformations are 
negatively correlated with number of horizontally-linked villages in a songgye. On the 
other hand, cooperative transformations are positively associated with the ratio of 
member villages with cross-institutional links. The opposite is true for non-cooperative 
transformations. The direction of association exhibited by the number of villages in a 
songgye is consistent with the transaction cost hypothesis of group size—the more 
participants there are in a collective action problem, the more difficult it is to organize 
collective action due to higher coordination or transaction costs (Poteete and Ostrom 
2004, Araral 2009). Because participant villages in a songgye act cohesively as single 
actors at the system-level, the number of member villages is a scale-invariant 
representation of group size. As such, songgye with higher counts of member villages 
probably faced greater transaction costs and thus were less likely to maintain collective 
action through transformations. This speculation is consistent with the observed patterns 
in our sample data. One might ask then why such songgye with large group sizes even 
existed in the first place. In the past, this type of social infrastructure design was probably 
possible or even welcomed because the salience of forest resources for villager 
livelihoods was high and the necessary public infrastructure, e.g., mountain trails, were 
threshold public goods that required economy of scale in contributions of human effort. 
 What we find more interesting is the positive association between the ratio of 
member villages with cross-institutional links and the prospect of villages engaging in 
more cooperative transformations. Such links emerged when the villages in Geumsan 
participate in multiple instances of songgye simultaneously. We speculate that these 
villages with cross-institutional links may have functioned as bridging actors or 
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connectors who facilitated information exchanges and brought in networks of contacts 
that helped local communities to gain access to new ideas and resources as well as 
institutional diversity (Westley 1995, Folke et al. 2005). In the past, these villages 
probably fostered circulation of more diverse and up-to-date knowledge useful for 
governing forest commons sustainably. Similarly, in the modern-day situations of 
transformation driven by globalization, the presence of such connectors probably 
mitigated the problem of information uncertainties regarding available trajectories of 
transformation and the associated costs and benefits. For example, the presence of 
bridging villages may have better facilitated circulation of information regarding the 
serviceability of new community infrastructure that villagers weren't aware of, what the 
social value of a conservation or alternative public infrastructure could be, or what the 
expected market value of a forest might have been if sold. 
 Next, we find some evidence that there was a potential tradeoff between 
robustness and transformative capacity of songgye. Our analysis shows that the 
topographic location of a village and the number of its horizontal links are significantly 
associated. Given that this connectedness resembles the organizational structure for 
nested entperise which are known to enhance adaptive capacity and thus robustness of 
social systems (Ostrom 1996, Folke et al. 2005, Marshall 2008), we could infer the 
following: such connectedness evolved in Geumsan in part because of the villages' efforts 
to enhance robustness of resource flows to variation associated with the biophysical 
context in which they operated. In the past, the emergence of such context-dependent 
connectedness probably gave those songgye more robustness to uncertainty in resource 
flows. For example, from the horizontal links, such songgye probably had more local 
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adaptability and economy of scale for providing collective goods. However, when 
pressures associated with globalization finally necessitated transformations, the 
advantages of horizontal links no longer applied and the transaction costs associated with 
horizontal links may have dominated the transformation action situation.  
 Lastly, we reflect on the effects of the remaining independent variables. Although 
these variables were absent in the best-fitting model, we can make the following 
assessments. The negative associations of the cooperative outcomes with existence of 
tenant fees, terrain of resource system, and topographic location of villages may imply 
that when these variables have larger values, the forests probably have more favorable 
terrains and locations and thus more potential for alternative uses. This could mean 
higher opportunity costs for transforming cooperatively. Contrary to our expectation, 
existence of tenant fees is negatively associated with the cooperative outcomes. A 
possible explanation is that slash-and-burn farming was strongly curbed by the national-
level forestation policies from the early 1970s, meaning no more revenue from tenants 
(Bae and Lee 2006). The positive associations of the cooperative outcomes with size of 
resource system and spatial extent of villages may be explained by the observation that 
some songgye with large-scale resource systems spread over multiple sub-districts chose 
to informally sub-divide their forests among their member villages (Kang 2001). This 
informal sub-division of shared property rights could have given those member villages 
more incentives for transforming cooperatively. 
 From the above analysis, some conclusions may be drawn about the 
transformative capacity of SES subjected to the growing extent and intensity of global 
interconnectedness. When self-governed CPR systems become untenable as a result of 
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globalization, systems with lower transaction costs, i.e., those with smaller group size, 
and higher network diversity, i.e., more ties to others through linkages such as cross-
linked property rights or shared institutional memory, are more likely to organize 
transformations that still preserve some form of collective welfare. Conversely, 
previously highly efficient systems that relied on economy of scale and undivided 
participation from multiple social systems through nested enterprise may become more 
vulnerable to transforming uncooperatively when they become untenable. Certainly, the 
present paper is limited in scope. Further studies on other contexts may find different 
empirical patterns and different variables to be more important. However, we emphasize 
that the accumulation of different insights from different contexts and their comparisons 
including ours will only lead to a fuller understanding on the transformative capacity of 
SES. 
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4. WHAT CHARACTERIZES EFFECTIVE ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF 
SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL SYSTEM UNDER UNCERTAINTY? EVIDENCE FROM 
A LABORATORY BEHAVIORAL EXPERIMENT 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
  
 Managing a complex social-ecological system (SES) under global change is an 
endeavor fraught with high degrees of uncertainty (Dietz et al. 2003). Over the years, 
scholars have come to agree that a learning-focused approach such as adaptive 
management is necessary to deal with the uncertainty and complexity of SES 
management (Folke et al. 2010, Polasky et al. 2011). In adaptive management, the 
process of learning-by-doing is a key condition for success—an iterative decision-making 
process in which decision-makers adapt to changing conditions and new information by 
constantly learning from re-evaluating past assumptions and actions (Walters and Holling 
1990, Gunderson 1999, Lee 1999). In addition, a large volume of literature suggests that 
several other conditions or processes contribute to the social capacity necessary to 
implement adaptive management. These conditions include, for example, user 
participation (Armitage et al. 2009, Plummer et al. 2012), monitoring and reflection 
(Armitage et al. 2008), leadership (Folke et al. 2005, Gutiérrez et al. 2011) and 
knowledge generation (Berkes 2009), among others. These conditions likely characterize  
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exemplary features of adaptive management linked to SES resilience (Walker et al. 2004, 
Folke et al. 2010) or robustness (Anderies et al. 2004). 
 However, after three decades of research on adaptive management of SES, the 
question of what type of learning-by-doing is most effective and under what conditions 
still remains largely unanswered (Biggs et al. 2012, Fabricius and Cundill 2014). That is, 
although our theoretical understanding on each of the conditions related to adaptive 
management is considerable, how these conditions combine to differentially affect SES 
adaptability in the face of uncertainty is poorly understood. What are appropriate 
configurations of learning-by-doing and supporting conditions? Do such configurations 
vary depending on the presence or absence of uncertainty? This study examines these 
questions using a laboratory behavioral experiment of SES. Human-subjects of our 
behavioral experiment face a decision problem on collective management of an irrigation 
infrastructure under environmental uncertainty. By observing how they iteratively 
deliberate and learn to solve the decision problem under uncertainty, we tried to uncover 
some of the causal configurations of the conditions linked to successful adaptive 
management of SES. 
 We used the experimental data from a laboratory irrigation experiment that was 
conducted for another study (Anderies et al. 2013a). A large number of undergraduate 
students in a U.S. university (21 groups of five participants) participated in the 
experiment in 2010. Following the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) 
Framework (Ostrom et al. 1994), our irrigation experiment is designed to have the 
biophysical characteristics and the structure of action situation that mirror collective 
management of a farmer-managed irrigation system (Yoder 1994) in a developing 
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context. The participants tackled the management decision problem through multiple 
rounds of group discussion, management actions, and sensing outcomes of those actions, 
while facing environmental uncertainty in selected rounds. This repeated cycle of the 
steps most likely facilitated the participants to engage in an iterative learning-by-doing to 
manage their irrigation system. Hence, a careful analysis of the experiment data may 
provide empirical clues to identifying what type of learning-by-doing is most effective 
and under what conditions for successful adaptive SES management. Controlled 
behavioral experiments in a laboratory setting are typically used to study specific 
hypotheses about human behavior in collective action situations (Poteete et al. 2010). 
Although this type of experiments does not involve actual stakeholders in a real field 
setting, it has confirmed numerous observed phenomena in field studies and contributed 
to theoretical developments in the study of human behavior in the use of common-pool 
resources and public goods (Poteete et al. 2010). 
 The action situation of the experiment captures the essence of collective action 
problems associated with managing a farmer-managed irrigation system. In a typical 
system, farmers convey water from its source through production infrastructure (weir) 
and distribution infrastructure (canals) to produce food. But such action situations pose 
two types of decision problems on farmers (Ostrom and Gardner 1993, Dayton-Johnson 
2003). First, farmers must mobilize a substantial level of collective labor to repair the 
infrastructure each year (canals must be cleaned of debris and damaged water diversion 
structures must be fixed). If too few farmers participate in the collective repair work, the 
irrigation system stops functioning and everyone loses out (a threshold public goods 
dilemma). Secondly, farmers must coordinate for fair water distribution, which can be 
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undermined by upstream-downstream asymmetry stemming from the canal layout (an 
asymmetric commons dilemma). If upstream farmers do not share water, downstream 
farmers are left with little or no water. In such cases of inequality, downstream farmers 
who do not get enough water often retaliate by not contributing labor to the infrastructure 
(Ostrom and Gardner 1993, Janssen et al. 2011a). Participants in our experiment played 
20 rounds of that action situation. In the initial 10 rounds, they encountered the decision 
problem under environmental certainty, i.e., the rate of water supply feeding the 
infrastructure and the annual decline or deterioration rate of the infrastructure were fixed. 
However, in the latter 10 rounds, they faced the same decision problem under 
environmental uncertainty, i.e., the water supply rate or the infrastructure decline rate was 
fluctuating.  
 Group communication is an important part of our experiment, i.e., participants 
engage in group discussion before making the decisions in every round. Among the 
diverse factors that are known to foster collective action, the opportunity to communicate 
has been consistently revealed to be the most critical of these factors (Sally 1995, 
Cardenas et al. 2000, Janssen et al. 2010). However, in contrast to the voluminous 
scholarship on the effects of communication on collective action, there have been 
relatively few studies on the effects of communication on the adaptability of SES. Our 
research explored the role of communication on SES adaptability by categorizing and 
mapping different types of group communication content to some of the conditions 
related to adaptive management (different types of learning-by-doing, user participation, 
knowledge generation, monitoring and reflection, and group coordination). By mapping 
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such linkages, we tried to identify potential causal configurations of the conditions tied to 
SES adaptability.  
 Previous studies based on the similar experimental setup found that individuals in 
small groups (5 participants) can successfully manage the irrigation system if allowed to 
communicate (Janssen et al. 2011a), individuals are willing to tolerate some inequality in 
the amount of appropriated irrigation water as long as there is some proportional 
equivalence between investments in and benefits from the irrigation infrastructure (ibid), 
and that unequal sharing of irrigation water under environmental certainty may cause 
collective action to be more fragile under environmental uncertainty (Anderies et al. 
2013a). It was also found that the presence of certain combinations of social roles (e.g., 
leader, knowledge-generator, moralist) may influence a group's level of collective action 
(Pérez et al. 2013). This study complements the previous studies by examining how 
participants' prior experience with some emergent conditions of iterative management 
process under environmental certainty affect their capacity to manage the irrigation 
system in times of environmental uncertainty.  
 We measured two types of individual and group-level learning using the 
experimental data: inner-loop (or single-loop) and outer-loop (or double-loop) learning 
processes (Argyris and Schön 1978, Pahl-Wostl 2009, Rodela 2011). These learning 
types, visualized by the recursive processes in Figure 4.1, are known to help SES 
management in different ways. Learning-by-doing through the inner-loop is defined as 
involving revisions or updating of specific strategies or actions to better meet existing 
goals or assumptions. This process focuses on the question: are we as a group doing 
things right? Learning-by-doing through the outer-loop entails change in underlying goals 
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or assumptions that underlie specific strategies or actions. The question here is: are we as 
a group doing the right things? The iterative process of decision-making and learning has 
long been regarded as a central condition of adaptive SES management (Fazey et al. 2005, 
Levrel and Bouamrane 2008, Reed et al. 2010, Tschakert and Dietrich 2010).  In 
particular, learning-by-doing at the level of social learning—learning that goes beyond 
individuals to become situated within  wider social units through social interactions—is 
thought to be essential for success (Reed et al. 2010, Rodela 2011). The participants of 
our irrigation experiment likely engaged in learning-by-doing at the level of social 
learning, i.e., they interacted through group discussions and engaged in decision-making 
and learning.  
 A large volume of literature also highlights the importance of several other 
conditions such as user participation, exchange of knowledge, and continuous monitoring 
and reflection (Armitage et al. 2009, Plummer et al. 2012, Fabricius and Cundill 2014). 
User participation, defined as process whereby individuals, groups, or organizations 
actively engage in decision-making, is considered central to co-management (Reed 2008, 
Armitage et al. 2009). User participation is known to stimulate a group's capacity to learn, 
and thus likely contributes to SES management (Cundill 2010). It is also not surprising 
that active sharing or exchange of knowledge is linked to better group capacity to learn 
and adapt (Berkes 2009, Newig et al. 2010). Further, through monitoring and reflection, 
actors continuously compare and evaluate the effects of their management actions. 
Monitoring and reflection enable the dynamic feedback process that is essential for 
adaptive management (Fabricius and Cundill 2014). Finally, group coordination among 
users likely represents the level of collective action or social cohesion in a group. Group 
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coordination could be interpreted as an outcome of learning-by-doing, but it may also 
occur without it. Tight group coordination for management action can lead to more robust 
SES (e.g., Cifdaloz et al. 2010).  
 We measured all of the above conditions by analyzing the content of group 
communication and the decisions of the participants. Which configurations of the above 
conditions lead to more robust SES? Does every condition need to be present? In 
particular, is there a configuration that works under certainty but fail under uncertainty? 
Analysis of our experimental data may provide clues to these questions.  
 
 
Figure 4.1. Learning-by-doing through inner-loop and outer-loop processes in a social-
ecological system. The inner-loop processes is for controlling specific management 
strategies. The outer-loop process updates shared goals or assumptions that underlie 
specific management actions. The circle with letter R represents the process of reflection. 
The arrows denoted by di and do represent internal and external disturbances, respectively. 
This figure is adapted from Pahl-Wostl (2009) and Anderies (2014b). 
 This chapter progresses through two stages. First, we analyzed both the content of 
group discussion (qualitative data) and the decisions and outcomes of the participants 
(quantitative data) to identify which configurations of the conditions may be causally 
linked to group performance (level of group earnings from the irrigation system) under 
environmental certainty. Second, we explored which configurations may be causally 
linked to the robustness of group performance under environmental uncertainty. We used 
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the analytical method of fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to identify 
potential causal configurations. The results of our fsQCA highlight the importance of 
learning-by-doing at the level of the outer-loop—updating of goals or assumptions that 
underlie specific strategies or actions. Active adapting of goals or assumptions may be a 
necessary condition for robustness under uncertainty. 
 
4.2. Methods 
 
4.2.1. Experimental action situation 
 
 Our research data are from a laboratory irrigation experiment conducted at 
Arizona State University in 2010 (Anderies et al. 2013a). A randomly-recruited sample of 
105 undergraduate students (21 groups of five participants) from various majors 
participated in the experiment. The experiment was administered through a computer 
interface that emulates the essence of collective action problems associated with 
managing a farmer-managed irrigation system. Each participant sat in a study cubicle 
with a computer during the experiment, and was instructed not to verbally speak with 
their neighbors or see others' computer screens. How a participant performed in the 
experiment (i.e., earn tokens from managing and using the irrigation system) was directly 
linked to monetary rewards he or she received at the end of the experiment ($0.05 per 
token), i.e., salience. Hence, each participant faced incentives to make decisions that 
increase his or her tokens earned. 
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 The experiment began with a moderator reading out instructions to the 
participants about the rules and procedures of the experiment, followed by a short quiz 
that tested how well they understood the experiment. Next, each group of five 
participants played two rounds the experiment as practice. Finally, each group went 
through 20 rounds of the action situation linked to monetary rewards. Each round is 
comprised of the following three steps. 
 In the first step, all participants in a group enter into group discussion for 60 
seconds. They use a computer chat interface to communicate with others in the same 
group. They typically engage in discussions about the following subjects, among others: 
conditions of the irrigation system, outcomes or behaviors of individuals and the whole 
group in previous rounds, specific group strategies to deploy in the second step (how 
much tokens to invest for maintaining the irrigation infrastructure) and the third step 
(how to coordinate among themselves to harvest water from the irrigation infrastructure ), 
shared goals or assumptions to achieve (e.g., equal harvesting of water, optimal 
maintenance of the infrastructure), supporting information or knowledge about the action 
situation, and how to correct behaviors of specific participants that deviate from shared 
strategies. In short, group discussion is the main arena through which social interactions 
occur for managing the irrigation system. 
 At the start of the second step, each participant receives an endowment of 10 
tokens. He or she must decide how much of this endowment to invest for maintaining the 
infrastructure or for keeping. Un-invested tokens yield a fixed return of $0.05 per token. 
This investment decision can lie anywhere between two extremes: invest all for the 
infrastructure maintenance and keep all for the fixed return. In round 1, the infrastructure 
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is initialized to 75% efficiency. Note that investments are regularly needed to repair the 
infrastructure because its efficiency declines at a certain rate every round. This decline 
mirrors the natural wear-out of irrigation infrastructure from accumulation of debris in 
canals or washouts of water diversion structures from flash floods. Normal rate of the 
efficiency decline is 25% per round. Investment of one token restores the efficiency by 
1%. This means that at least 25 tokens are needed every round to stop the net decline of 
the infrastructure efficiency.  
 The relationship between the infrastructure efficiency and the water delivery 
capacity of the infrastructure  (cubic feet of water  per second) is of sigmoid shape 
(Figure 4.2 A). The infrastructure must have at least 46% efficiency to start to convey 
water. However, beyond 61% efficiency, the infrastructure faces diminishing return in 
delivery capacity as additional investments are made to increase the efficiency. Note that 
the water source (e.g., river, reservoir) normally supplies 30 cubic feet of water per 
second to the infrastructure. This means that, under the normal conditions, it is optimal to 
maintain the infrastructure at 66% efficiency (i.e., synchronizing the water delivery 
capacity and the water supply rate at 30cf/s) and invest 25 tokens every round to 
compensate for the infrastructure decline of 25%. If the infrastructure efficiency drops 
below 66%, the delivery capacity falls below the available water supply .  
 This investment decision problem faced by the participants is essentially a 
threshold public goods dilemma. To make the infrastructure perform, collective 
investments are needed because no one can single-handedly maintain the infrastructure 
(i.e., 25 tokens are needed to balance the efficiency decline of 25% but a single 
participant is endowed with only 10 tokens). However, the benefit of investment (water 
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diverted and conveyed by the infrastructure) is open to all participants regardless of their 
investment levels. Thus, self-interested rational actors would invest zero tokens and 
attempt to free-ride by taking water without investment. 
 In the third step, participants in a group harvest water from the infrastructure over 
the period of 50 seconds to produce crop, which yields tokens. They open and close water 
gates to their fields in the computer interface to harvest water (Figure 4.3). An opened 
gate can take water at a maximum rate of 25cf/s. The relationship between water harvest 
and crop production (tokens earned) is of inverted-U shape (Figure 4.2 B). Crop 
production is maximized at 500-549 cf of water harvest. Beyond this interval, additional 
water harvest leads to reduced crop production because of adverse effects, e.g., water 
logging. It is crucial to note that there are five participants (denoted as participant A, B, C, 
D and E in the computer interface) in a group, and that they are heterogeneously located 
along the irrigation canal from the water diversion point (Figure 4.3). Participant A is 
closest to the water or at the most upstream location, while participant E is furthest from 
the water source or at the most downstream location. This heterogeneity in location leads 
to the so-called asymmetric commons dilemma, i.e., benefit is available to all, but 
individuals are heterogeneous in their capacity to obtain the benefit. In such a setting, 
advantaged individuals are tempted to take more benefit than others, which subtracts 
from what is available to others. Thus, self-interested rational participants in upstream 
locations would take as much water as they can (500~549cf of water), leaving little or no 
water for downstream participants.  
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Figure 4.2. Biophysical rules associated with the infrastructure investment and water 
harvest activities in the irrigation experiment. Panel A shows that the relationship 
between infrastructure efficiency and water delivery capacity is of sigmoid shape. Panel 
B shows that the relationship between water harvest and tokens earned from crop 
production is of inverted-U shape. 
 
Figure 4.3. Interface for water harvest in the irrigation experiment. Five participants with 
heterogeneous positions (position A, B, C, D and E) are located along the canal (blue-
colored water pipe with white bubbles). Participants can open and close their gates to 
harvest water. Note that position A is closest to the water or at the most upstream location. 
Participant E is farthest from the water or at the most downstream location. 
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 Each group played the first 10 rounds of the experiment under the normal 
conditions or stable environment, i.e., water supply rate is fixed at 30cf/s and the 
infrastructure declines by 25% every round. In the latter 10 rounds, however, each group 
faced one of the four experimental treatments that represent different kinds of 
environmental uncertainty. Note that, in round 11, the infrastructure efficiency is re-
initialized to 75%. The first two treatments relate to uncertainty in the rate of 
infrastructure decline (Figure 4.4 A). In the infrastructure high variability (I-HV) 
treatment, the decline rate fluctuates between 10% and 80% with the mean of 25%. In the 
infrastructure low variability (I-LV) treatment, the decline rate fluctuates between 15% 
and 35% with the same mean of 25%. A high decline rate (e.g., 80%) represents extreme 
flashfloods that destroy the irrigation infrastructure. The latter two treatments relate to 
uncertainty in the rate of water supply feeding the infrastructure (Figure 4.4 B). In the 
water supply high variability treatment (W-HV), the supply rate varies between 20cf/s 
and 40cf/s. This variability is reduced to the range of 25cf/s~35cf/s under the water 
supply low variability (W-LV) treatment. The number of groups that played each 
treatment is 5 groups for I-LV, 6 groups for I-HV, 5 groups for W-LV, and 5 groups for 
W-HV treatments. 
 The presence of environmental uncertainty in the latter 10 rounds means that 
groups need to dynamically adjust their decisions to maintain their performance. Which 
conditions differentiate the groups that adapt successfully and those that fail to do so? We 
hypothesize that a group's prior exposure to different configurations of learning-by-doing 
and supporting conditions may be causally associated with how well the group adapts 
under environmental uncertainty. Such prior exposure may influence the level of adaptive 
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capacity that a group develops. This paper examines potential causal linkages between 
configurations of  learning-by-doing and supporting conditions seen in the stable rounds 
and the robustness of group performance in the unstable rounds. 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Four types of environmental uncertainty are introduced in the irrigation 
experiment. Panel A shows high and low variability in infrastructure decline rate. Panel B 
shows high and low variability in water supply rate. 
 
4.2.2. Outcomes 
 
 We considered two outcome variables: group performance under environmental 
certainty and the robustness of group performance under environmental uncertainty 
(Table 4.1). In the stable rounds, a group's token earnings from water harvest depends 
heavily on the infrastructure efficiency, which in turn depends on the level of collective 
action achieved among participants. Thus, a group's total earnings from water harvest in 
an interval of rounds is an indicator for group performance (Pérez et al. 2013). We set the 
group earnings from water harvest in rounds 6 to 10 as our measure of group 
performance under environmental certainty. Earlier rounds (rounds 1 to 5) are excluded 
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because group participants typically take a few early rounds to stabilize their behavior. 
Hence, group earnings from water harvest in rounds 6 to 10 is a more reliable indicator of 
group performance. While the lack of water harvest in rounds 1 to 5 may be of a transient 
nature, the deficiency of water harvest in rounds 6 to 10 is more definitive sign of poor 
group performance.  
 The robustness of group performance under environmental uncertainty is 
measured by comparing the group earnings from water harvest in rounds 11 to 15 (rounds 
with uncertainty) to that in rounds 6 to 10 (rounds with certainty). The comparison is 
made by deriving the ratio of group earnings from water harvest in the unstable rounds to 
that in the stable rounds. The ratio values around 1.0 indicate little or no change in group 
performance despite the uncertainty treatment (thus, a sign of robustness to the 
fluctuating conditions). The ratio values considerably below 1.0 signify a large drop in 
group performance in times of uncertainty (thus, a sign of fragility to the uncertainty). 
Note that groups that performed poorly in the stable rounds but performed better or 
similarly in the unstable rounds will likely have a ratio value near or above 1.0. Because 
such ratio values are misleading, we excluded the groups that performed poorly in round 
6 to 10 in our analysis for robustness. See APPENDIX D for more details on how these 
two outcome variables are measured. 
 
4.2.3. Causal conditions 
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 We considered six potential causal conditions: type of learning-by-doing (inner-
loop and outer-loop learning), user participation in decision-making process, knowledge-
sharing, monitoring and reflection, and group coordination (Table 4.1). We analyzed both 
the content of group discussion  and the actual decisions of group participants to evaluate 
the six conditions. 
 The occurrence of learning-by-doing may be demonstrated when participants 
revise their group strategies through social interactions. Of course, a change in group 
strategy does not necessarily mean that learning has occurred. Conversely, continuation 
of a group strategy does not necessarily mean that learning has not occurred. But given 
that learning-by-doing typically revolves around the recursive process of reflecting on 
past outcomes and deliberating for a new management action for testing, a change in 
group strategy is a relatively good proxy for the occurrence of learning-by-doing. 
 The existence of a group strategy adhered by participants and whether there is a 
change in such a shared strategy is a sign of learning-by-doing in action. If the majority 
of participants in a group (i.e., three or more participants) follow a same rule for either 
the investment or water harvest decision in a given round, we assumed that a group 
strategy is present in that round. For example, a group strategy likely exists when three or 
more participants invest a same amount of tokens or extract a same amount of water 
based on prior agreements made through group discussions. Whenever a group strategy 
for either the investment or water harvest decision is revised or updated in a round to 
better meet an existing goal, we treated it as an occurrence of learning-by-doing through 
the inner-loop (APPENDIX D). For example, if the prevailing assumption shared by 
group participants is to share water equally, they will experiment with various water 
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allocation and distribution strategies to approach that goal. Likewise, if the social goal is 
to maintain  the infrastructure efficiency at the 66~70% interval, they will test various 
investment strategies to move toward that goal.  
 Similarly, an occurrence of outer-loop learning may be detected in a given round 
when a group strategy for either the investment or water harvest decision is revised to 
meet a new goal or assumption (see APPENDIX D for the different types of social goals 
we identified). For example, if the content of group discussion reveals that participants 
share an updated assumption that 66% infrastructure efficiency is better than 81% 
efficiency and their subsequent decisions show they indeed switched their investment 
decisions to reach that new goal, it is highly likely that an outer-loop learning has 
occurred.  
 We aggregated these round-level occurrences of learning types through rounds 1 
to 10 and the last practice round (see APPENDIX D). These aggregated results represent 
a group's exposure to inner- and outer-loop learning-by doing prior to environmental 
uncertainty. The last practice round is included because decision-making and learning 
frequently occur in it and carry into the subsequent rounds. Hence, we included the last 
practice round for more accurate analysis. 
 User participation for decision-making is assumed to be present in a given round 
whenever two or more participants propose a unique group strategy during group 
discussion of that round (e.g., "everyone invest 5 tokens this round", "open gate for 10 
seconds only"). All unique strategy proposals are counted regardless of whether or not 
they are followed by participants. Similarly, monitoring and reflection is assumed to be 
present in a given round whenever one or more participants comment about outcomes or 
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behaviors of individuals or the whole group (e.g., "it didn't work", "that was a bad round", 
"E didn't invest in the last round"), raise issues with certain individuals in order to correct 
their behavior (e.g., "hey A, close your gate", "hey A and B, if you don't share water, I 
will stop investing"), or comment about a biophysical condition (e.g., "infrastructure 
efficiency dropped to 45%"). We also assumed that knowledge-sharing  is present in a 
given round whenever one or more participants give some kind of supporting information, 
explanation, or knowledge about the action situation of or tips about the experiment (e.g., 
"available water supply is only 30cf/s, so it is optimal to keep 66% efficiency"). We 
again aggregated these round-level occurrences of user participation, knowledge-sharing, 
and monitoring and evaluation through rounds 1 to 10 and the last practice round to 
determine their overall levels prior to environmental uncertainty. 
  Finally, group coordination is assumed to be present in a given round whenever 
the majority of participants (three or more participants) follow same rules for both the 
investment and water harvest decisions. Frequent occurrences of such a tight group 
coordination imply a high level of collective action or social cohesion in a group. We 
again aggregated the round-level occurrences of group coordination to estimate its overall 
level prior to environmental uncertainty.  
 We examined in detail both the content of group discussion and the decisions and 
outcomes of participants to estimate the six conditions for all 21 groups. A protocol was 
devised to assess the conditions (see APPENDIX D). Using the protocol, two of the co-
authors independently carried out coding to determine the levels of the conditions. After 
the coding, the two coders came together and compared their coding results to discern 
where the results match and mismatch. For the mismatched results, the two coders re-
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analyzed the raw data and discussed until a consensus was reached. Two measures of 
inter-coder reliability, percent agreement and Cohen's Kappa (Cohen 1960), were derived 
to assess the consistency of our coding work. Cohen's Kappa score is generally thought to 
be more robust than percent agreement because it takes into consideration the agreement 
occurring by chance. Percent agreement came out to be 75%. The average of the Cohen's 
Kappa scores for the six conditions came out to be 59%. This score is on the borderline 
between being 'moderate' and 'substantial agreement' (Landis and Koch 1977) or falls in 
the range for 'fair to good' (Fleiss 1981).  
 
Table 4.1. Definitions of the outcome variables and the causal conditions related to 
adaptability in the irrigation experiment. See APPENDIX D for more details. 
Variables Definitions 
Outcomes:  
Group performance Level of tokens earned by a group from harvesting water from the irrigation 
system in rounds 6 to 10 (rounds with the normal or stable conditions). This 
measure is derived by calibrating total number of tokens earned. The 
calibrated measure has a  continuous  scale  of  0–1.0 (clearly low 
performance = 0, clearly high performance = 1.0). 
Robustness of group 
performance 
Level of continuity in the performance (see above) under environmental 
variability. This measure is derived by calculating the ratio of group 
earnings from water harvest in rounds 11 to 15(unstable rounds) to that in 
rounds 6 to 10 (stable rounds). The resulting measure is then calibrated to 
have a continuous scale of 0–1.0 (clearly fragile = 0, clearly resilient = 1.0). 
Causal conditions:  
Inner-loop learning How often a group changed or tested different group strategies for the 
investment or water harvest decision  to meet an existing group goal (clearly 
often  =  1.0,  more often than not  =  0.67,  seldom  =  0.33,  clearly never  
=  0.0). 
Outer-loop learning How often a group changed or tested different group goals or assumptions 
that guide specific group strategies (clearly often  =  1.0,  more often than 
not  =  0.67,  seldom  =  0.33,  clearly never  =  0.0). 
User participation Level of user participation in the decision-making processes for group 
strategies (clearly participatory  =  1.0,  more participatory than not  =  0.67,  
less participatory than not  =  0.33,  clearly not participatory  =  0.0). 
Knowledge-sharing Level of sharing or exchange of supporting information during group 
discussions (clearly present  =  1.0,  more present than not  =  0.67,  seldom 
present  =  0.33,  clearly absent  =  0.0). 
Group coordination Level of participant coordination for group strategy in both the 
infrastructure investment and water harvest decisions (clearly present  =  
1.0,  more present than not  =  0.67,  seldom present  =  0.33,  clearly absent  
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=  0.0). 
Monitoring and reflection Level of monitoring and evaluation regarding (1) group- and individual-
level outcomes and behaviors, (2) condition of biophysical components, or  
(3) correcting of opportunistic behaviors (clearly present  =  1.0,  more 
present than not  =  0.67,  seldom present  =  0.33,  clearly absent  =  0.0). 
 
4.2.4. Analytical approach 
 
 We used fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to identify possible 
configurations of the six conditions causally linked to the two outcome variables. Given 
the medium-N size (21 groups ) of our sample data and our goal of identifying multiple 
causal configurations, we judged that fsQCA is the best analytical method available to us. 
fsQCA, which is based on Boolean algebra, treats an empirical case as a logical 
configuration of set-memberships to different conditions and outcomes (Ragin 1987, 
2000). fsQCA allows researchers to identify all possible configurations of conditions that 
may be causally associated with the outcome of interest (Pérez et al. 2013, Basurto 2013). 
The set-theoretic assumption allows researchers to establish the conditions of necessity 
and sufficiency (Ragin 2008). A condition is necessary but not sufficient if it appears in 
all configurations tied to an outcome. A condition is sufficient but not necessary if its 
presence is associated with an outcome in certain configurations but is not the only 
condition with that association (i.e., there is another condition associated with that 
outcome). A condition is both necessary and sufficient if it is tied to an outcome and is 
the only condition with that linkage. For more details on the method, see Ragin (2000, 
2008). Poteete et al.(2010), Basurto (2013), and Pérez et al. (2013) also provide the 
methodological overview or exemplary applications of the method to the study of SES. 
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We conducted fsQCA using a software program called fs/QCA, a widely-used  tool for 
QCA developed by Charles Ragin and his colleagues. This software is freely available for 
download and use for research purposes. Visit www.compasss.org for more information 
about and to download fs/QCA.  
 We conducted fsQCA through two stages. First, all configurations of the 
conditions were tested for their potential causal linkage to group performance under 
environmental certainty. We used all of the 21 groups in this analysis. The results show 
which conditions are necessary, sufficient, or both for the outcome. In the second stage, 
we sought to identify possible configurations that may be causally linked to the 
robustness of group performance under environmental uncertainty. We dropped two 
groups (group 5 and 12) from the second analysis because they performed poorly in 
rounds 6 to 10. Comparison of group performance between rounds 11 to 15 and rounds 6 
to 10 is not meaningful for these two groups.  
 We used two subsets of the remaining 19 groups for the second analysis: the 
sample containing all of the 19 groups and the sample containing the groups that faced 
the high variability treatments only (i.e., the groups that faced I-HV and W-HV 
treatments). Applying all of the 19 groups allows us to explore potential causal 
configurations linked to more general coping capacity, irrespective of the differences in 
the degree of environmental uncertainty. This mixing of groups with different treatments, 
however, may be problematic because more decline in performance may be explained by 
differences in the level of variability in the treatments  rather than by the differences in 
the causal configurations. That is, groups that faced the high variability treatments likely 
experienced more drop in performance than those that faced the low variability 
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treatments.  Hence, we also did the second analysis using only the groups that faced the 
high variability treatments (I-HV and W-HV). If fsQCA shows a consistent pattern for 
both datasets, we can have more confidence in the results obtained. 
 
4.3. Results 
 
4.3.1. Trends in group performance and robustness 
 
 Figure 4.5 shows change in group performance between rounds 6 to 10 and 
rounds 11 to 15 for all 21 groups. In rounds 6 to 10, the mean and the median group 
earnings from water harvest are 249 and 268, respectively, with the minimum of 58 and 
the maximum of 301. Among 21 groups, 16 groups earned at least 250 tokens in the 
stable rounds. Hence, most of the groups performed similarly in the stable rounds. It can 
be seen from Figure 4.5 that groups 5 and 12 failed to perform adequately in the stable 
rounds. Barring these two groups, the mean and the median percentage change in group 
earnings between the stable and the unstable round intervals came out to be -18% and -
14%, respectively, i.e., group performance generally decreased under uncertainty. The 
largest drop in percentage is -64%. The most positive change is +6%, i.e., one group 
actually increased its performance by 6% under environmental uncertainty. Figure 4.5 
also visually reveals that groups that faced the high variability treatments (I-HV and W-
HV) more consistently experienced decline in group performance under environmental 
variability. The average percentage changes in group performance with the I-HV, I-LV, 
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W-HV, and W-LV treatments are -24%, +1%, -28%, and -2%, respectively. This pattern 
is expected because high variability treatments naturally pose more challenges and 
potential for surprise to the affected groups. 
 We also did cross-table comparisons between the six causal conditions and the 
two outcome variables. Table 4.2 shows that "monitoring and reflection" condition 
appears in all groups regardless of the outcome measure used. This suggests that 
"monitoring and reflection" is a necessary condition for both performance and robustness. 
Further, it can be seen that "outer-loop learning" appears in all of the groups that showed 
robust group performance when both the high and low variability treatments are 
considered. 14 out of 19 groups have set-membership to robust outcome, and they all 
contain that condition in their logical configurations. The same pattern occurs when only 
the high variability treatment groups are considered.  The condition "outer-loop learning" 
is present in the logical configurations of the seven groups that are robust. 
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Figure 4.5. Trends in group performance and robustness in the irrigation experiment. 
Panels A and B show change in group performance between rounds 6 to 10 and rounds 
11 to 15 for the infrastructure low variability (I-LV) and the infrastructure high 
variability (I-HV) treatment groups, respectively. Panels C and D show change in group 
performance between rounds 6 to 10 and rounds 11 to 15 for the water supply low 
variability (W-LV) and the water supply high variability (W-HV) treatment groups, 
respectively. Note that groups 5 and 12 performed poorly in rounds 6 to 10. 
 
Table 4.2. Cross-table comparison between the causal conditions and the outcome 
variables of the irrigation experiment.  
Conditions Levels 
Performance  
(N=21) 
Robustness† 
(N=19) 
Robustness‡ 
(N=11) 
[0, 0.5) (0.5, 1] [0, 0.5) (0.5, 1] [0, 0.5) (0.5, 1] 
Inner-loop 
learning 
0 2 1 1 0 0 0 
0.33 0 5 3 2 3 2 
0.67 0 10 1 9 1 4 
1.0 0 3 0 3 0 1 
Outer-loop 
learning 
0 1 2 2 0 1 0 
0.33 1 1 1 0 1 0 
0.67 0 10 2 8 2 4 
1.0 0 6 0 6 0 3 
User 
participation 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.33 1 5 2   3 2 1 
0.67 1 9 3 6 2 4 
1.0 0 5 0 5 0 2 
Knowledge- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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sharing 0.33 1 9 3 6 2 3 
0.67 1 9 2 7 2 3 
1.0 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Group 
coordination 
0 2 1 1 0 0 0 
0.33 0 6 3 3 3 1 
0.67 0 11 1 10 1 5 
1.0 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Monitoring & 
reflection 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 0.67 1 14 5 9 4 4 
 1.0 1 5 0 5 0 3 
†Two groups are excluded (groups 5 and 12). Both the high and low variability treatment groups are 
included. 
‡Only the high variability treatment groups (I-HV and W-HV) are included. 
 
4.3.2. Causal configurations for performance 
 
 The results of fsQCA show two potential causal configurations linked to group 
performance under environmental certainty (Table 4.3). These are (1) "group 
coordination" combined with "user participation" and "monitoring and reflection" and (2) 
"inner-loop learning" combined with "outer-loop learning" and "monitoring and 
reflection." As hinted by the cross-table comparison, "monitoring and reflection" appears 
in both causal configurations, and is thus a necessary condition for group performance. 
The first configuration signifies that if group participants actively partake in decision-
making and adhere to shared group strategies while regularly evaluating past outcomes, 
they can achieve good performance under environmental certainty (even without active 
learning-by-doing). The second configuration implies the importance of learning-by-
doing: groups that actively engage in both inner- and outer-loop learning via constant 
evaluations of past rounds can succeed in achieving good performance. See APPENDIX 
C for more details on the outputs of fsQCA. 
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4.3.3. Causal configurations for robustness 
 
 Our fsQCA for the robustness of group performance reveals two potential causal 
configurations when both the high and low variability treatment groups are considered: (1) 
"inner-loop learning" combined with "outer-loop learning" and "monitoring and 
reflection"  and (2) "group coordination" combined with " outer-loop learning ", "user 
participation", and "monitoring and reflection" (Table 4.3). The same analysis based on 
the groups that faced only the high variability treatments shows three potential causal 
configurations: (1) "group coordination" combined with "outer-loop learning", "user 
participation", and "monitoring and reflection", (2) "inner-loop learning" combined with 
"outer-loop learning",  "user participation", "knowledge-sharing", and "monitoring and 
reflection", and (3) "inner-loop learning" combined with "outer-loop learning", 
"knowledge-sharing", "group coordination", and "monitoring and reflection." As 
expected, "monitoring and reflection" appears in all of the configurations linked to 
robustness. What we find more interesting is that all of the configurations linked to 
robustness now includes "outer-loop learning". This regularity suggests that learning-by-
doing through the outer-loop is a necessary condition for robust group performance under 
environmental uncertainty. See APPENDIX C for more details on the fuzzy-set truth 
table construction and the consistency and coverage scores of the logical configurations 
we found.  
 
Table 4.3. Comparison of logical configurations linked to group performance under 
environmental certainty and to the robustness of group performance under environmental 
uncertainty. See APPENDIX C오류! 참조 원본을 찾을 수 없습니다. for more details on the outputs 
of fsQCA.  
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Performance Robustness 
(N=21) (N=19) 
Both high and low variability 
(N=11) 
High variability only 
Three configurations: Two configurations: Three configurations 
Outer-loop learning 
AND 
Inner-loop learning 
AND 
Monitoring & reflection 
Outer-loop learning 
AND 
Inner-loop learning 
AND 
Monitoring & reflection 
Outer-loop learning 
AND 
User participation 
AND 
Group coordination 
AND 
Monitoring & reflection 
OR OR OR 
User participation 
AND 
Group coordination 
AND 
Monitoring & reflection 
Outer-loop learning 
AND 
User participation 
AND 
Group coordination 
AND 
Monitoring & reflection 
Outer-loop learning 
AND 
Inner-loop learning 
AND 
User participation 
AND 
Knowledge 
AND 
Monitoring & reflection 
  OR 
  Outer-loop learning 
AND 
Inner-loop learning 
AND 
Knowledge 
AND 
Group coordination 
AND 
Monitoring & reflection 
 
4.4. Discussion and conclusion 
 
 We began this paper by highlighting the centrality of learning-by-doing for 
dealing with uncertainty and complexity of SES management under global change. A 
long-held assumption among SES scholars has been that a structured cycle of exploratory 
management actions, sensing and evaluation of outcomes, and adjusting next actions 
based on learning is crucial for SES adaptability. However, after three decades of 
research on adaptive management, the question of what type of learning-by-doing is most 
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effective and under what conditions still remains largely unanswered. To help address 
that research gap, we turned to a laboratory behavioral experiment in which human-
subjects face a decision problem on collective management of an irrigation system under 
environmental uncertainty. We analyzed the experimental data to measure two outcome 
variables (group performance under environmental certainty and the robustness of group 
performance under environmental uncertainty) and six potential causal conditions 
associated with adaptive management during the stable rounds (inner- and outer-loop 
learning , user participation, knowledge-sharing, monitoring and reflection, and group 
coordination). Our objective was to find potential causal linkages between different 
configurations of the six conditions seen in the stable rounds and the two outcome 
variables. 
 Using fsQCA, we found the following causal configurations for group 
performance under environmental certainty: (1) "group coordination" combined with 
"user participation" and "monitoring and reflection" and (2) "inner-loop learning" 
combined with "outer-loop learning" and "monitoring and reflection." Two interesting 
points emerge: monitoring and reflection is a necessary condition for group performance, 
and one configuration involves active learning-by-doing while the other is based on tight 
group coordination and user participation.  
 We also found multiple causal configurations linked to robustness. When we 
included all groups in the analysis, robust groups are characterized by two logical 
configurations: (1) "inner-loop learning" combined with "outer-loop learning" and 
"monitoring and reflection" and (2) "group coordination" combined with "outer-loop 
learning", "user participation", and "monitoring and reflection." When we considered 
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only groups that faced the high-variability treatments, three causal configurations are 
found to be linked to robustness : (1) "group coordination" combined with "outer-loop 
learning", "user participation", and "monitoring and reflection", (2) "inner-loop learning" 
combined with "outer-loop learning", "user participation", "knowledge-sharing", and 
"monitoring and reflection", and (3) "inner-loop learning" combined with "outer-loop 
learning", "knowledge-sharing", "group coordination", and "monitoring and reflection". 
What we find interesting is that all logical configurations linked to the robustness of 
performance now contain "outer-loop learning" in addition to "monitoring and reflection". 
This implies that "outer-loop learning" is a necessary condition for robustness under 
environmental uncertainty. 
 Based on the results, we conjecture that that active explorative updating of 
underlying assumptions or social goals may be crucial for building SES adaptive capacity. 
When environmental conditions are stable, social groups may still be able to guide their 
SES to perform well without active learning-by-doing—as long as they are able to tightly 
coordinate for group strategies with active monitoring and reflection and user 
participation, they can still succeed. This may occur, for example, in a social group that 
settles early on shared goals and strategies and adheres to them by relying on constant 
reflection of outcomes and user participation. Updating of social goals and strategies may 
be rare in such a social group. However, as suggested by our results, such a group may be 
unable to adapt opportunely in times of environmental uncertainty. Because of the lack of 
experience with active learning-by-doing (in particular, outer-loop learning), such a 
group may not have developed enough flexibility or adaptive capacity to dynamically 
adjust their goals or strategies.  
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 To reiterate, groups that were able to maintain performance under environmental 
uncertainty shared one prior experience in common—they have often updated 
assumptions or goals that underlie their specific group strategies. That is, these groups 
not only coordinated to adapt their actions to better meet existing goals, but they also 
often ventured and revised the goals themselves. Such experience may have helped the 
exposed groups to build adaptive capacity required for dealing with environmental 
uncertainty. We argue that this empirical regularity is concordant with the notion of 
transformability in the resilience literature. Transformability, defined as the capacity to 
change system structure and identity and patterns of interactions (Walker et al. 2004, 
Folke et al. 2010), likely requires change in underlying assumptions or goals shared by 
social actors. Navigating SES through change and uncertainty often forces transformative 
capacity on the actors involved (Olsson et al. 2004, Scheffer and Westley 2007, Folke et 
al. 2010). Social groups that have not built transformative capacity through frequent 
outer-loop learning may be unable to break away from their conventional ways of 
thinking or goals in times of change and surprises. They may be unable to seize the 
window of opportunity to transform because of their lack of exposure to the outer-loop 
process.  
 A prime example of a group that actively engaged in outer-loop learning is group 
7. This group faced the high variability treatment in infrastructure decline, but still was 
able to performed well under both certain and uncertain conditions. The experimental 
data suggest that the group participants quickly tested the shared goals of maintaining the 
infrastructure near 100% efficiency and of equal sharing of water. In the subsequent 
rounds, they revised their goals: maintain the infrastructure at a moderate level 
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(somewhere around 81% efficiency) and use water equally and efficiently (everyone 
harvest water equally and player E always leave his or her gate open to prevent water 
wastage). Such experience may have helped them to build capacity to cope with 
environmental uncertainty in the latter rounds. This capacity was indeed demonstrated 
because the group participants later anticipated that a catastrophic infrastructure decline 
might be on way, and again revised their investment goal to 100% infrastructure 
efficiency. They reasoned that 100% efficiency would create more buffer to counter a 
potentially large decline in the infrastructure efficiency. This anticipatory thinking 
enabled the group to stay fairly robust through the unstable rounds. 
 Groups 6, 11, and 13 are examples of groups that were able to perform well 
without active learning under certainty but failed to achieve the same feat under 
uncertainty. The experimental data show that these groups experienced little or no outer-
loop learning during the stable rounds. They relied primarily on group coordination, user 
participation, monitoring and reflection, and/or inner-loop management learning to get 
through the stable rounds relatively well. However, these groups failed to maintain group 
performance under uncertainty because of their inability to adjust their group strategies. 
Their lack of experience with outer-loop learning may have caused this rigidity.  
 The causal configurations we identified (Table 4.3) also suggest that there may 
exist some substitutability relationship between different causal conditions. The causal 
configurations for robustness when both the high and low variability treatments are 
considered include (1) "inner-loop learning" combined with "outer-loop learning" and 
"monitoring and reflection" and (2) "group coordination" combined with "outer-loop 
learning", "user participation", and "monitoring and reflection." A comparison of these 
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two configurations might suggest that the combination of "group coordination" and "user 
participation" may be equivalent or substitutable to "inner-loop learning." This potential 
substitutability do make some sense: groups in which users actively participate in 
decision-making process and tightly coordinate for group strategies will likely try 
different strategies proposed by various group members (which is equivalent to inner-
loop learning). The causal configurations for robustness when only the high variability 
treatments are considered (Table 4.3) also suggest that "group coordination" and "user 
participation" may be equivalent or substitutable. This potential connection also makes 
some sense: presence of group coordination likely means that everyone is buying into the 
management system and is thus probably more motivated to contribute to the decision-
making process.  
 Finally, our research findings may have some implications to one related area of 
research. Recent years have witnessed the growing applications of the resilience 
paradigm to the management of critical infrastructure systems under uncertainty (e.g., 
Fiksel 2003, Hollnagel et al. 2006, McDaniels et al. 2008, Park et al. 2011, Chang et al. 
2014, Linkov et al. 2014). One of the key messages that have emerged from this line of 
research is that a recursive process involving sensing of outcomes, anticipation, 
adaptation, and innovation and  learning is crucial for adaptive management of complex 
infrastructure systems (Klein 2003, Gunderson 2010, Zhou 2010, Park et al. 2013). 
Because irrigation systems are a highly-engineered form of SES in which infrastructure is 
coupled to natural and social systems, our findings about the outer-loop learning may be 
also applicable to the adaptive management of critical infrastructure systems. 
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 To conclude, our results show that prior exposure to active outer-loop learning is 
a necessary condition for successful management of SES under environmental 
uncertainty. SES characterized by rigidity of social goals or underlying assumptions may 
be particularly more vulnerable when they are subjected to environmental shocks. We 
suggest that resilience practitioners and policy-makers interested in improving general 
resilience must consider fostering the culture of outer-loop learning in their SES. We also 
suggest some directions for the future studies. Our research relied on the experimental 
data from the undergraduate students of a U.S. university. Future studies may consider 
conducting a field experiment participated by real resource users and managers to 
incorporate more realistic contexts into the analysis. Power asymmetry among social 
actors may also be an important causal condition related to performance and robustness 
(Biggs et al. 2012). Future studies may devise an experiment with one additional 
experimental treatment: groups with significant power asymmetry among human-subjects 
and those with zero asymmetry in power.  
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
 
5.1. Summary of the research findings 
 
 Social-ecological systems (SES) are faced with two undeniable trends in the 
Anthropocene (Crutzen and Stoermer 2000), the era of domineering human influence on 
the Earth's ecosystem processes. On the one hand, SES have become increasingly 
populated with hard and soft human-made infrastructures that affect how humans benefit 
from and interact with the environment (Anderies et al. 2004, Anderies 2014a). On the 
other hand, global change issues have increased the complexity and uncertainty present in 
the dynamic elements of SES (Dietz et al. 2003, Polasky et al. 2011). A key challenge for 
sustainability is then how we can maintain the capacity of infrastructure-dependent SES 
to perform their intended functions in the face of change and surprise.  
 To help address this broader question, I tackled the following research questions 
throughout the thesis. First, how the designed features of physical or social infrastructure  
affect the incentives that users face in collective action problems associated with 
infrastructure maintenance and resource appropriation, and how such effects, in turn, 
influence the long-term dynamics of SES under global change? Second, in the face of 
uncertainty generated by global change, how can we guide adaptive management of 
infrastructure-dependent SES for more robustness? Below, I summarize my research 
findings.  
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 In Chapter 1, I used a stylized dynamic model of an irrigation system to examine 
how some of the designed features of irrigation infrastructure affect the long-term 
dynamics of social norm and system performance in the face of collective action 
problems and an external economic shock. The model results suggest that change in two 
designed features—asymmetric access to water and threshold of infrastructure 
maintenance—can cause regime shifts as well as a considerable alteration in robustness 
characteristics. When the model system's canal layout induces asymmetric access to 
water among farmers, there emerged a regime of economic inequality between upstream 
and downstream users. This supports the empirical regularity observed in field studies 
(e.g., Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson 2002). I also observed that the regimes of economic 
inequality, system collapse, and sustainability emerged, expanded, or shrunk as the 
threshold of infrastructure maintenance was varied. 
 In Chapter 2, I analyzed an existing case study of 89 self-governed forest 
commons (Kang 2001) to explore how connectedness among social units (a kind of social 
infrastructure) influenced the post-failure transformations of the commons under 
economic globalization. In particular, I focused on the effects of two structural properties 
of the social connectedness that had developed in each commons system as it adapted to 
local conditions: the number of horizontal links (the number of participating villages in a 
system) for joint collective action and the degree of cross-system links (the ratio of 
participating villages that are also part of another commons system). By conducting 
secondary analysis on Kang (2001)'s original data, I tried to uncover how the two 
structural properties affected the trajectories of transformation undergone by the systems 
under economic globalization. I found some evidence that while the degree of cross-
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system links is associated with desirable forms of transformation (e.g., maintenance of 
the forest commons, conversion to alternative social goods), the number of horizontal 
links is associated with undesirable forms of transformation (e.g., sell the forest commons 
and divide the proceeds from the sale among households).  
 In Chapter 3, I used an existing laboratory behavioral experiment (Anderies et al. 
2013a) to examine the question of how we can guide adaptive management of 
infrastructure-dependent SES for more robustness under uncertainty. In the experiment, 
human-subjects tackled a decision problem on collective management of an irrigation 
system under environmental uncertainty. I analyzed the contents of group communication 
and the decisions and outcomes of individuals to find configurations of conditions related 
to adaptability (types of learning-by-doing and supporting conditions such as user 
participation, knowledge-sharing, monitoring and reflection, etc.) that are causally linked 
to the robustness of group performance under environmental uncertainty. The results 
show that two conditions are necessary for robustness: active adjusting of assumptions or 
goals shared by human subjects and active monitoring and reflection of outcomes in 
previous rounds. 
 
5.2. Synthesis of the research findings 
 
 I now synthesize the research findings of the thesis. First, I was able to observe a 
pattern of robustness-fragility tradeoffs under different designed conditions of 
infrastructure in the SES I studied. In Chapter 2, it was found that lower thresholds of 
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infrastructure maintenance make the system more robust to system collapse, but in so 
doing inadvertently make the system more fragile to economic inequality (when 
combined with asymmetric access to water). It was also shown that the system output of 
infrastructure efficiency is more sensitive to the effects of wage shocks under lower 
maintenance thresholds. Conversely, higher thresholds of infrastructure maintenance 
make the system more robust to economic inequality, but at the same time cause the 
system to be more fragile to system collapse. Similarly, in Chapter 3, evidence suggests 
that a structural aspect of social connectedness that had helped villages to be better 
adapted to local conditions inadvertently caused their forest commons to be more fragile 
to undesirable forms of transformation in the current era of economic globalization. 
Horizontal links that were created among villages for beneficial purposes (i.e., economize 
the cost of managing large-scale commons) created fragility to undesirable forms of 
transformation because of higher transaction costs associated with maintaining those 
links. These fragilities were exposed when the economic salience of forest resources 
declined as a result of economic globalization.  
 These patterns of shifting fragilities are concordant with the fundamental property 
of robustness-fragility tradeoffs which is known to be present in all feedback systems 
(Csete and Doyle 2002). This property suggests that a system feature that contributes to 
controlling the sensitivity of a system output to a particular disturbance necessarily leads 
to hidden system fragilities to some unexposed disturbances. Because the SES that I 
examined in this thesis contain either hard or soft human-made infrastructures that are 
created for a purpose, it is unsurprising that hidden fragilities of these systems were 
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realized when they were exposed to novel conditions (see Janssen and Anderies 2007, 
Janssen et al. 2007 for other examples).  
 Second, the robust-yet-fragile nature of SES likely means that design for 
robustness is insufficient for sustaining complex SES in the face of uncertainty. The risk-
based engineering approach, which is a conventional method for attaining robustness, 
typically involves the following tasks: identify all possible threats and their probabilities 
and deploy some designed solutions to preemptively deal with the identified threats (Park 
et al. 2013, Linkov et al. 2014). However, given that global change issues generate 
irreducible amount of uncertainty in what kinds of shocks will be faced by SES in the 
long run, it is impossible for the risk-based approach to ensure robustness all the time. 
Further, any design fixes that we introduce to deal with a particular kind of shock will 
likely create hidden fragilities that will be materialized only when unforeseen shocks 
arrive at a later time. This means that the risk-based engineering approach of SES must 
be complemented by another approach that helps SES to build adaptability to deal with 
all types of shocks in the long-run (Park et al. 2013).  
 But how can we build such adaptability that gives rise to SES resilience or 
robustness? What kind of engineering or management approach is required to achieve it? 
To date, multiple heuristics or approaches have been proposed to implement adaptability 
in practice: adaptive management (Walters and Holling 1990), adaptive co-management 
(Armitage et al. 2009), robustness of SES approach (Anderies et al. 2013b), and 
resilience engineering of built systems for safety management (Hollnagel 2014). These 
approaches all emphasize one condition in common—centrality of learning for achieving 
adaptability. For example, Anderies et al. (2013b) suggest that social actors must 
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constantly monitor and learn about their SES and changing conditions and then 
dynamically modify their system by choosing which disturbances they want to be robust 
against and which fragilities they can live with at a particular point in time. Likewise, 
adaptive management highlights that learning is needed because knowledge about SES is 
often incomplete and change and surprise are inevitable in coupled social and ecological 
processes. It suggests that management experiments facilitate actors to learn about the 
consequences of exploratory management actions and to update existing strategies and 
assumptions, so that SES can persist through uncertainty. In addition to learning, these 
approaches also highlight the importance of several other conditions for achieving 
adaptability: participatory process, knowledge-generation, and monitoring and reflection 
for adaptive management or co-management (Armitage et al. 2009, Plummer et al. 2012, 
Fabricius and Cundill 2014), diversity and redundancy of system functions and 
modularity of system structure for robustness (Anderies and Janssen 2011), and the 
system capacity to respond to shocks, monitoring of system performance and 
environmental conditions, and anticipation for proactive adaptation for resilience 
engineering (Hollnagel 2014).  
 However, the evidence in support of these approaches does not indicate which 
specific combinations of the above conditions may be causally linked to enhanced 
adaptability (Biggs et al. 2012, Fabricius and Cundill 2014, Hollnagel 2014). Do all of 
such conditions must be present? Or, are certain combinations of them more crucial than 
others? In Chapter 4, I focused on a subset of the conditions thought to be related to 
adaptability (user participation, knowledge-sharing, monitoring and reflection, level of 
group coordination, and different types of learning-by-doing) and found that two 
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conditions may be necessary for achieving enhanced adaptability: active monitoring and 
reflection of past outcomes and learning-by-doing through outer-loop (frequent updating 
of underlying assumptions or goals). To sum it up, the risk-based engineering or 
management of SES is insufficient for ensuring sustainability under global change 
because of the robust-yet-fragile nature of SES. To overcome this problem, we need to 
improve system adaptability by investing in the social capacity to carry out constant 
monitoring and reflection of past outcomes and in the social capacity to flexibly adjust 
underlying goals or assumptions. 
 Third, design criteria for robust SES must consider the potential for robustness-
fragility tradeoffs associated with different design choices. The notion of robust-yet-
fragile nature of designed systems is obvious for physically built systems such as 
buildings, bridges, and jet airplanes. Engineers working with these systems routinely 
conduct risk analyses and simulations to explicitly consider how tradeoffs in system 
fragilities occur under different design choices. These considerations for tradeoffs allow 
engineers to build systems that remain robust in most of the circumstances. The same 
considerations for tradeoffs, however, are less obvious and  less appreciated for partly-
designed, complex SES that operate on much slower time scale and broader spatial scale, 
such as irrigation, forestry, and urban water systems. My thesis and the pioneering works 
by Anderies et al. (2004) and Janssen et al. (2007) make a strong point in this regard—
that most SES are infrastructure-dependent and thus exhibit the fundamental property of 
robustness-fragility tradeoffs.  
 Further, design criteria for robust SES must consider how designed aspects affect 
the social capacity to organize and maintain collective action. This capacity is, in turn, 
123 
probably tied to enhanced system adaptability. I argue that without the ability to organize 
and maintain collective action, the component parts of adaptability such as learning and 
anticipation will likely not function. Hence, to improve adaptability, designers of physical 
and social infrastructures must ensure that their design choices do not adversely affect the 
structure of incentives that users face in collective action situations. What is the nature of 
this structure of incentives? Which specific structural variables or micro-situational 
variables should we consider when making design choices? A useful starting ground is 
considering how designed aspects of infrastructure may affect some of the structural 
variables or micro-situational variables that are thought to be tied to collective 
action or durability of institutions (Agrawal 2002, Ostrom 2005b, Poteete et al. 2010). 
These variables include, for example, shape of production function, heterogeneity among 
participants, interdependency among participants, number of participants, ease of 
communication, information about past outcomes, freedom to enter or exit, and ease of 
monitoring and sanctioning, among others. For example, the design of production 
infrastructure can influence the structural variables of production function shape and 
interdependency among users. Likewise, the design of distribution infrastructure can 
influence the structural variables of heterogeneity, interdependency, and ease of 
monitoring and sanction among users. The design of social infrastructure (such as 
organizational form or social institutions) may also influence the structural variables of 
ease of communication, information about past outcomes, and freedom to enter or exit, 
among others. Because these structural variables influence the likelihood of individuals to 
solve collective action problems (and thus ultimately system-level adaptability), 
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engineers and policymakers responsible for designing physical and social infrastructures 
must carefully consider how their choices subtly influence these variables. 
 Finally, based on the SES I studied in this thesis, I highlight some designed 
aspects of physical and social infrastructure that I found to be crucial for collective action 
and SES adaptability. 
 Design choices for production infrastructure must foster an adequate level of 
interdependency among different user groups for achieving a productive outcome. 
Such interdependency is especially important when multiple user groups are 
heterogeneous in their capacity to compete for resources because of the nature of 
distribution infrastructure. If the interdependency is too strong, a system may 
become fragile to system collapse from opportunistic behavior. If the 
interdependency is too weak, a system may become fragile to economic 
inequality. 
 Design choices for social infrastructure must foster smaller user group size and 
more connections to outside systems. Smaller group size may reduce the 
transaction cost of maintaining collective action in a SES. More connections to 
outside systems likely generate more flows of knowledge and information, which 
likely help SES adaptability. 
 Design choices for production, distribution, or social infrastructure must facilitate 
monitoring and sanction, reflection of information on past outcomes, group 
communication, as well as group-level learning linked to active updating of 
underlying goals or assumptions. For example, shorter networks of distribution 
infrastructure facilitate monitoring and sanction, whereas long stretches of 
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distribution infrastructure may make the monitoring difficult. Creating a social 
infrastructure such as arenas for regular community meetings and participatory 
decision-making process may facilitate group communication and social 
flexibility to achieve active updating of underlying goals or assumptions. 
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A.1. Dynamics of the strategies 
 
N  farming households are spread across two villages (Village 1 and Village 2) 
that co-manage a single irrigation system. The number of households in each village is 
1N  and 2N , respectively, which satisfy 1 2N N N  . The irrigation system is governed 
by the following rules. Maintenance labor to be contributed by a farmer is proportional to 
his or her acreage. Water allocated to a farmer is proportional to his or her acreage, but 
only among the water rights holders. Only farmers who contributed labor to the 
infrastructure prior to the planting season obtain water rights. Farmers choose between 
two strategies: group-conformist (G) and opportunist (O). Gs follow and enforce the 
rules, and strive to maximize the total welfare of the two villages. Os break the rules and 
attempt to maximize individual net income. 
Our model tracks the fraction of Gs in Village i denoted by /Gi i iX N N . We 
define the total number of Gs as 1 2
G G GN N N  . Finally, the fraction of Os in Village i is 
1 /Oi i iX N N  . We used replicator equations below to track the fractions of the 
strategies in Villages 1 and 2.  
 1 1 1 1[ ]
GdX X
dt
     
 2 2 2 2[ ]
GdX X
dt
     
Here, Gi   is the payoff of G in Village i. The term i , the average payoff of a 
farmer in Village i, is given by (1 )G Oi i i i iX X     , where Oi  is the payoff of O in 
the same village.  
To explore the dynamics of our model system, we used XPPAUT, a software 
package specialized for studying non-linear dynamical systems. XPPAUT numerically 
derives local stability properties of equilibrium points, i.e., a set of system states ( 1X , 
2X  ) where the changes in 1X  and 2X  are zero as time is varied. Equilibrium points 
reveal the stable attractors of our model system.  
 
A.2. Infrastructure efficiency 
 
 Let ( )mI L  be the efficiency of the shared irrigation infrastructure, where mL  is 
the sum of maintenance labor provided by all farmers each year, i.e., m mL l . Farmers 
have to maintain the infrastructure each year (canals must be cleaned of silt and debris, 
and water diversion structures such as weirs must be repaired) to keep the irrigation 
infrastructure functional. A threshold of labor is assumed for the maintenance of 
infrastructure, i.e., little or no water is generated until the annual maintenance labor 
reaches a certain threshold (see Figure A.1 and the equation below). We use a piece-wise 
linear function to represent this maintenance threshold. Here, maxI  is the maximum 
infrastructure efficiency. The half-saturation point of labor ( ) and half-width of the 
threshold slope ( ) determine the threshold of maintenance (  ). When the 
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maintenance labor is in the range of mL      , the efficiency increases by 
/ 2maxI   per unit of mL . Below this range, the efficiency is zero. Above this range, no 
further efficiency is generated by adding more labor. Total irrigation water is given by 
( ) ( )mQ I L S t , where ( )S t  is the abundance state of a renewable water resources system 
such as river. In this study, ( )S t  is the main natural component of our model system and 
is assumed to be constant ( ( )S t S ), i.e., there is always a constant source of water from 
which farmers can divert water. Of course, ( )S t  can be more elaborate and have its own 
dynamics (i.e., rainfall, evaporation, etc.). We chose the simplest representation (
( )S t S ) because this allows us to focus on the effects of infrastructure design.  
 
 
m
m
m
0 0 L -
( ) ( ) L +
2
L L
max
m m
max
II L L
I

  

         

  

  
 
 
  
Figure A.1. Threshold and linear provision of infrastructure maintenance. Panel A shows 
a high-threshold infrastructure (a threshold public good). Panels B shows a low-threshold 
infrastructure (a linear public good).  
 
A.3. Income 
Each farmer is endowed with the same amount of available labor ( l ) each year. A 
farmer may appropriate a volume of water ( q ) from the system, and allocate labor among 
three kinds of work: farming ( fl ), maintaining infrastructure ( ml ), and outside 
employment ( el ) with wage rate w , i.e., f m el l l l   . Let ( , , )f i if f l q a  be a farmer's 
agricultural output in village i, which depends on the production inputs of farming labor (
fl ), irrigated water ( iq ), and acreage ( ia ) (lowercase symbols are individual-level 
quantities). We specify f  using a standard production function, 
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(1 )( ) ( )j k j kf i i if b l q r a
   , where b  is productivity coefficient for inputs of production, 
ir  is the amount of freely-available alternative water (e.g., rainfall) that a farmer receives, 
and j  and k  represent output elasticity of farming labor and irrigated water, 
respectively. A farmer's income from agricultural production is then given by pf , where 
p  is price per unit of agricultural yield. In addition, the income from outside 
employment is given by ewl , where ewl  is the wage rate for outside employment. A 
farmer total income in village i is then given by:  
 
 (1 )( ) ( )j k j ki f i i i epb l q r a wl       
 
Note that we assume each farmer is endowed with the same acreage ( ia ). This 
assumption is restrictive because farmers would likely be heterogeneous in their acreage 
in most irrigation systems. Nevertheless, this assumption enables us to focus on the 
effects of asymmetry in distribution infrastructure. Moreover, implementing asymmetry 
in acreage at individual level would require a different modeling approach such as agent-
based modeling. Future studies may focus on the interaction effects between asymmetries 
in acreage and distribution infrastructure using agent-based modeling.  
Similarly, the aggregate income of the two villages is given by:  
 (1 )( ) ( )j k j kf epb L Q R A wL
       
where the upper case symbols represent aggregate-level quantities.  
 
A.4. Optimal maintenance of infrastructure 
 
We used the method of Lagrange multipliers for constrained optimization to 
calculate the optimal values of total maintenance labor *mL , farming 
*
fL , and employment 
*
eL , that would maximize the aggregate income ( ) of the two villages. This problem 
can be express as follows:  
 1
,
max [ ( ) ] ; subject to:
f m
j k j k
f m e f m eL L
pbL I L S R A wL L L L L        ,  
where L  is the total available labor of the farmers in the two villages, i.e., 
1 2( )L N N l  . We assumed that each farmer is endowed with an equal amount of labor 
each year ( l ), and 1N  and 2N  represent the number of farmers in Villages 1 and 2, 
respectively. Note that we can rewrite the expression for   replacing eL  by m fL L L  . 
The optimization is performed for the three different regions of the infrastructure 
efficiency ( )mI L . In the following, we present the different optimal values of fL , mL , eL
, for these different regions.  
 Region I:  0 mL    ;  ( ) ( ) 0m mQ L I L S  .  
 Clearly, * 0mL  . This is because any maintenance labor in this region would not 
exceed the threshold (  ). As a result, the optimization problem becomes: 
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 1
,
max ; subject to:
f e
j k j k
I f e f eL L
pbL R A wL L L L      .  
Using the constraint, we can rewrite 1 ( )j k j kI f fpbL R A w L L
     . We then solve 
1 / 0fd dL   to obtain the following optimal values: 
1
* 1 1( / )j k k jfL jpbA R w
    , and 
* *
e fL L L  . The maximum value of the aggregate income is:  
 1 * *, ( ) ( )
j k j k
I max f fpbA L R w L L
     . 
When the return for wage labor is zero ( 0w  ), the optimal values become: * * 0m eL L  , 
*
fL L , and 1, j k j kI max pbA L R   .  
 
 Region II: mL      ;  ( ) ( ) ( )2
max
m m m
QQ L I L S L      , where 
max maxQ I S . 
The optimization problem in this region becomes:  
 1
,
max ( ) ;
2f m
k
j j kmax
II f m eL L
QpbL L R A wL             
subject to: , andf m e mL L L L L        
 
Using the equality constraint to set e f mL L L L   , we define the Lagrangian as 
follows:  
 1( , , ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
 
k
j j kmax
f m f m f m m
QL L pbL L R A w L L L L                   ,  
where   is the lagrange multiplier for the inequality constraint. To calculate the 
optimal values *fL  and 
*
mL , we solve the following set of equations:  
 0;
f mL L 
         
with the complementarity condition ( ) 0mL       and 0   to obtain the 
following values.  
When 0   (i.e., mL    ):  
1
1
*
2
 
k j k
max
f
kQjpbL A
w j
         
 , 
1
1 1
* 2 2
2
 
j j k
max
m
max max
kQR A jpbL
Q Q w j

             
    , and 
* * * e f mL L L L   .  
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The maximum value of the aggregate income can be calculated by substituting the 
optimal values:  
 1 * * * *, ( ) ( ) ( )2
k
j k j max
II max f m f m
QpbA L L R w L L L             .  
When 0w  , the optimal values become:  
 * * * *1 2( ) , , 0m f m e
max
j RL kL j L L L L
j k Q
          
 , and, 
 1 * *, ( ) ( )2
 
k
j k j max
II max m m
QpbA L L L R           .  
When 0   (i.e., mL     ); the optimal values will be equal to those for the 
region III that are presented next.  
 
Region III: mL L    ;  ( )m max maxQ L I S Q  .  
The optimal value of the maintenance labor is *mL    . The optimization 
problem then becomes:  
   1
,
max ; subject to:
f e
kj j k
I f max e f eL L
pbL Q R A wL L L L          . 
 
Using the constraint, the aggregate income becomes: 
 1 ( )kj kIII max fpbA Q R w L L          . We then solve for / 0III fd dL   to 
obtain the following optimal values:  
 
1
* ( )j k kmax
f
jpbA Q RL
w
     
  
 
1
* ( )j k kmax
e
jpbA Q RL L
w

        
  , and 
  1 * *, ( ) ( )kj k jIII max f max fPi pbA L Q R w L L       .   
When 0w  , the optimal values become: *mL    , * 0eL  , *fL L    , 
and  1, ( ) kj k jIII max maxpbA L Q R      .  
 
A.5. Strategy payoffs under upstream-downstream asymmetry 
 
Our model system is governed by the following rules. Maintenance labor to be 
contributed by a farmer is proportional to his or her acreage. Water allocated to a farmer 
is proportional to his or her acreage, but only among the water rights holders. Only 
farmers who contributed labor to the infrastructure prior to the planting season are given 
water rights. Farmers choose between two strategies: group-conformist (G) and 
opportunist (O). Gs follow and enforce the rules, and strive to maximize the total welfare 
of the two villages. Os break the rules and attempt to maximize individual net income. 
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Each G assumes everyone will contribute to the public infrastructure and 
contributes their proportionate share (1 / N ) of the optimal total maintenance labor ( *mL ), 
attempts to take only the allocated share (1/ GN ) of the total water (Q ), and allocates 
labor between farming and employment to maximize the total income. Gs also monitor 
for rule violations in their own Village i and the other village j ( i j ), and punish 
violators at a cost to themselves. The cost of enforcement for a G increases with the 
frequencies of opportunists, i.e.,    1 1s i o jX X       where s  and o  represent the 
maximum enforcement costs for the same village and the other village, respectively.  
Os contribute zero maintenance labor ( 0ml  ), and thus do not hold water rights. 
Nevertheless, they steal as much of other farmers' water as they can within the limits set 
by the penalties imposed, their relative capacity for competing for water in comparison to 
others, and the benefits to be gained by using the outside employment options. Os steal 
an amount of water and allocate the labor saved from skipping the maintenance work to 
other work (either more farming or employment labor) to maximize their individual net 
income. The probability of being caught and punished increases with the average 
frequency of Gs, i.e., ( ) / 2i jX X . The penalty varies by situation: it increases with the 
amount of water stolen ( Oq ), but decreases with water abundance in the system. When 
water is abundant, rule violations are tolerated because farmers have little incentives to 
concern themselves with equity issues. This effect is represented by 
*[1 ( ) / ( )] Om mQ L Q L q  ; where   is the maximum penalty, *( ) / ( )m mQ L Q L is the proxy 
for water abundance, and 1   is the tolerance factor. If 0  , farmers hardly tolerate 
water theft even if water is abundant.  
The payoffs of the two strategies in Village 1 are given by the following two 
equations.  
      1 1 1 1 1 2( ) ( ) 1 1 G G j G k Gf e s oc l q r w l X X             
    kO O j O O Om 1 21 1 f 1 1 e 1*
m
Q(L ) X +X=c (l ) q +r +w l - 1- q
Q 2
 
(L )
             
Likewise, the payoffs of the two strategies in Village 2 are given by the following 
two equations.  
      2 2 2 2 2 1( ) ( ) 1 1 G G j G k Gf e s oc l q r w l X X             
    kO O j O O Om 1 22 2 f 2 2 e 2*
m
Q(L ) X +X=c (l ) q +r +w l - 1- q
Q 2
 
(L )
             
Here, 1( ) j ki ic pb a
   , and * *( ) ( )m mQ L I L S  is the optimal total amount of water 
desired by the two villages, and ( ) ( )m mQ L I L S  is the total amount of water actually 
available in the system. The above payoff equations assume that all farmers share 
common knowledge on the water abundance proxy *( ) / ( )m mQ L Q L . Alternative 
formulations could be introducing heterogeneity into this awareness among farmers and 
adding non-linearity to the proxy. Such formulations would likely make the system 
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dynamics more interesting, possibly introducing additional bifurcations. Note that Gi   
could be negative if enforcement cost is larger than the combined farming and wage 
income. In such cases, we impose the condition that 0Gi  . Finally, we assume o s   
because a farmer's cost for monitoring own village should be cheaper than that for 
monitoring other village.  
For the analysis, we used a set of default model parameter values (Table A.5). 
Figure A.2 A and B are phase-space representations of the overall cooperation level of 
the system. Figure A.2 A suggests that, in the absence of asymmetry, two regimes 
typically emerge for most parameters explored: all Os (ALL-Os) and all Gs (ALL-Gs). 
There is no inequality in total income between Villages 1 and 2 in these two regimes. 
With asymmetry, however, three regimes are possible: ALL-Os; a sustainable situation in 
which most are Gs in Village 1, but all are Gs in village 2 (MOSTLY-Gs); and a 
decoupled situation in which the two villages stop collaborating for a common goal, i.e., 
Gs dominate in Village 1 but Os prevail in Village 2 (DECOUPLED) (Figure A.2 B).  
 
 
 
Figure A.2. Comparison of dynamics with and without upstream-downstream asymmetry. 
The x and y axes show the fractions of Gs in Village 1 ( 1X ) and Village 2 ( 2X ), 
respectively. Red dots represent stable equilibrium points of the dynamics. Arrows 
represent the flows of dynamics from particular initial states. Red and green lines 
represent 1X  and 2X  nullclines, respectively. Panel A shows possible dynamics when 
asymmetry is absent. Two regimes are possible: ALL-Os and ALL-Gs. Income inequality 
does not exist in these two regimes. Infrastructure is fully maintained at ALL-Gs, but the 
system collapses at ALL-Os. Panel B shows possible regimes under asymmetry: ALL-Os 
(light pink area), MOSTLY-Gs (light green area), and DECOUPLED (light blue area). At 
ALL-Os, the irrigation system collapses. At MOSTLY-Gs, most farmers follow the rules, 
water is almost fully supplied, and some income inequality exists between the villages. 
At DECOUPLED farmers in Village 2 leave farming, and considerable inequality in total 
income exists between Villages 1 and 2. Panel C shows a comparison of the three 
regimes shown in B (model with asymmetry) in terms of infrastructure efficiency and 
income inequality between Villages 1 and 2. Income inequality is computed by deriving 
gini-coefficients of total income between Villages 1 and 2. The default parameter values 
are: 0.2w  , 0.2  , 0.125 , 1maxI  , 100S  , 1a  , 1l  , 1 2 50N N  , 
0.05s   , 0.1o  , 1.4  , and 0.9  . 
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Figure A.2 C compares the three regimes of the asymmetric case in terms of 
infrastructure efficiency and inequality in total income. At ALL-Os, no water is supplied 
and everyone is equally bad off. At MOSTLY-Gs, water is almost fully supplied and the 
two villages have a roughly equal total income (but the income of Village 1 is somewhat 
higher than that of Village 2). At DECOUPLED, some water is supplied but considerable 
income inequality exists at village-level because only farmers in Village 1 obtain 
irrigated water. Farmers in Village 2 leave agriculture and resort to outside employment.  
In the following sub-sections, we specify the decisions of Gs and Os regarding 
their labor allocations and the amount of water they appropriate.  
 
 Case 1 ( mL    )  
When mL   , the optimal maintenance labor ( *mL ) is derived by solving the 
following maximization problem:  
 1
,
max [ ( ) ] ; subject to:
f m
j k j k
f m e f m eL L
pbL I L S R A wL L L L L        .  
A special case occurs when mL L    . In this situation, the optimal 
maintenance labor becomes *mL    .  
Without upstream-downstream asymmetry, the two villages have equal access to 
water. For simplicity, let us assume that within each village, farmers also have equal 
access. Here, farmers are symmetric in their capacity for competing for water because 
they all have equal access to water and are endowed with the same levels of available 
labor, technology, and skills. It follows that if all farmers are to rush and compete for 
water, they will face, on average, a constraint of /Q N  on the amount of water they 
obtain. Hence, Os in each village harvest water and allocate labor at levels that maximize 
their payoff subject to the conditions /Oiq Q N  and O Of el l l  . The total amount of 
water taken by Os in each village is  1O Oi i i iQ q X N   and we define 1 2O O OQ Q Q  . It 
follows, then, that Gs in each village obtain the amount of water given by 
/G O Giq Q Q N    , which is less than what they should receive ( / GQ N ).  
In the setting with upstream-downstream asymmetry, water is accessed 
sequentially—farmers in Village 1 access water before those in Village 2. Note that the 
total amounts of water appropriated by Gs and Os in Village i are given by 
 G Gi i i iQ q X N   and  1O Oi i i iQ q X N  , respectively. Because of their privileged 
access, Os in Village 1 are less constrained by the higher upper bound on the amount of 
water they can steal ( 1 1Q/N
Oq  ). At the same time, Gs in Village 1 rely on their 
upstream position to extract water to bring their actual amount as close as possible to 
allocated amount, i.e., 1 1 1min / , ( ) / )
G G O Gq Q N Q Q N     . It follows, then, that 
G O
2 1 1 2Q-Q -Q /N
Oq      is the upper bound on the amount of water that Os in Village 2 can 
steal. Finally, Gs in Village 2 obtain the amount 2 1 1 2 2/
G O G O Gq Q Q Q Q N      . Note 
that Os in Village 1 face an upper-bound on the amount of they obtain, i.e., 1/Q N . This 
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constraint derives from our assumption that both Gs and Os in Village 1 compete for 
water at the same time and they are symmetric in their capacity for competing for water 
(i.e., equal access to water and symmetry in available labor, technology, and skills). For 
the same reason, Os in Village 2 face an upper-bound on the amount of they obtain, i.e.,
1 1 1( ) /
O GQ Q Q N   .  
The actions stipulated by the rules and the actual actions of Gs and Os in Villages 
1 and 2 under the asymmetric setting are given in the following tables (when mL   ). 
Note that 1 2 *
( )1
2 ( )
m
m
Q LX X
Q L
           and the actual values of 1
Oq  and 2
Oq  should be 
below the specified limit, i.e.,  1 1/
Oq Q N and 2 1 2 2( ) /O G Gq Q Q Q N    . 
 
The values of ,
G
i fl  ( where 1,2i  , that refers to the village i are obtained by the 
following optimization problem:  
      
,
, ,max :G
i f
j kG G G
i i f i i i e
l
c l q r w l       
, , ,subject  to    
G G G
i f i e i ml l l l    
 
Table A.1. The decisions of Gs and Os in Village 1 for Case 1. 
Var. Rule Actual 
G
ml   
* 1
mL N
      
* 1
mL N
     
1
Gq   G
Q
N
  1
1
min ,
O
G G
Q QQ
N N
   
  
G
fl   N/A 
1
1
1 1 1( )
G k j
G
j c q r
w
   
  
G
el   N/A 
G
fl l   
O
ml   
* 1
mL N
      0   
1
Oq   G
Q
N
  
1
1 1
1 1
j j j k
O
k jc r
w
                
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O
fl   N/A 
1
1 1
1( / ) ( / )
O k k j kc j w k       
O
el   N/A 
O O
e fl l l    
 
 
Table A.2. The decisions of Gs and Os in Village 2 for Case 1. 
Var. Rule Actual 
G
ml   
* 1
mL N
      
* 1
mL N
      
2
Gq   G
Q
N
  1 1 2
2
O G O
G
Q Q Q Q
N
  
  
G
fl   N/A 
1
1
2 2 2( )
G k j
G
j c q r
w
   
  
G
el   N/A 
G
fl l   
O
ml   
* 1
mL N
      0   
2
Oq   G
Q
N
  
1
1 1
2 2
j j j k
O
k jc r
w
                
  
O
fl   N/A 
1
1 1
2 ( / ) ( / )
O k k j kc j w k       
O
el   N/A 
O O
e fl l l    
 
 
The values of 1, 1,
O O
fl q  can also be obtained by the following optimization problem:  
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   
1
1 2
1 1 1 1*,
( )max : 1
( ) 2O Of
j kO O O Om
f e
l q m
Q L X Xc l q r wl q
Q L
                
 
1
1
Qsubject  to   ;
N
  O O Of el l l q    
and that for 2, 2,
O O
fl q   from: 
    
2
1 2
2 2 2 2*,
( )max : 1   
( ) 2O Of
j kO O O Om
f e
l q m
Q L X Xc l q r wl q
Q L
                
  
O G
1 1
2
2
Q-Q -Qsubject to  ;
N
O O O
f el l l q    
 
 Case 2 ( 0 mL     )  
In this region, the maintenance labor is * 0mL  ; hence, *( ) 0mQ I L S  . This 
means that no irrigated water is produced in the system. As a result, water theft and rule 
enforcement do not exist. In this case, the payoffs of Gs and Os in Village i are modified 
to: ( , , )G G G Gi f i ef l q a wl    and ( , , )O O O Oi f i ef l q a wl   , respectively. The values of 1,Gfl , 
1,
O
fl , 2,
G
fl , and 2,
O
fl  can be derived by the following optimization (note that 0
G O
i iq q    
because there is no irrigated water):  
      
,
,max :I
i f
j kI I I
i i f i e
l
c l r w l      
, ,subjectto :
I I
i f i el l l   
 
where 1,2i    and ,I G O . The actions stipulated by the rules and the actual 
actions of Gs and Os in Villages 1 and 2 under the asymmetric setting are given in the 
following Tables (when 0 mL    )..  
 
Table A.3. The decisions of Gs and Os in Village 1 for Case 2. 
Var. Rule Actual 
G
ml   N/A 0 
1
Gq   N/A 0 
G
fl   N/A 
1
1
1 1( / )
k G jjc r w    
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G
el   N/A 1,
G
fl l   
O
ml   N/A 0 
1
Oq   N/A 0 
O
fl   N/A 
1
1
1 1( / )
k O jjc r w    
O
el   N/A 1,
O
fl l   
 
 
Table A.4. The decisions of Gs and Os in Village 2 for Case 2. 
Var. Rule Actual 
G
ml   N/A 0 
2
Gq   N/A 0 
G
fl   N/A   112 2 /k G jjc r w    
G
el   N/A 2,
G
fl l   
O
ml   N/A 0 
2
Oq   N/A 0 
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O
fl   N/A   112 2 /k O jjc r w    
O
el   N/A 2,
O
fl l   
 
A.6. Effect of maintenance threshold 
 
Figure A.3 shows that the maintenance threshold determines the dominance of the 
three regimes. As the threshold gets lower and gentler in slope (  approaches  ), ALL-
Os loses resilience, i.e., its basin of attraction shrinks. At the same time, MOSTLY-Gs 
emerges and expands. But this regime shift occurs at the cost of emergence of the 
DECOUPLED regime and more free riders in Village 1 of the MOSTLY-Gs regime (the 
red dot for MOSTLY-G moving to left as   approaches   in Figure A.3). The opposite is 
true when the threshold gets higher and sharper in slope (  approaches zero). These 
results suggest that low-threshold scalable systems (i.e.,  ) are less likely to collapse, 
but are more prone to economic inequality. Conversely, centralized capital-intensive 
systems (i.e., 0 ) are less likely to have inequality issues, but are much more likely to 
collapse.  
 
 
 
Figure A.3. Effect of maintenance threshold on system behavior. Note that half-saturation 
point of labor is 0.2, i.e., 0.2  . The three regimes shrink and expand as   is varied 
(Panels A to D). The small inset graphs next to the panel labels show the shape of the 
infrastructure-labor relation for each value of  . Except for the focal parameter, the same 
default parameter values were used as in Figure A.2. 
 
A.7. Parameters 
 
The parameters of output elasticities for labor, water, and acreage are set to 
0.3j  , 0.4k  , and 1 0.3j k   , respectively. These values reflect that the three 
inputs of production have more or less similar effects on agricultural yield. Agricultural 
yield is chosen as a numeraire good ( 1p  ). Wage is set low ( 0.2w  ) to represent that 
farmers have little opportunity cost for living as farmers, i.e., they live in isolated rural 
areas with little or no alternative options for livelihood other than farming. Number of 
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farmers or households in each village is set to a modest value ( 1 2 50N N  ). Half-
saturation point of mL  is set to 0.2 (20% of total labor) to represent that the irrigation 
infrastructure consumes a considerable amount of repair labor every year. Productivity 
coefficient for the inputs of production (b), acreage of farmer (a), and available labor per 
farmer (l) are all set to 1 to ease calculations. 
 
Table A.5. Default parameter values for the irrigation model. 
Symbol Definition Value(s) 
w Wage for outside employment. 0.2 
   Half-saturation point of mL  yielding / 2maxI   infrastructure 
efficiency. 
0.2 
   Half-width of the threshold slope for infrastructure maintenance. 0.125 
maxI   Maximum infrastructure efficiency. 1.0 
,j k   Output elasticities of farming labor and irrigated water for agricultural yield, respectively. 0.3, 0.4j k   
p Price per unit of agricultural yield. 1.0 
b Productivity coefficient for the inputs of production. 1.0 
ia   of farmer in Village i 1 2 1a a    
l Available labor per farmer. 1.0 
iN   Number of farmers in Village i. 1 2 50N N    
R Total amount of freely-available alternative water. 0 
ir   Amount of alternative water available to a farmer in Village i. 0 
,s o    Maximum enforcement costs for monitoring opportunists in the same village and the other village, respectively. 0.05, 0.1 
   Maximum penalty cost imposed on opportunists. 1.4 
   Tolerance for water theft shown by group-conformists when water is abundant in the system ( 1.0  ). 0.9 
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APPENDIX B 
 
B. SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 3 
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B.1. Forest growth in Geumsan from 1976 to 2010 
 
The overall forest cover of Geumsan, South Korea increased by a factor of 13.4 between 
1976 and 2010. 
 
Table B.1. Trends in forest cover in Geumsan from 1976 to 2010.  
Year Growing stock (m3) 
1976 
1995 
2000 
2005 
2010 
327,468 
1,116,566 
1,445,177 
2,559,201 
4,410,952 
Source: KFS 2013, KNSO 2013 
 
 
B.2. Model selection 
 
We studied the factors determining cooperative transformation by means of multivariate 
logistic-regression models. Contextual factors included two factors (spatial extent of 
villages and size of the resource system), four continuous variables (number of villages, 
existence of tenant fees, ratio of cross-institutional links, andtopographic location of 
villages), and one dichotomous variable (terrain of resource system). Our dependent 
variables (type of transformation) is dichotomous (1 if cooperative transformation and 0 
if non-cooperative transformation). See Table Table B.2 for the values given to each 
variable. 
 
Table B.2. Values of the contextual variables in songgye. 
Variables  Values 
Existence of tenant fees  1: annual tenant fees were collected 
0: otherwise 
Number of villages  Continuous. Range: 1‐39 
Ratio of cross‐institutional 
links 
Continuous. Range: 0‐1 
Spatial extent of villages  0: one village is involved; 
1: multiple villages are involved but all are situated within 
one sub‐district 
2: multiple villages are involved and are situated over 
multiple sub‐districts 
Size of resource system  0: 1‐10 hectares 
1: 11‐100 hectares 
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2: greater than 100 hectares 
Terrain of resource system  1: considerable dry‐field farming exists 
0: otherwise 
Topographic location of 
villages 
Continuous. Range: 0.05‐0.61 
 
We used a model selection approach  (Johnson and Omland 2004)to determine which sets 
of combinations of factors better explain cooperative transformation. We applied the 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) method to compare the fits of all possible 
combinations of explanatory variables (Burnham and Anderson 2002).AIC is calculated 
for a suite of models and the best-fitting model has the smallest AIC. The absolute size of 
the AIC is unimportant; instead the difference in AIC values between the best fitting 
model and the others models (i) indicates the relative support for the models. In order to 
compare models, we calculate Akaike weights (w) as the probability that a model would 
be selected as the best fitting model if the data were collected again under identical 
circumstances  (Burnham and Anderson 2002):  
 
ݓ௜ ൌ exp	ሺെ0.5 ∗ ∆௜ሻ∑ exp	ሺെ0.5 ∗ ∆௥ሻோ௥ୀଵ  
 
Where wi is the Akaike weights for model i; iis the different between the 
AIC of the best fitting model and that of model i. The numerator is the 
relative likelihood of the the model i. The denominator calculates the sum 
of the relative likelihoods for all candidate models.  
 
For the set of models, Akaike weights sum to 1. A model whose Akaike weight is close 
to 1 is unambiguously supported by the data  (Burnham and Anderson 2002). We 
consider as plausible models those with Akaike weights that are within 10% of the 
highest weight. We also calculated the relative variable importance as the sum of Akaike 
weights over all models including the explanatory variable. The relative variable 
importance is the probability that, of the variables considered, a certain variable is in the 
best approximating model. We calculated the model averaged estimates weighted by its 
Akaike weight  (Burnham and Anderson 2002). Model-averaged parameter estimates are 
only calculated for those independent variables that are included in the confidence set of 
models.  
 
All analyses were conducted using the R Project for Statistical Computing package, 
particularly applying the package MuMln.  
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APPENDIX C 
 
C. THE FUZZY-SET QCA RESULTS FOR CHAPTER 4 
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Table C.1. Fuzzy-set values of all conditions and the outcome for the group performance 
under environmental stability. See Appendix B for the definitions of the variables. 
Group #  Treatment  Outcome  Conditions
PERFORM  COORD INNER OUTER UPART KNOW  MOREF
1  I‐LV  0.99 0.67 1 1 1 0.33 0.67 
2  I‐LV  0.98 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.33 
3  I‐LV  0.92 0.67 0.67 1 1 0.67 0.67 
4  I‐LV  0.98 0.67 0.67 1 1 0.67 0.67 
5  I‐LV  0.01 0 0 0 0.33 0.33 0 
6  I‐HV  0.97 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.33 
7  I‐HV  0.98 0.67 0.67 1 1 1 0.67 
8  I‐HV  0.85 0.67 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.67 
9  I‐HV  0.99 0.67 1 1 1 0.33 0.67 
10  I‐HV  0.95 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.67 0.67 
11  I‐HV  0.98 0.67 0.33 0 0.67 0.33 0.67 
12  W‐LV  0.03 0 0 0.33 0.33 0.67 0 
13  W‐LV  0.96 0 0 0 0.67 0.33 0 
14  W‐LV  0.98 0.67 1 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.67 
15  W‐LV  0.99 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.67 0.67 
16  W‐LV  0.98 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.33 
17  W‐HV  0.94 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.33 
18  W‐HV  0.98 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.33 
19  W‐HV  0.98 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.33 
20  W‐HV  0.97 0.67 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.67 
21  W‐HV  0.99 1 0.67 1 0.67 0.67 1 
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Table C.2. Fuzzy-set values of all conditions and the outcome for the robustness of group 
performance under environmental uncertainty. See Appendix B for the definitions of the 
variables. 
Group #  Treatment  Outcome  Conditions
ROBUST  COORD INNER OUTER UPART KNOW  MOREF
1  I‐LV  0.99 0.67 1 1 1 0.33 0.67 
2  I‐LV  1 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.33 
3  I‐LV  0.96 0.67 0.67 1 1 0.67 0.67 
4  I‐LV  0.99 0.67 0.67 1 1 0.67 0.67 
6  I‐HV  0.32 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.33 
7  I‐HV  0.99 0.67 0.67 1 1 1 0.67 
8  I‐HV  0.51 0.67 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.67 
9  I‐HV  0.92 0.67 1 1 1 0.33 0.67 
10  I‐HV  0.89 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.67 0.67 
11  I‐HV  0.03 0.67 0.33 0 0.67 0.33 0.67 
13  W‐LV  0.01 0 0 0 0.67 0.33 0 
14  W‐LV  0.99 0.67 1 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.67 
15  W‐LV  0.99 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.67 0.67 
16  W‐LV  0.97 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.33 
17  W‐HV  0.77 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.33 
18  W‐HV  0.04 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.33 
19  W‐HV  0.22 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.33 
20  W‐HV  0.96 0.67 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.67 
21  W‐HV  0.84 1 0.67 1 0.67 0.67 1 
 
Table C.3. Truth table for the analysis of sufficiency for the group performance under 
environmental stability. 
COORD INNER  OUTER  UPART KNOW MOREF PERFORM N Consist. Group # 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 1 3,4,7,21 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 2,17,18 
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 3 1 1,9,14 
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 2 1 8,20 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 10,15 
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 16 
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 11 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.924433 19 
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0.875 13 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 0.818868 6,12 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.806452 5 
Cutoff consistency: 0.95 
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Table C.4. Truth table for the analysis of sufficiency for the robustness of group 
performance under environmental uncertainty. Both the high- and low-variability 
treatments (N=19)  are considered. 
COORD  INNER  OUTER  UPART KNOW  MOREF  ROBUST  N  Consist.  Group # 
1  1  1  1  1 1 1 4 0.941176  3,4,6,19 
1  1  1  1  0 1 1 3 0.934921  1,8,12 
1  1  1  0  1 1 1 2 0.911638  9,13 
0  1  1  0  0 1 1 1 0.896726  14 
1  0  1  1  0 1 1 2 0.885312  7,18 
0  1  1  1  1 1 1 3 0.880952  2,15,16 
0  0  1  0  0 1 0 1 0.793956  17 
1  0  0  1  0 1 0 1 0.735516  10 
0  0  0  0  1 1 0 1 0.681395  5
0  0  0  1  0 1 0 1 0.681395  11
Cutoff consistency: 0.85 
 
Table C.5. Truth table for the analysis of sufficiency for the robustness of group 
performance under environmental uncertainty. Only the high-variability treatments 
(N=11) are considered. 
COORD  INNER  OUTER  UPART KNOW  MOREF  ROBUST  N  Consist.  Group # 
1  1  1  1  1 1 1 2 0.896985  2,11
1  1  1  1  0 1 1 1 0.876133  4
1  1  1  0  1 1 1 1 0.862416  5
1  0  1  1  0 1 1 2 0.828313  3,10
0  1  1  1  1 1 1 2 0.794521  7.8
0  0  1  0  0 1 0 1 0.716981  9
1  0  0  1  0 1 0 1 0.647651  6
0  0  0  0  1 1 0 1 0.647651  1
Cutoff consistency: 0.75 
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Table C.6. Tests for the analysis of sufficiency for the two outcome variables. Tests for 
the analysis of sufficiency cover group performance, the robustness of group performance 
based on high- and low-variability treatments, and the robustness of group performance 
based on high-variability treatment only. 
Presence of outcome  fsQCA results
Performance (N=21)  Intermediate solution:
INNER*OUTER*MOREF 
COORD*UPART*MOREF 
 
Solution  Coverage: 0.635870 
Solution  Consistency: 0.999146 
Robustness: 
High‐ and low‐variability 
(N=19) 
Intermediate solution:
INNER*OUTER*MOREF 
COORD*OUTER*UPART*MOREF 
 
Solution  Coverage: 0.750560 
Solution  Consistency: 0.910326 
Robustness: 
High‐variability (N=11) 
Intermediate solution:
COORD*OUTER*UPART*MOREF 
INNER*OUTER*UPART*KNOW*MOREF 
INNER*OUTER*COORD*KNOW*MOREF 
 
Solution  Coverage: 0.787365 
Solution  Consistency: 0.848837 
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APPENDIX D 
 
D. CODING PROTOCOL FOR CHAPTER 4 
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I. Outcome variables 
 
1. Group  performance under environmental stability (PERFORM) 
 
The number of tokens earned by groups in rounds 6 to 10 is our base measure for group 
performance under environmental stability. The mean and the median values of this 
measure are 249 and 268 tokens, respectively, with the minimum of 58 and the maximum 
of 301, i.e., a left-skewed distribution. Among 21 groups, 16 earned at least 250 tokens or 
more during that round interval. Hence, we decided that the total earnings of 250 tokens 
is the threshold for high group performance. For the threshold of poor group performance, 
we used our subjective judgment to set that total earnings below 100 tokens clearly 
indicate poor performance. This threshold is consistent with the two groups that plainly 
failed in maintaining the irrigation system (groups 5 and 12). These two groups earned 
less than 100 tokens. We used these two thresholds to calibrate the measure to a 
continuous  scale  of  0–1.0 (0 being 'clearly low performance'; 1.0 being 'clearly high 
performance'). We used the calibration function of fs/QCA (a software tool for QCA 
analysis developed by Charles Ragin) to calibrate the measure into that continuous scale. 
 
2. Robustness of group performance under environmental uncertainty (ROBUST) 
 
The ratio of group earning from water harvest in rounds 11 to 15 (rounds with uncertainty) 
to that in rounds 6 to 10 (rounds with stability) is our base measure for robustness of 
group performance under environmental uncertainty. The ratio values around 1.0 indicate 
little or no change in group performance under uncertainty. If the ratio is considerably 
below 1.0, it means a large drop in group performance under uncertainty. Barring the two 
groups that performed poorly in rounds 6 to 10 (groups 5 and 12), the mean and the 
median values of the ratio are 0.82 and 0.86, respectively, with the maximum of 1.06 and 
the minimum of 0.36. Here, we used our educated judgment to define the thresholds for 
'clearly robust' and 'clearly fragile' outcomes. We decided that a ratio value above 0.9 
indicates a 'clearly robust' outcome, i.e., 10% or less drop in performance under 
uncertainty. It was also decided that a ratio value below 0.5 indicates a 'clearly fragile' 
outcome, i.e., 50% or more drop in performance under uncertainty. We used these two 
thresholds to calibrate the measure to a continuous  scale  of  0–1.0 (0 being 'clearly 
fragile'; 1.0 being 'clearly robust'). We used fs/QCA to do the calibration. 
 
II. Coding of the causal conditions at the round-level 
 
1. Group coordination 
 
Analyze both actual actions (how much tokens are invested and how much tokens are 
earned from water harvest) of group participants and group communication content in a 
given round. If the data suggest that three or more participants followed shared strategies 
for both investment and harvest decisions, we assume that group coordination exists in 
that round.  
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Consider the following example. If group participants proposed for investment of 5 
tokens and 10-tokens-worth of harvest during group chat session of previous round(s) and 
their actual actions show that three or more of them followed BOTH proposals (see the 
table below), we assume that group coordination exists in that round. 
  Tokens for investment  Tokens earned from harvest 
Participant   A  B  C  D  E  A  B  C  D  E 
Decisions  5  5  4  5  5  15  10  10  10  4 
 
Consider another example. If group participants proposed for investment of 5 tokens and 
10-tokens-worth of harvest during group chat session of previous round(s) and their 
actual actions show that three or more of them followed ONLY one of the proposals (see 
the table below), we assume that group coordination does not exist in that round. 
  Tokens for investment  Tokens earned from harvest 
Participant   A  B  C  D  E  A  B  C  D  E 
Decisions  5  5  4  5  5  15  15  10  4  4 
 
Consider the same example. If actual actions of group participants show that three or 
more of them followed NEITHER of the proposals (see the table below), we assume that 
group coordination does not exist in that round. 
  Tokens for investment  Tokens earned from harvest 
Participant   A  B  C  D  E  A  B  C  D  E 
Decisions  1  3  4  5  5  15  15  10  4  4 
 
Some caveats or exceptions apply: 
a) If some participants invest slightly more or slight less tokens than others based on 
voluntary decision or approval from others (if plans for such deviations are stated 
during group discussion and done to complement shared strategies), their 
decisions are still counted toward group coordination. 
b) Exclude cases where upstream participants (A, B, and C) and downstream 
participants (D and E) are in conflict (participants A, B, and C invest a same 
amount of tokens but downstream participants invest little or none in retaliation). 
c) Exclude cases in which three or more participants harvested for 4 tokens (unless 
there is clear sign of reduced water delivery capacity).  
d) Consider for rotating investments, e.g., participants agree to alternate who invest 
more in a round (investment amounts don't have to be exact as long as alternating 
pattern is observed). 
 
2. Inner-loop management trial and learning 
 
Presence of a group strategy adhered by participants and whether there is a change in 
such a shared strategy are a sign of inner-loop management trial and learning. If the 
experimental data show that the majority of participants in a group (three or more 
participants) follow a same rule for either investment or harvest decision in a given round, 
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we assumed that a group strategy is present in that round. If there is a change in such a 
group strategy to better meet an existing goal, an inner-loop trial may be in play.  
 
Group action Cues for inner-loop management trial and learning 
Investment Any change in the number of tokens invested for infrastructure in group 
strategy to better meet an existing goal (e.g., group strategy switches to 
'each must invest 5 tokens' from 'each must invest 8 tokens' in the 
previous round to achieve 66% infrastructure efficiency). 
Harvest Any change in the following aspects of group strategy for water harvest to 
better meet an existing goal.  
1) How much to harvest. 
 Time‐based (e.g., harvest for 10 seconds). 
 Quantity‐based (e.g., stop at 250 units of water, stop at 
earning 10 tokens). 
2) Method of harvest. 
 Sequential: Players take sequential turns in opening gates to 
harvest water  
 Rotation: Players rotate which player(s) get most of the water 
in a given round 
3) Order of harvest. 
 Forward: Harvest from participant A to participant E. 
 Reverse: Harvest from participant E to participant A.  
4) Special rules. 
 Water wastage prevention: Participant E always leaves gate 
open . 
 Rotate extra water: Rotate which player(s) get little more 
water in a given round. 
 
Some caveats or exceptions apply: 
a) A coordinated group action may exist and change without a clear reference to 
underlying assumption or social goals. We do not count that situation as an inner-
loop trial.  
b) If group participants adopt a strategy for rotation in investment or harvest levels, 
we do not count it as an inner-loop trial even if amount of investment or harvest 
constantly changes every round.  
 
3. Outer-loop management trial and learning 
 
Outer-loop management trial and learning can be detected when the experimental data 
show that group strategies for either the investment or water harvest decision is revised or 
updated to meet a new social goal. 
 
Group action Types of underlying assumption or social goal 
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Investment The following types of assumption or goals are generally observed as 
group participants deliberate for investment decision. 
1)  Invest for high infrastructure efficiency: Participants aim to 
reach and stay around 100% infrastructure efficiency. 
2) Invest for optimal infrastructure efficiency: Participants aim to 
reach and stay around 66~70% infrastructure efficiency. 
3) Invest for moderate infrastructure efficiency: Participants aim to 
reach and stay somewhere between 66~70% and 100% 
efficiencies. 
4) One of above three & proportional investment: Participants 
expect those with slightly more or less water harvest should be 
compensated by investing slight more or less. 
5) Invest for robustness: Participants aim to invest more tokens 
than usual to prepare for a catastrophic damage to the 
infrastructure.  
6) None 
Water harvest The following types of assumption or goals are generally observed as 
group participants deliberate for water harvest decision. 
1) Equal harvest: Participants aim to harvest an equal amount of 
water. 
2) Equal harvest & Efficiency: In addition to harvesting water 
equally, participants want to reduce or prevent water wastage 
(i.e., unused water that exit the system). 
3) Proportionality: Participants generally agree those who do not 
invest should get zero water or vice versa (e.g., I am not 
investing, so I am OK with getting little or no water). 
 
Some caveats or exceptions apply: 
a) Repeatedly going over 100% for the infrastructure efficiency likely means that 
there is no underlying assumption or social goal for investment. 
b) We assume that underlying assumption or social goals tend to have continuing 
presence once established. Hence once we detect a clear sign of assumption or 
goal in a round, we assume that it is present in the subsequent rounds unless we 
clearly see that there is a change. 
 
4. User participation 
 
Analyze the content of group communication to assess user participation in decision-
making process in a given round. If two or more participants propose an unique group 
strategy for either investment or harvest decision (irrespective of whether or not such a 
proposal is followed by others), we assume that multiple users are participating in the 
decision-making process in that round. For example, statements like "we should invest 5 
tokens each" may count as a proposal. Repeating the proposals mentioned by others do 
not count as an unique proposal. Note that we only consider proposals for shared group 
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strategy, not plans for individual actions. For example, statements like "I will invest 5 
tokens" don't count as a proposal for group strategy, unless the context of the group 
discussion shows that such a statement is really intended for group strategy. 
 
5. Knowledge-sharing 
 
Analyze the content of group communication to assess the presence of knowledge-
sharing in a given round. Shared knowledge can be about rules about the experiment, 
insight about how the experiment should be played, and any answer given to a question 
(investment or harvest-related) raised by participants during group discussion.  For 
example, statements like "it could be at 80% or 90% efficiency and still be ok" count as a 
knowledge-sharing for investment decisions. 
 
6. Monitoring and reflection 
 
Analyze the content of group communication to assess the presence of monitoring and 
reflection. If a participant makes comments related to the following items, we count it as 
a sign of monitoring and reflection in that round: 
 
a) Outcomes or behaviors of individuals or the whole group (e.g., "A is hogging 
water", "that was a bad round", "it didn't work") 
b) Current biophysical conditions (e.g., "current infrastructure efficiency is 55%") 
c) Raising issues or trying to correct mistakes or opportunistic behaviors of specific 
individuals (e.g., " hey A, close your gate ", " I'm not investing because upstream 
guys are not giving us water"). 
 
III. Aggregating the round-level coding results 
 
1. Does this group have tight group coordination (COORD)? 
(0=No, 0.33=More no than yes, 0.67=More yes than no, 1.0=Yes) 
 
Count the number of rounds with group coordination (among rounds 1 to 10 and the last 
practice round). Divide this count by 11 to derive average group coordination per round. 
 
If this average is in the interval [0, 0.165), result is 0.  
If this average is in the interval [0.165, 0.495), result is 0.33.  
If this average is in the interval [0.495, 0.835), result is 0.67. 
If this average is in the interval [0.835, 1], result is 1.0. 
 
2. Does this group actively engage in inner-loop management trial and learning (INNER)? 
(0=No, 0.33=More no than yes, 0.67=More yes than no, 1=Yes) 
 
Count the number of rounds with inner-loop management trial and learning (among 
rounds 1 to 10 and the last practice round). Divide this count by 11 to derive average 
inner-loop trial per round. 
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If this average is in the interval [0, 0.165), result is 0.  
If this average is in the interval [0.165, 0.495), result is 0.33.  
If this average is in the interval [0.495, 0.835), result is 0.67. 
If this average is in the interval [0.835, 1], result is 1. 
 
3. Does this group actively engage in outer-loop management trial and learning (OUTER)? 
 (0=No, 0.33=More no than yes, 0.67=More yes than no, 1=Yes) 
 
0 if one of the following conditions are met: 
 There was no change in general strategy in the rounds. 
 There was only one change in appropriation general strategy (only "Equal" 
appears) in entire rounds (P2-R10). 
 
0.33 if the following condition is met: 
 There was little or no change in general strategy in early rounds (P2-R5) . 
However, in later rounds (R6-R10), there was one or two changes in general 
strategy. 
 
0.67 if the following condition is met: 
 There were changes in BOTH appropriation and provision general strategies in 
early rounds (P2-R5). However, in later rounds (R6-R10), there was no change in 
general strategy. 
 
1 if the following condition is met: 
 There were changes in BOTH appropriation and provision general strategies in 
early rounds (P2-R5). In later rounds (R6-R10), there were one or two changes in 
general strategy. 
 
4. Does this group have active user participation (UPART)? 
 
Count the number of rounds with user participation (among rounds 1 to 10 and the last 
practice round). Divide this count by 11 to derive average user participation per round. 
 
If this average is in the interval [0, 0.165), result is 0.  
If this average is in the interval [0.165, 0.495), result is 0.33.  
If this average is in the interval [0.495, 0.835), result is 0.67. 
If this average is in the interval [0.835, 1], result is 1. 
 
5. Does this group actively share knowledge (KNOW)? 
 
Count the number of rounds with knowledge-sharing (among rounds 1 to 10 and the last 
practice round). Divide this count by 11 to derive average knowledge-sharing per round. 
 
If this average is in the interval [0, 0.165), result is 0.  
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If this average is in the interval [0.165, 0.495), result is 0.33.  
If this average is in the interval [0.495, 0.835), result is 0.67. 
If this average is in the interval [0.835, 1], result is 1. 
 
6. Does this group monitor and reflect on outcomes (MOREF)? 
 
Count the number of rounds with monitoring and reflection (among rounds 1 to 10 and 
the last practice round). Divide this count by 11 to derive average monitoring and 
reflection per round. 
 
If this average is in the interval [0, 0.165), result is 0.  
If this average is in the interval [0.165, 0.495), result is 0.33.  
If this average is in the interval [0.495, 0.835), result is 0.67. 
If this average is in the interval [0.835, 1], result is 1. 
 
 
